Fraser of Allander Institute : Economic Commentary [November 2014] by Fraser of Allander Institute
Fraser of Allander Institute (2014) Fraser of Allander Institute : Economic 
Commentary [November 2014]. [Report] , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/62019/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Vol 38 No. 2 In association with
Fraser of Allander Institute
Economic Commentary
  
 
Fraser of 
Allander  
Institute 
Economic  
Commentary 
 
Vol 38 No 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 University of Strathclyde, 2014 
 
The University of Strathclyde is a charitable body, 
registered in Scotland, number SC015263 
 
ISSN 2046-5378 
 
 
 
 
The Scottish economy 
 
Outlook and appraisal ............................................................... 2 
Forecasts of the Scottish economy ......................................... 24 
Review of Scottish Business Surveys ..................................... 33 
Scottish Labour Market ........................................................... 37 
Editorial Introduction ............................................................... 49 
 
Economic perspectives* 
The post-crisis labour market and the challenges to 
policymakers  
  Julia Darby & Stuart G. McIntyre ........................................... 51 
 
Labour market changes and implications for policy 
and labour market information (LMI) in Scotland 
  Stephen Boyd ....................................................................... 63 
 
The development of Scottish economic statistics 
  Mairi Spowage ...................................................................... 81 
 
‘Nowcasting’ the Scottish economy 
  Grant J. Allan, Gary Koop,  
  Stuart G. McIntyre and Paul Smith,  ...................................... 93 
 
The role of sales and acquisitions in company growth 
in Scotland 
  Paul Hopkins and Kenny Richmond ...................................... 96 
 
Determinants of European national men’s football 
team performance:  Scotland’s potential progress in 
the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers 
  N Scelles and W Andreff ..................................................... 108 
 
Policy section  
The Scottish NHS: meeting the financial challenge 
ahead 
  James Barbour, Alec Morton, Laura Schang  ...................... 126 
 
It all depends on your perspective: economic 
perceptions and the demography of voting in the 
Scottish Independence Referendum 
  John Curtice  ....................................................................... 147 
 
The fate of the UK’s single market: the issue that the 
referendum campaigns failed to address and how it 
shaped the outcome  
  Alf Young  ........................................................................... 153 
 
*Opinions expressed in the policy section and economic 
perspectives are those of the authors and not necessarily 
those of the Fraser of Allander Institute 
 The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary was first published in 1975.  The association between PwC and 
the University of Strathclyde’s Business School provides the Fraser of Allander Institute with the support to 
publish the Commentary, and is gratefully acknowledged.  The Fraser of Allander Institute is a research unit 
within the Department of Economics at the University of Strathclyde in Glasgow.  The Institute carries out 
research on the Scottish economy, including the analysis of short-term movements in economic activity.  Its 
researchers have an international reputation in modelling regional economies and in regional development.  
The Institute is able to undertake one-off research projects by private and public sector clients.  If you would like 
further information on the Institute’s research or services, please contact the Institute Administrator on 0141 548 
3958 or email the Institute at fraser@strath.ac.uk.  
 
The Fraser of Allander Institute was established in 1975 as a result of a donation from the Hugh Fraser 
Foundation.  We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Buchanan and Ewing Bequest towards the 
publication costs of the Commentary.  
 
PwC in Scotland supports the production of the Economic Commentary and has no control of its editorial 
content, including, in particular, the economic forecasts.  PwC in Scotland produces its own regular review of 
UK and international economic prospects, the next issue of which is published on their website 
http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/uk_economic_outlook.html 
 
The editor welcomes contributions to the Commentary’s Policy and Economic Perspectives sections. Material 
submitted should relate predominantly to the Scottish economy (or regional economies) and/or have a wider 
Scottish public policy interest. Contributions should be written in an intelligible style for a non-technical and 
informed readership. Contributions should be submitted to Kevin D Kane, Managing Editor, Fraser of Allander 
Economic Commentary at k.kane@strath.ac.uk. Articles accepted for publication should be supplied in 
electronic form and conform to the guidelines available from Isobel Sheppard at fraser@strath.ac.uk . Opinions 
expressed in the Policy and Economic Perspectives sections are those of the authors and not necessarily those 
of the Fraser of Allander Institute. The copyright for all material published in the Economic Commentary rests 
with the University of Strathclyde, permission to quote is freely given provided full citation is given. If you wish to 
receive copies of press releases and be kept informed of other publications from the Commentary, please click 
on the following link: http://www.sbs.strath.ac.uk/apps/fraser-commentary and complete the registration form. 
 
Announcement: digitisation of historical issues of the Fraser Economic Commentary 
The Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary (formerly known as the Quarterly Economic Commentary) has been published 
digitally since 2001.  The Commentary, however, has an archive stretching back to 1975 and, unlike many journals today, 
much of this archive still remains in hardcopy only, thereby restricting its accessibility over the Internet. 
 
In 2015 the Commentary will celebrate its 40th year of publication.  To celebrate this milestone it is the intention of the Fraser 
of Allander Institute that all historic issues of the Commentary be digitised and made accessible via the Institute’s website and 
an associated digital repository.  These digitised articles will form an important part of the anniversary celebrations whilst 
simultaneously widening public access to a significant scholarly resource. 
 
Those who have contributed articles to the Commentary over the years may be notified directly about this digitisation activity 
over coming months; however, owing to difficulties sourcing contact details for historical authors, it may not be possible to 
contact everyone.  If you have not been contacted and are the author of an article(s) that you do not wish to be included in 
this digitisation activity, please contact openaccesspublications@strath.ac.uk with details of the article(s) in question.  To 
ensure that digitisation can be completed by the anniversary date we would request that all such articles are registered at the 
above noted email address by Friday 29th August 2014.  The Fraser of Allander Institute would also like to take this 
opportunity to apologise in advance to those authors whom we have been unable to notify and whose work is subsequently 
digitised. 
 
General queries concerning the planned digitisation work can also be directed to openaccesspublications@strath.ac.uk. 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Strathclyde 
Sir William Duncan Building 
130 Rottenrow 
Glasgow G4 0GE 
t:  +44 (0) 141  548 3958    
f:  +44 (0) 141  548 5776 
e:  fraser@strath.ac.uk 
w: http://www.strath.ac.uk/fraser/ 
 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2) Outlook and appraisal 
 
November 2014  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Scottish economy 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2) Outlook and appraisal 
 
November 2014  2 
1 Outlook and appraisal 
Brian Ashcroft, Economics Editor, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Overview 
The Scottish economy delivered strong economic growth in the first half of the year in the run up to the 
referendum but there are signs that growth may be beginning to slow. Growth in the wider global 
economy and the UK economy appears also to have begun to slow recently. The IMF Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde fears we may be entering a phase of weak growth which she has called the ‘new 
mediocre’. Others such as ex US Treasury Secretary and leading economist Larry Summers go further 
and argue that the world economy now faces a situation of secular stagnation, a permanent deficiency of 
demand – caused, for example, by a permanent slow-down in the growth of working population - which 
can’t be overcome even with near-zero interest rates. The recent indicators of slowing demand both at 
home and abroad, falling real wages, rising levels of household debt, the prospect of more substantial 
UK fiscal austerity to come, and the deeper concerns about secular stagnation raise several questions. 
Questions that can be posed but cannot be definitively answered, such as whether the Scottish and UK 
economies are now poised for a period of slower but sustainable growth, or whether growth will slow and 
then slip back into recession? Are we at a turning point or are we on a knife-edge? 
The Nobel Laureate economist Paul Krugman has recently argued that if we are faced – as we are - with 
a persistent shortfall in demand then Government measures to boost spending including sustained 
spending on public works are appropriate. And borrowing can finance such investment because we 
should be less concerned about borrowing and the level of public debt when interest rates are likely to 
remain low and close to zero for a long period. The IMF in its October 2014 World Economic Outlook 
echoed Krugman by urging Governments to undertake increased public infrastructure investment. Such 
investment the IMF argued raises output in both the short and long term, particularly during periods of 
economic slack and when investment efficiency is high. So, in countries with infrastructure needs, it 
considered the time was right for an infrastructure push as borrowing costs are low and demand is weak. 
Debt-financed projects could have large output effects without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio, if clearly 
identified infrastructure needs are met through efficient investment. 
The Outlook shows that the estimated quality of UK infrastructure overall has been improving in recent 
years but still remains below that of the major advanced countries - Germany, France, Japan and 
Canada. The July 2013 report of the McKinsey Global Institute highlighted infrastructure investment as 
one of the top 5 catalysts for economic growth. It is also a major factor in the attraction of foreign 
investment. The UK Government appears to agree since at the time of writing it is unveiling plans for 
£15 billion of new infrastructure projects this week to make it “easier than ever” to invest in the UK. Such 
public investment is to be welcomed. However, we contend that in the light of slowing growth, the risks 
of secular stagnation, the need to boost competitiveness, net trade and inward foreign investment, that 
there is strong case that Government, and the UK Government in particular, should invest much more in 
infrastructure in and for Scotland. For example, more needs to be done to improve the infrastructure of 
road and rail, especially, between Scotland and the UK. Raising the borrowing levels available to the 
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Scottish Government would also help to support and encourage its own plans for infrastructure 
investment within Scotland.  An expanded programme of public investment would appear to be essential 
when the real volume of private investment continues to be markedly below pre-recession peak levels in 
both Scotland and UK, even though private investment has picked up in recent quarters. 
With the signs that the growth of productive activity may be slowing, we note also the strong 
performance of the Scottish labour market in recent months, with 52,000 jobs created over the year and 
unemployment on the ILO measure falling to 151,000 or 5.5%. However, despite the strong recent 
‘headline’ recovery in the labour market, we are still some way from the conditions that maintained prior 
to the start of the Great Recession. Much of the recovery in jobs has been driven by the growth of part-
time and self-employment. Full-time employment still remains considerably below its pre-recession peak, 
although there has been some pick up in recent quarters. An indication that there is still a deficiency of 
demand in the Scottish labour market, irrespective of whether the shift to part-time and self-employment 
is structural or cyclical, is provided by data on the number of weekly hours worked. These data show 
that the total number average weekly hours worked is at the latest data point -2.4% below the pre-
recession peak. Finally, when jobs are compared to the potential labour supply as measured by the 
employment to adult population ratio we find that by June-August 2014, the ratio stood at -1.5% below 
the pre-recession peak, compared to -5.7% at the trough of the recession. This suggests that even when 
we consider jobs alone and not hours worked there is still plenty of slack in the Scottish labour market 
compared to the pre-recession peak, despite the recent strong jobs recovery. (The post-crash labour 
market is the subject of two articles in this Commentary).  
It is against this background that we have prepared our latest forecasts. We are now forecasting GDP 
growth in Scotland of 2.7% in 2014, 2.2% in 2015, and 2.1% in 2016. Given our previous forecast errors 
the lower and upper bounds for growth in 2014 are expected to be 2.4% and 3.0%, for 2015, 1.7% to 
2.7%, and for 2016, 1.0% to 3.2%. We have therefore revised up our forecast for 2014 from 2.5% to 
2.7% due to the strong growth in the first half of the year. We have held our forecast for 2015 at 2.2% 
but have revised down our forecast for 2016 from 2.4% to 2.1% in the light of concerns about secular 
stagnation and a persistent weakness of aggregate demand. Production and manufacturing continue to 
be the major sectors exhibiting the fastest growth in 2014, 2015 and 2016. Our forecasts for employee 
job creation and unemployment are similar to June 2014, with some revisions. On the central forecast, 
we are now forecasting that net jobs will increase by 46,560 in 2014, 41,600 in 2015 and 48,900 in 2016. 
Our projection for unemployment on the ILO measure at the end of 2014 is 124,700 (5.3%). In 2015, 
unemployment is now forecast to be 157,300 (5.8%) falling further to 151,800 (5.6%) by the end of 2016. 
Recent GDP performance 
The latest Scottish GDP data for the second quarter of this year (2014q2) show that Scottish GDP rose 
by 0.9% in Scotland in the quarter. This represents a strong growth performance but a slight weakening 
from the 1% GDP growth recorded in the first quarter. However, as anticipated in the June 2014 
Commentary first quarter growth in Scotland is likely to have been inflated by the resumption of 
production at the Grangemouth refinery, after the resolution of the dispute that shut it down  during the 
fourth quarter 2013. UK GDP grew by 0.9% in the first quarter. If the Grangemouth shutdown reduced 
Scottish GDP by -0.2% to -0.4%, as suggested in the previous Commentary, in the fourth quarter then 
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we can conclude that underlying Scottish GDP growth might have been slightly weaker than the UK in 
the first quarter of 2014. 
 
Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 2007q1 - 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and 1st quarter 2014 and FAI 
calculations 
Figure 1 charts Scottish quarterly GDP growth to the 2014q2 and UK quarterly GDP growth to 2014q1. 
We do not have comparable GDP growth figures Scotland and the UK for 2014q2. This is because the 
ONS have from the 2014q2 introduced changes to the UK National Accounts to comply with the 
European System of Accounts 2010. The key changes relevant to the estimation of aggregate GDP 
include the treatment of some activities (such as research and development and military expenditure) as 
outputs alongside the inclusion of previously uncounted ones (such as illegal activities). These changes 
are currently estimated to raise the level of annual current price GDP in the UK by between 2.6 and 4.6 
per cent, though the impact will vary across individual years. It follows that the two series - GDP for 
Scotland and the UK - will not be strictly comparable for the next two Scottish GDP releases (i.e. 
October 2014 and January 2015) as the Scottish series will continue to be estimated on the old basis 
until the transition of the Scottish National Accounts system is complete. The Scottish Government’s 
advice to users is that the Quarterly GDP series remains a valid measure of short-term growth of the 
Scottish economy and in particular short-term comparisons over the quarter and the year between 
Scotland and the UK are still meaningful despite these methodological differences. However, it is not 
valid for longer-term comparisons. 
Under the new system, UK GDP rose by just under 0.9% in the second quarter much the same as the 
estimate for Scotland on the old basis. However, the impact of the changes on the level of UK GDP is 
quite large as Figure 1a shows. 
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Figure 1a: UK GDP under old and new system of accounts 
 
 
The scale of the recession in the UK is reduced from a contraction of -7.3% to -6.0% now much closer to 
the -5.4% contraction experienced in Scotland. By the first quarter of this year UK GDP was still -0.6% 
below its pre-recession peak under the old accounts system but +1.8% above the peak after the 
changes that are contained in the new system. So, UK GDP reached its pre-recession peak in the third 
quarter of 2013 under the new system compared to the old system where the peak had not been 
reached by the first quarter of this year. 
Over the year to the fourth quarter - four quarters on previous four quarters - Scottish GDP grew at 
2.4%, a growth rate that is above trend. These data indicate that the recovery continues at a strong rate 
and faster in the first half of this year than we had anticipated. Positive growth has now been recorded 
for the Scottish economy in the last 8 quarters. The effect of the latest data on Scotland and the UK’s 
recovery from recession is shown in Figure 2. 
In the second quarter, GDP in Scotland was +1.1% above the pre-recession peak, having finally passed 
the peak in the first quarter of this year 6 years later. We await the publication of the Scottish GDP series 
next year under the new system to see if the revisions and additions to the data raise the level of GDP 
and bring forward the time when the pre-recession peak was reached as it did in the UK. Despite the 
recent strong Scottish growth performance, the overall strength of the recovery is still greater in the UK 
than Scotland. By 2014q2 Scottish GDP had grown by 6.9% since the trough of the recession compared 
to 7.3% in the UK to the earlier quarter 2014q1.  However, as noted in previous Commentaries there is 
the complicating factor of oil and gas production which - offshore production - is included in the UK GDP 
data but not in the Scottish data. Removing oil and gas production gives us Figure 3. 
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Figure 2: GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2014q2 (Relative to pre-recession peak) 
UK to 2014q1 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014, ONS and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 3: GVA ex oil & gas, recession and recovery to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014, ONS and FAI calculations 
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When oil and gas production is removed, we find that on the old data series UK   GDP was 0.3% above 
the pre-recession peak by 2014q1 compared to 0.2% in Scotland. The long period of weak oil and gas 
production has resulted in the UK GDP - ex oil & gas - having a much stronger recovery from recession 
than Scottish GDP. As noted above, Scottish GDP has recovered by 6.9% since the trough of recession 
while UK GDP - ex oil & gas - recovered by 8.3% from its trough by the previous quarter 2014q1.  
Turning now to individual sectors of the economy.  The Scottish service sector, which accounts for 72% 
of GDP in Scotland and 77% in the UK, grew by 0.9% in Scotland in the second quarter; this followed 
growth of 0.8% in Scotland and 0.9% in the UK in the first quarter - see Figure 4. Under the new system 
of accounting UK services output grew by 1.1%, faster than in Scotland. 
 
Figure 4: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth 2007q1 to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
Over the year - that is four quarters over previous four quarters - the service sector in Scotland grew by 
2.4%. The state of the recovery in Scottish and UK services is presented in Figure 5.  Figure 5 indicates 
that by the second quarter output in Scottish services stood at 2.2% above the previous peak. By the 
first quarter output in Scottish services stood at 1.2% above the previous peak while output in UK 
services was 1.9% above. The data suggest that up to the first quarter the recovery in Scottish services 
continued to be weaker than in the UK with growth of 6.5% since the trough of the recession compared 
to 7.9% in UK services. In the previous three Commentaries we noted that the recovery in Scottish 
services' growth continues to underperform the overall performance of the economy in the recovery, 
whereas that was not the case in the UK where the recovery in services has been somewhat quicker. 
However, the data for the first and second quarters reveals that the recovery in Scottish services is 
strengthening both absolutely and relatively with growth of 6.5% since the trough compared to 6.9% for 
GDP in the economy as a whole. The service sector recovery in the UK still continues to outstrip, to 
some degree, the overall recovery in GDP. The production sector in Scotland still continues to boost 
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Scottish growth, growing by a little over 11% over the recovery, while the sector remains a significant 
drag on the recovery in the UK with growth of less than 1% to 2014q1 since the trough of the recession. 
 
Figure 5: Services GVA in recession and recovery Scotland and UK to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1)  
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 6: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 2007q1 to 2014q2 (UK 
to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
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Scottish production output strengthened in the first quarter of the year as production at Grangemouth 
came back on stream. Output rose in the first quarter by 2.1% then rose again by 0.3% in the second 
quarter. UK production sector output grew by only 0.2% in the quarter. Over the year - four quarters on 
four quarters - production GVA rose by 0.6%. Within production, Mining & quarrying GVA grew by 5.4% 
in the second quarter and rose by 2.6% over the year. Electricity & gas supply GVA fell by –3.1% in the 
second quarter and also fell by -0.6% over the year. In the second quarter, GVA in Scottish 
manufacturing fell by -0.4% after rising by 2.8% in the first quarter, again largely due to the impact of 
Grangemouth restarting production. Over the year to the second quarter, Scottish manufacturing 
contracted slightly by -0.1%, indicating a flattening of the recovery in the sector. Figure 6 charts the 
quarterly percentage changes in GVA in Scottish and UK manufacturing. 
Figure 7 shows the impact of the latest data on the manufacturing sector's recovery from recession. 
 
Figure 7: Manufacturing GVA in recession and recovery Scotland to 2014q2,  UK to 2014q1  
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
By the second quarter Scottish manufacturing GVA was still -5.6% below its pre-recession peak. The 
chart makes clear that the recovery in both Scottish and UK manufacturing effectively stalled in 2011q2, 
three years before the latest data point.  UK manufacturing has demonstrated a stronger recovery since 
the first quarter of 2013. However, by the first quarter of this year UK manufacturing was -7.6% below its 
pre-recession peak compared to -5.2% in Scotland, reflecting the greater fall in UK manufacturing output 
in the recession and the stronger recovery in Scottish manufacturing before 2011q2. 
Within manufacturing, four of seven principal sectors experienced growth in the second quarter: 
computer, electrical and optical products (electronics) (accounting for 9% of manufacturing GVA), which 
grew by 3% in the quarter but contracted by -10.0% over the year; transport equipment (accounting for 
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8% of manufacturing GVA) which expanded by +1.5% in the quarter but reduced output by -1.0% over 
the year; metals, metal products & machinery n.e.c. (accounting for 19% of manufacturing GVA) which 
grew by 0.9% in the quarter but by 6.5% over the year; and other manufacturing Industries, repair & 
installation (accounting for 22% of manufacturing GVA) which grew by 0.3%% in the quarter while 
growing by 2.2% over the year. The three manufacturing sub-sectors that contracted in the quarter were: 
textiles, clothing & leather products (accounting for only 2% of manufacturing GVA) which suffered a 
loss of output of -3.0% in the quarter but grew by 2.9% over the year; food & drink (accounting for 28% 
of manufacturing GVA) which contracted by -1.9% in the quarter and by -2.5% over the year; and finally, 
refined petroleum, chemical & pharmaceutical products (accounting for 12% of manufacturing GVA) 
which contracted by -2.0 in the quarter and by -0.8% over the year. 
Turning now to construction, the latest data are presented in Figure 8.  
 
Figure 8:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 2007q1 - 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
Scottish construction GVA picked up considerably in the second quarter growing by 3.6% after falling by 
-0.6% in the previous quarter and falling by -0.8% in the final quarter of 2013. UK construction GVA in 
contrast rose by 0.7% in the second quarter. Over the year – four quarters on four quarters - Scottish 
construction grew by 7.5%. Figure 9 displays the recession and recovery performance in both Scottish 
and UK construction. 
Figure 9 highlights the recent recovery in Scottish construction after the downturn for two quarters. By 
the second quarter Scottish construction was still -8.5% below its pre-recession peak. By the end of the 
first quarter UK construction was -10.3% below peak and Scottish construction -11.6% below its peak.  
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Within services, the principal sub-sectors in the private sector all displayed positive growth in the fourth 
quarter. Business and financial services grew strongly by 2%. Over the year, the sector grew at 4.4%. 
Figure 10 shows the growth of the sector in Scotland and UK during the recession and recovery. 
 
Figure 9: Construction, Recession and Recovery to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 10: Business & Financial Services: Recession and Recovery to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
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By the first quarter, output or GVA in the sector had moved to +4.3% above its pre-recession peak in 
Scotland compared to +2.8% in the UK underlying the stronger recovery of this sector in Scotland 
compared to the UK. By the second quarter of this year output in the sector in Scotland stood at +6.5% 
above the previous peak. The aggregate GVA data for business and financial services in Scotland have 
recently masked significant differences between the performance of financial services on the one hand 
and business services on the other. Figure 11 shows what has been happening to financial services 
since peak output in the second quarter of 2008. 
 
Figure 11: Financial Services, Recession and Recovery 2007q2 to 2014q2 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
These data show that the recovery in the sector is continuing this year after the weak performance in the 
second half of 2013. Now GVA in the sector is -6.8% below the pre-recession peak compared to the 
trough of -16.0% in 2012q4. The continuation of the recovery in financial services raises the hope that 
despite the structural change that occurred in the banking sector in particular after the Great Recession, 
output does now seem to be moving back slowly towards pre-recession levels. 
Elsewhere, in private services, distribution, hotels and catering (accounting for 19% of services sector 
output in Scotland), grew by only 0.2% in the second quarter. Over the year, the sector grew by 2.1%. 
Figure 12 shows the performance of the sector during recession and recovery. 
Figure 12 reveals that after data revisions the sector in Scotland just attained its pre-recession and is 
+0.04% above. By the first quarter the sector in the UK was still -0.7% below its peak, while the sector in 
Scotland was doing slightly better at just -0.2% below. However, it should be noted that the sector had a 
less serious recession in Scotland than in the UK with output falling by -7.4% here compared to -10.1% 
in the UK. The track of the recovery in the sector picked up strongly during 2013 and 2014 in both 
Scotland and the UK. 
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Figure 12: Distribution, Hotels & Catering: Recession and Recovery to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 13: Government and Other Services: Recession and Recovery to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
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Output in Government & Other Services fell slightly in Scotland in the second quarter by -0.2%. Over the 
year, output in the sector grew slightly in Scotland by 0.7%. Figure 13 shows the performance of GVA in 
the sector in recession and recovery. 
By the first quarter GVA in the sector in the UK was 3.5% above the pre-recession peak, which as we 
have noted in several earlier Commentaries is difficult to understand at a time of fiscal consolidation, 
whereas output in the sector in Scotland was -0.3% below its pre-recession peak, which seems more 
reasonable.  In the second quarter output in the sector in Scotland was -0.5% below peak. 
Finally, Figure 14 highlights the performance of transport, storage & communication in Scotland and UK 
in recession and recovery. The sector accounts for nearly 8% of total GVA and about 11% of service 
sector output. 
 
Figure  14: Transport, Storage & Communication: Recession and Recovery to 2014q2 (UK to 2014q1) 
 
Source: Scottish Government GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 2nd QUARTER 2014 and FAI calculations 
The pick-up in the performance of the sector in Scotland continued in the second quarter with GVA rising 
by 1.3%. Over the year, the sector grew by 1.6% in Scotland. By the end of the first quarter GVA in the 
Scottish sector was -6.2% below pre-recession peak compared to -2.4% in the UK. By the second 
quarter, output in the sector in Scotland stood at -5.0% below pre-recession peak. 
The Labour Market 
The latest labour market data (see Scottish Labour Market section below) show a continuing strong 
recovery. In the quarter June – August 2014, employment rose by 1.4% in Scotland and was 0.0% in the 
UK. In terms of numbers, jobs rose by 35,000 in the quarter, compared to a 46,000 in the UK as a 
whole. Over the year, Scottish jobs rose by 52,000, a rise of 2.0%, while UK jobs rose 736,000, or 2.5%. 
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During the quarter unemployment in Scotland, in a further reflection of jobs growth , fell by -40,000, or    
-21.0%, to 151,000, or a rate of 5.5%, while in the UK, unemployment fell less rapidly by -154,000, or     
-7.2%, to a rate of 6.0%. Over the year, unemployment fell strongly by -54,000, or -26.2%, while in the 
UK unemployment also fell strongly but a little more slowly by -538,000, or  -21.4% (See Figure 1 in the 
Scottish Labour Market section below, which shows the track of quarterly unemployment in Scotland and 
the UK from 2000 to August 2014.) 
Figure 15 shows the performance employment in Scotland and the UK during recession and recovery to 
2014q2.  
 
Fig 15: Total Employment: Scotland and UK Pre-recession peak to 2014q2 
 
 Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
Scottish jobs as reported in the LFS worker surveys have now passed their pre-recession peak. Yet, 
despite the good recent performance of the labour market in Scotland overall performance in the 
recovery continues to be worse than the UK. By the end of the second quarter while Scottish 
employment was 1.1% above the pre-recession peak, in the UK jobs were 3.2% higher than the peak. 
Despite the strong recent recovery in the labour market, we are still some way from the conditions that 
maintained prior to the start of the Great Recession. One indicator of this is the balance between full-
time, part-time and self-employment. Figure 2 in the Scottish Labour Market section below reveals that 
much of the recovery in jobs has been driven by the growth of part-time and self-employment. Full-time 
employment still remains considerably below its pre-recession peak, although there has been some pick 
up in recent quarters. Whether this represents a continuing deficiency in the demand for labour or a 
more structural change heralding greater continuing shares in part-time and self-employment and a 
smaller share for full-time employment remains a moot point.  An indication that there is still a deficiency 
of demand in the Scottish labour market, irrespective of whether the shift to part-time and self-
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employment is structural or cyclical, is provided by data on the number of weekly hours worked. Figure 
16 charts this statistic from 2007. 
 
Figure 16: Total weekly hours worked in Scottish labour market (millions)  
 
Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
 
Figure 17: Employment to population (16 and over) July-Sep 2007 to Jun-Aug 2014 in recession and 
recovery 
 
Source, ONS Regional Labour Statistics and FAI calculations 
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During the year July 2013 to June 2014 total weekly hours worked averaged 80 million that is 2 million, 
or -2.4%, below the pre-recession peak average weekly hours worked. So despite the number of jobs 
being higher than before the recession, the demand for labour as measured by hours worked is still 
lower 
Finally, not only is the demand for labour still lower than pre-recession but demand -measured in terms 
of jobs - is still considerably deficient when compared to the supply of labour. Figure 17 charts the 
employment to population (aged 16 and over) ratio relative to pre-recession peak for Scotland to June-
August 2014. 
By June-August 2014, the ratio stood at -1.5% below the pre-recession peak, compared to -5.7% at the 
trough of the recession. This suggests that even when we consider jobs alone and not hours worked 
there is still plenty of slack in the Scottish labour market compared to the pre-recession peak despite the 
recent strong jobs recovery. 
Forecasts 
Background 
Global and UK economies 
In the June 2014 Commentary we suggested that there were four potential obstacles to a sustained 
recovery of the Scottish economy: a failure to achieve a balanced recovery; weak or no growth in real 
wages; an overheated housing market, especially in London and the South East of England; and the risk 
of deflation in the Eurozone.  
At the present conjuncture only the overheating in the housing market has moderated, with house price 
growth slowing and, as the October 2014 minutes of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) notes: “Having risen strongly in the second half of 2013, mortgage approvals for house purchase 
had turned down in the early part of 2014 and had since failed to recover.” However, there is little 
evidence of a more balanced recovery; indeed, the latest data suggest that growth in the UK still 
remains unbalanced. Real wage growth is still in negative territory, although there is some evidence that 
median real wages may now be rising in Scotland. Moreover, despite part-time and self-employment 
driving the recent growth in jobs, self-employment income appears to be stagnating and the decline in 
Trade Union membership and the diminishing influence of unions over pay setting may be contributing to 
the weakness of real wages (for more discussion see the Scottish Labour Market review below and the 
article by Boyd). The stagnation in the Eurozone has if anything worsened since we last reported. There 
would appear to be a real risk of deflation unless the ECB takes counter monetary policy measures in 
the absence of a loosening of fiscal policy, in Germany in particular. Quarterly growth in Germany 
averaged only 0.3% in the first half of the year, while industrial production fell by over 4% in August. 
Outside the Eurozone the US economy is displaying reasonable growth, perhaps justifying the Fed’s 
decision to cease its policy of quantitative easing. Growth also appears to be slowing in emerging 
economies especially China. To be set against that is the impact of the recent substantial falls in the 
price of oil. Oil prices have slumped this year falling nearly 25 per cent over the past five months. Brent 
crude was trading as high as $115 in June 2014 and at the time of writing Brent crude futures are below 
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$85 per barrel. The Bank of England MPC suggests that the fall in the price of oil reflects subdued global 
demand against a background of rising supply. Moreover, the MPC notes that the upward-sloping oil 
price futures curve is consistent with some of the weakness in oil prices being expected to be temporary. 
Nevertheless, lower oil prices should produce a favourable income effect in net oil importing countries, 
which should help support the growth of demand. 
Against this background the UK Government points to the strong growth of the UK economy as an 
exception to a picture of depressed demand outside the US in the wider global economy. While this is 
correct, the strong growth we have witnessed recently is substantially a delayed reaction to a recovery 
from recession that was significantly subdued by the UK Government’s fiscal austerity policy and weak 
export performance. Of all the major OECD countries the UK was almost the last – with the exception of 
Italy - to begin to recover.  
The key question is whether UK growth can be sustained. There seems little doubt that growth has 
begun to slow. The preliminary GDP estimate for the third quarter reported growth of 0.7% compared to 
0.9% in the second quarter. Retail sales volumes in September 2014 fell 0.3% on August but this was 
mainly due to lower clothing sales reflecting the unseasonably warm autumn weather. There appeared 
to be no general slowdown in household demand. 
Construction activity expanded at its weakest pace in five months in October due to a sharp slowdown in 
residential building growth but remained well above the long-term average, according to the latest 
purchasing managers’ index from Markit/CIPS. Finally, the latest Markit/CIPS purchasing managers’ 
survey for the service sector in October fell for the second consecutive month to its lowest level in 17 
months. The survey indicated that growth was still occurring in the sector but at slower rate. To be set 
against these indicators of slowing overall and key sectoral growth, the latest Markit/CIPS survey of 
purchasing managers in the UK’s manufacturing sector suggested that the sector expanded at its fastest 
rate in three months in October, fuelled by domestic demand. 
In the light of these recent indicators, the key question is whether the UK economy is now poised for a 
period of sustainable growth, or whether growth will slow and then slip back into recession? Are we at a 
turning point? The IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde has recently worried that the global 
economy is poised to slip into what she calls “the new mediocre”. Others such as ex US Treasury 
Secretary and leading economist Larry Summers believe that the world economy now faces a situation 
of secular stagnation, a permanent deficiency of demand – caused, for example, by a permanent slow 
down in the growth of the working age population - which can’t be overcome even with near-zero interest 
rates. As Paul Krugman says at its root it is "the problem of building consumer demand at a time when 
people are less motivated to spend" And that applies to investment too. If we are faced with a persistent 
shortfall in demand the policy implications are, as Krugman further notes, “ … measures to boost 
spending — higher inflation, maybe sustained spending on public works (and less concern about debt 
because interest rates will be low for a long time).” 
UK growth is increasingly reliant on domestic demand as the net trade position continues to be weak. 
While there has been a clear pickup in investment in the UK, growth is very dependent on household 
demand. And the growth of household demand it must be said is not based on solid foundations. Jobs 
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are being created in large numbers so boosting aggregate labour income, a key factor in household 
spending. But real wages are still not rising, which must be serving to dampen household spending. 
Households are clearly resorting more to credit and borrowing but it is difficult to believe that this can be 
sustained for very long. House price growth appears to be moderating. Rising asset/house prices allow 
households to borrow more knowing that the increased borrowing is ‘covered’ by the rising value of the 
assets they hold. Borrowing therefore becomes more risky if the growth in house prices starts to 
moderate, as it has. On top of this, household debt appears to be rising again to potentially dangerous 
levels. The recent Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report 2014 notes that in the UK household debt grew 
quickly as a multiple of income from 1980 to reach 180% of income in 2008. During and after the Great 
Recession - which many economists believe was triggered by levels of private, including household, 
debt that had become unsustainable - household debt fell to 150% by 2013. However, in the last year 
the ratio has risen again to 170%. Moreover, a too soon increase in base rate by the Bank of England 
could prove to be the catalyst that leads to retrenchment: a sharp increase in the household saving rate 
and a sudden drop in spending. 
Finally, we must not forget that the British economy is still subject to significant fiscal austerity. The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies has estimated that by the current fiscal year April 2014 to 2015 only 50% of 
the planned cuts in current spending will have been implemented, or 53% of overall – capital and current 
– spending cuts. The tax rises were more front-loaded so that 80% of these will have been implemented. 
But overall, with planned fiscal austerity amounting to 10% of UK national income by 2018-19, not much 
more than half of that has been achieved to date.  
The brake imposed on domestic demand by this future austerity will be considerable. This, coupled with 
weakening export markets and a potential pull back in household spending, could see the UK economy 
slip back into recession. And Scotland would, obviously, not be immune. 
The Scottish Economy 
The Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data from the Scottish Government allows us to gauge 
the extent to which the recovery in Scotland is becoming more balanced. Data published in August 2014 
go up to the first quarter of this year.  These data have been revised for the earlier quarters in 2013 
compared with data presented and discussed in the previous Commentary. Figure 18 presents our 
estimates of the contribution of each expenditure components to nominal Scottish GDP growth in the 
final three quarters of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014. 
What is heartening about these data is that investment – Gross Capital Formation – is playing a much 
more positive role in driving growth than in earlier quarters. Indeed, over the four quarters the 
contribution of investment was greater than the contribution of household demand to nominal GDP 
growth. The downside is that net trade made a negative contribution to Scottish growth during the 
second half of last year and the first quarter of this. 
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Figure 18:     Expenditure Components Percent Point Contribution to Nominal Scottish GDP  
Growth in 2nd, 3rd, 4th Quarters 2013 and 1st Quarter 2014 
 
Source: SNAP 13 August 2014 and FAI calculations 
So, we can conclude that elements of a balanced recovery are falling into place. Investment has clearly 
picked up. But with the net trade position consistently negative in the last three quarters and a 
weakening global market the prospects that external demand will serve to sustain growth appear 
unlikely. Hence the prospects for sustained investment spending would appear to depend on the growth 
of domestic demand and household spending in particular. Household spending is continuing to make a 
positive contribution to growth but its underling determinants remain weak, as the discussion on the UK 
economy above make clear. 
Investment in Scotland has picked up with inward foreign direct investment playing a role. So, in the light 
of slowing growth, the risks of secular stagnation, the need to boost competitiveness, net trade and 
inward foreign investment, we do believe there is strong case that Government, and the UK Government 
in particular, should invest more in infrastructure in and for Scotland. The IMF in its recent World 
Economic Outlook published in October makes the following plea to Governments: 
“ …. increased public infrastructure investment raises output in both the short and long term, 
particularly during periods of economic slack and when investment efficiency is high. This 
suggests that in countries with infrastructure needs, the time is right for an infrastructure push: 
borrowing costs are low and demand is weak in advanced economies ….. Debt-financed 
projects could have large output effects without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio, if clearly 
identified infrastructure needs are met through efficient investment.”  
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The Outlook shows that the estimated quality of UK infrastructure overall has been improving in recent 
years but still remains below that of Germany, France, Japan and Canada, of the major advanced 
countries. The July 2013 report from McKinsey Global Institute highlighted infrastructure investment as 
one of the top 5 catalysts for economic growth. It is also a major factor in the attraction of foreign 
investment. 
The UK Government appears on the face of it to agree since at the time of writing it is unveiling plans for 
£15 billion of new infrastructure projects this week and to make it “easier than ever” to invest in the UK. 
This is to be welcomed. However, more needs to be done to improve the infrastructure of road and rail, 
especially, between Scotland and the UK. Raising the borrowing levels available to the Scottish 
Government would also help to support and encourage its own plans for infrastructure investment within 
Scotland. 
Scottish GDP growth in the first half of this year was somewhat faster than previously forecast. However, 
as noted above, UK GDP growth slowed to 0.7% in the third quarter from 0.9% in the second quarter. 
We do not have GDP outturn data for the third quarter for Scotland. However, we do have some partial 
indicators and business surveys. According to the Scottish Retail Consortium retails sales in September 
2014 fell sharply. The suggestion that the referendum was a key factor in the downturn seems 
implausible. The unseasonal warms weather affecting clothing sales seems a better structural 
explanation but we must not rule out the possibility that we are seeing a slowing in the growth of 
domestic demand for some of the reasons discussed above. The third quarter Quarterly Business 
Survey from the Scottish Chambers of Commerce conducted by the Fraser of Allander Institute confirms 
the impression that growth is slowing down while still remaining positive. Orders and sales grew in the 
quarter but at a slower pace than in the second quarter while the increase in business optimism was 
more muted than between April and June 2014. 
It is against this background in Scotland, the UK and the global economy that we have prepared our 
latest forecasts. 
GVA Forecasts 
For our latest GVA forecasts we continue the presentational procedure adopted in previous 
Commentaries. We present only a central forecast but use estimated forecast errors to establish the 
likely range that the true first estimate of the growth of Scottish GVA will lie between.  
Table 1 presents our forecasts for Scottish GVA - GDP at basic prices - for 2014 to 2016. The forecasts 
are presented in more detail in the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section of this Commentary. 
Table 1 shows that our GDP forecast for 2014 is 2.7%, which is revised up from our forecast of 2.5% in 
June 2014, due to the strong growth performance exhibited in the first half of the year. For 2015, we 
have maintained our June forecast of 2.2%. We have revised down our forecast for 2016 to 2.1% from 
2.4% in June. This reflects an anticipation of a further weakening of the recovery than already forecast 
due especially to continuing weakness of the Eurozone economies. 
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Table 1, also compares our GVA forecasts with the median of latest independent forecasts for the UK 
as published by the UK Treasury. These show that we again expect Scottish growth to continue to be 
weaker than UK growth over the forecast period. So, we are now forecasting growth of 2.7% in 2014, 
2.2% in 2015, and 2.1% in 2016. Given our previous forecast errors the lower and upper bounds for 
growth in 2014 are expected to be 2.4% and 3.0%, for 2015, 1.7% to 2.7%, and for 2016, 1.0% to 
3.2%. 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth, 2014-2016  
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2014 2015 2016 
Central forecast 2.7 2.2 2.1 
June forecast 
UK mean independent new forecasts 
(October) 
Mean Absolute Error % points 
2.5 
3.1 
 
+/- 0.29 
2.2 
2.7 
 
+/- 0.49 
2.4 
n.a. 
 
+/- 1.12 
 
Production and manufacturing continue to be the major sectors exhibiting the fastest growth in 2014, 
2015 and 2016. In 2014, production is projected to grow by 3.1%. Services and construction display 
positive growth this year at 2.5% and 2.0% respectively. This relative performance continues in both 
2015 and 2016 even though forecast growth diminishes across all sectors in 2015 and then rises again 
in 2016. Production grows by 2.6% and 2.5% in 2015 and 2016, while service growth is projected to be 
2.1% in 2015 and 2.0% in 2016. The construction sector continues to lag with growth of 1.3% in 2015 
and 1.2% in 2016. 
Employment Forecasts 
Table 2 presents our forecasts for net employee jobs for the years 2013 to 2015 in terms of a central 
and upper and lower forecast. Note that in forecasting employee jobs we are not forecasting self-
employment, which has been an important component of the recent jobs recovery. 
Our forecasts for employee job creation are similar to our June forecasts, with a slight upward revision 
for this year and further downward adjustments for 2015 and 2016. On the central forecast, we are now 
forecasting that net jobs will increase by 46,560 in 2014, 41,600 in 2015 and 48,900 in 2016. This year, 
we now expect nearly 40,000 service sector jobs to be created, with around 2,100 added in production 
due to expected productivity increases given the growth in output, and somewhat stronger jobs growth of 
3,600 in agriculture. Construction jobs are now forecast to rise this year by 1,600. In 2015/2016, the bulk 
of the jobs created are again expected to be in the service sector with an additional 32,600/38,300 jobs 
forecast, while 4,400/5,400 are added in production, 3,050/3,300 in agriculture and 1,550/1,900 in 
construction. 
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Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2014-2016 
 
2014 2015 2016 
Upper 
53,000 53,450 76,750 
June forecast 52,850 66,050 87,200 
Central  46,560 41,600 48,900 
June forecast  43,100 42,900 58,150 
Lower 33,400  19,900 29,900 
June forecast 33,400 19,900 29,900. 
 
Unemployment Forecasts 
The key unemployment forecasts are summarised in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3: Forecasts ILO unemployment 2014-2016 
 
2014 2015 2016 
ILO unemployment    
Rate (ILO un/TEA 16+) 
June forecast 
5.3% 
6.4% 
5.2% 
 6.2% 
5.0% 
5.8%. 
Numbers 127,700 141,019 135,537 
 
The ILO rate is our preferred measure since it identifies those workers who are out of a job and are 
looking for work, whereas the claimant count simply records the unemployed who are in receipt of 
unemployment benefit. Our unemployment forecasts have been revised down further again from March, 
reflecting higher economic activity. Our projection for unemployment on the ILO measure at the end of 
2014 falls to 124,700 (5.3%). In 2015, unemployment is now forecast to fall slightly to 5.2% but to 
increase in terms of numbers to 141,019 as the workforce increases. Falling again, to 135,537 (5.0%) by 
the end of 2016. 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
7 November 2014
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2 Forecasts of the Scottish economy 
Grant Allan, Fraser of Allander Institute
 
Abstract  
The latest figures indicate that the Scottish economy has picked up strongly in the first half of 2014, in 
line with a surge in leading indicators across business surveys. It is likely however that this has eased as 
we turned into the later part of this year, suggesting that the rate of growth will slow. Where 2014 has 
exceeded our earlier expectations, we have revised our forecasts for growth (upwards) and 
unemployment (downwards) from June’s Commentary. It remains unlikely that we will see a renewed 
expansion in activity given the scope for potential downside risks from, in particular, weak growth and 
deflation fears in the Eurozone; weak export growth; debt constrained households unlikely to continue to 
support economic activity and only slowing improving outlook for investment through 2015. Revisions to 
the data for the UK, to be implemented in Scottish statistics next year, will make somewhat difficult to 
make direct comparisons about the recent trajectory of the UK and Scottish economic performances: 
however the general picture, of slow and unsteady growth for Scotland is likely to characterise 
developments through the coming years. 
Fiscal and monetary outlook 
Analysis by Fiscal Affairs Scotland from October 2014, carried out in the aftermath of the Scottish Draft 
Budget, suggests that the coming year (2015-16) will be “one of the milder years in terms of cuts”, as the 
fiscal consolidation of the UK Government continues. They note a real terms reduction in Scottish 
Government spending in 2015-16 of the order of 1.7%. The milder year coming however is, in their 
analysis, likely to followed by reductions of over 3% in both 2016-17 and 2017-18. That the public 
investment consolidation has concluded, these future reductions in spending will fall hardest on current 
spending in these years. 
Monetary policy stance remains accommodative of activity – with no change in interest rates from 0.5%, 
and an unchanged QE asset purchase programme since we reported in June’s commentary. That has 
moved considerably since the summer is the expected date (and pace at which) the Bank of England 
would seek to “normalise” interest rates. Current “forward-guidance” from the Bank indicates that with 
spare capacity in the economy and no breaches to its inflation target of 2%, it will not consider raising 
interest rates. Inflation had slowed in September to 1.2%, and so remains below the Bank’s target. The 
QE programme will be maintained until the rise in the Bank’s interest rate.  
Since the August Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting there have been signs of a disagreement 
within the group setting interest  rates for the UK on the appropriate monetary policy stance. The 
minutes from October’s meeting confirm that, as in August and September, two of the nine-member 
committee proposed to raise interest rates by 0.25% (to 0.75%). They argued that some signs of slack 
in, for example, the labour market had dropped rapidly, suggesting that prices could increase quickly. 
Given the lags in monetary policy therefore it would be, in their argument, sensible to act in advance to 
ensure inflation remain at the Bank’s target over the medium term, and that increases in interest rates 
occurred gradually. The MPC voted 7-2 in favour of keeping interest rates at their current level. 
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Households 
It is clear that household spending has driven a considerably portion of economic activity in Scotland 
and the UK. What is also clear from Figure 1 is that the volatility of (real) consumption spending growth 
has been greater in Scotland that the UK as a whole, as evidenced by two quarters of real terms 
reductions in spending growth during 2013. In the most recent quarter for which data is available (Q1 
2014) consumer spending grew by 0.86% in Scotland and 0.89% in the UK as a whole. Data for Q2 
2014 will be available on 12th November 2014. While savings ratios are not currently comparable for the 
UK and Scotland due to data compatibility it appears likely that the pattern of a declining savings ratio 
has continued for the UK as a whole, indicating that consumption is continuing to be funded from 
reductions in savings in the absence of wage growth. With the rate of increase in consumer prices (CPI) 
at 1.9% in June 2014, there is continued slow growth to wages in the UK (with no comparable series for 
Scotland available). Average weekly earnings growth during the second quarter of 2014 was 0.9% for 
regular pay (i.e. not including bonuses).  
 
Figure 1: Household real consumption spending growth, Scotland and UK, Q1 2000 to Q1 2014, % q-
on-q 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
Investment 
Classification changes mean that – until the Scottish data is consistent with changed UK data – it will be 
difficult to directly compare trends in investment spending. (For example, reclassifications to investment 
spending now mean that some Research and Development activity is classified as “Investment”, while 
this will not be so in the Scottish series on investment until data is comparable). These changes are 
likely to have an impact on the path of investment spending over the recession. Figure 2 – which gives 
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comparable figures for Scotland and the UK to Q1 2014 - suggests that investment spending in Scotland 
had returned its level in 2008, while UK series was about 10% below its earlier (2008). Revisions to the 
UK series however now show a different profile to investment, so we hesitate to draw broad conclusions 
about the relative strength in investment spending in Scotland and the UK, based purely on this diagram 
(which relates to the first quarter of the year only). 
The Bank of England’s latest Inflation Report noted that business investment outlook between May and 
September was largely unchanged. Demand uncertainty was again important, but appear to have 
“receded” in the last year. They also point to excess capital in some sectors as potentially impacting on 
the scope for investment growth to grow sharply: since those sectors would not need to invest to expand 
output if demand conditions ease.  
 
Figure 2: Real gross fixed capital formation, Scotland and the UK, Q1 1998 to Q1 2014 
 
Sources: Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) data (Scottish Government) and UK Quarterly National 
Accounts (National Statistics) and FAI calculations.  
Trade 
The latest statistics on Scottish exports to the rest of the world – covering manufacturing exports alone 
(roughly 60% of Scottish exports outside of the UK) – showed that in the second quarter of 2014 there 
was growth of 2.8% on Q1, and the second consecutive quarterly increase. In constant price terms, 
exports were helped by a rebound of exports from refined petroleum activities for the second 
consecutive quarter (up 4.4% in Q2, following a 14.5% increase in Q1), following the sharp contraction in 
Grangemouth activity during Q4 2013. There was a reduction in drink exports, continuing the weak 
overseas exports performance for that sector since the start of 2013.  
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In terms of key markets for Scottish products, latest figures suggest little room for relaxed optimism 
about the short-term trajectory. Markit’s PMI for the Eurozone in October 2014 suggested a broad 
stability (indeed a small improvement) in activity however it was noted that the eurozone was “teetering 
on the edge of another downturn” with stagnation in new orders and declining employment, a contraction 
in business confidence and continued deflation. The Bank of England’s MPC minutes from October note 
that “there was mounting evidence of a loss of momentum in the euro area, including in Germany”. It is 
clear that downside risks to Eurozone economic activity cannot be ignored, and showing the 
dependence of an export-driven recovery on developing new international markets. Growth in the US is 
forecast to strengthen and is the only one of Scotland’s major international export markets to have seen 
upward revisions to growth for 2014 and 2015 since Summer 2014. Again, it appears that without US 
markets, Scotland’s export performance would be significantly worse. Table 1 shows the forecasts for 
growth in key global markets for Scottish products through 2014 and 2015. 
In September the OECD identified slow growth in the Eurozone as principally due to “anaemic” demand, 
suggesting that additional steps were required to increase demand in the Eurozone – such as “more 
vigorous monetary stimulus” - and avoid the possibility of damaging period of deflation (a risk also noted 
by the IMF). With significant debt across Eurozone members, deflation would be particularly harmful. 
The OECD cautioned against seeing more recent increases in inflation expectations as a sign of the 
path of inflation, given there had been little sign of the period of deflation in Japan prior to its damaging 
period of deflation in the early 1990s. Interestingly, October’s World Economic Outlook appraised the 
macroeconomic benefits of public infrastructure projects. They report that for advanced economies – 
and depending on the degree of slack, the stance of monetary policy and the way in which the 
investment is financed – such projects could have significantly positive impacts on output. 
 
Table 1: Economic growth forecasts for 2014 and 2015 for major Scottish export markets, plus UK, 
China, Japan and Euro area, % p.a. 
 2014 2015 
 
IMF (October 
2014) 
OECD (September 
2014) 
IMF (October 
2014) 
OECD (September 
2014) 
USA 2.2 2,1 3.1 3.1 
Netherlands 0.6 - 1.4 - 
France 0.4 0.4 1.0 1.0 
Belgium 1.0 - 1.4 - 
Germany 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Ireland     
     
United Kingdom 3.2 3.1 2.7 2.8 
China 7.4 7.4 7.1 7.3 
Japan 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.1 
Euro area 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.1 
Sources: World Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund, IMF, October 2014) and Interim Economic 
Assessment (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, September 2014) Notes:a “-” 
indicates a country forecast is not produced. 
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Forecasts for the Scottish economy: Detail 
While in June we reported on a return of optimism evident through surveys at that point, we warned that 
these appeared to be driven by stronger than expected household spending growth. Data now available 
for the second quarter of 2014 suggests that the first half of the year saw strong growth, however there 
remains limited evidence of a recovery in (private) investment spending or exports. Data for Q2’s 
(manufacturing) exports performance suggests a second quarter of positive growth however there were 
continued declines in drink exports, worth around 25% of Scottish exports.  
Details from the latest Scottish GDP results for Q2 2014 suggest that in that quarter Scotland grew in 
line with the UK rate. Construction activity in Scotland in Q2 appeared to be more robust than in the UK 
as a whole (growing by 3.6% in Scotland and 0.7% in the UK) however this reversed three consecutive 
quarters where UK construction sector activity had been stronger. Service sector growth rates were 
broadly similar. Definitional changes to GDP make longer term comparisons between UK and Scottish 
economic activity at aggregate and sectoral level more difficult to draw. 
Survey evidence points to some continued activity through the first half of 2014, consistent with the 
strong estimates for these two quarters. Most recent surveys for Q3 suggest that the rate of growth has 
eased into the second half of the year.  
We note that export markets for Scottish goods appear to be facing continued growth problems with 
price deflation and continuing risk to the Eurozone countries, which are some of Scotland’s major 
overseas markets. Domestic demand – specifically household consumption, with continued public 
austerity – appears to be robust however, we caution that households cannot continue to support 
economic activity in absence of real wage growth, and recent growth in the level of private debt suggests 
that consumption is increasing faster than wage income. As public austerity policy continues to reduce 
real (government consumption) spending through the next (Westminster) Parliament, this will continue to 
depress government spending as a driver of economic activity. The IFS note that around half of the 
planned Government’s fiscal consolidation has taken place at the time of writing. 
Results 
In this section of the Commentary, we forecast year-on-year real growth in Scotland’s key economic and 
labour market variables. In this issue, we forecast all variables for 2014, 2015 and 2016. Our forecasts 
cover Scotland’s Gross Value Added (GVA), employee jobs and unemployment. The model used is 
multi-sectoral, and where useful, results are reported to sectoral categories. 
We begin with the forecasts for GVA growth in the Scottish economy. The trend for annual growth in 
Scotland between 2005 and 2013 and our forecasts for the period to 2016 are shown in Figure 3. This 
also includes our upper and lower forecasts growth. As previously, the range around the central forecast 
is based on our past forecast accuracy of the first release of growth for the year. The changing basis for 
growth described above means that – following the release during 2015 of backdated growth figures for 
years which have been forecast – it is likely that earlier forecasts may appear to have larger errors. We 
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will reflect on the changing profile to Scotland economic growth and the implications for the assessment 
of our previous forecasts once the updated and revised Scottish data is produced. 
Based on earlier forecasts since 2000, the mean absolute error of forecasts in the winter period and 
growth in the same year is 0.288 percentage points. Growth forecast errors for the following year are 
0.494 percentage points. This gives the range for the upper and lower bands in 2014 and 2015. Our past 
forecast errors for the longest forecast horizon is 1.120 percentage points, so this is used to give the 
range around our central forecast for 2016. 
Relative to June 2014’s forecasts we have now revised up our central forecast for GVA growth in 2014 
from 2.5% to 2.7% (i.e. a revision upwards up by 0.2 percentage points) and largely driven by better 
than expected growth outcomes through the first half of 2014, in particular the stronger than expected 
performance in the second quarter. Our forecast for 2015 remains at 2.2%, while we have revised our 
forecast for 2016 down from 2.4% to 2.1% in light of the weaker domestic and global environment for 
growth beyond the short term.  
For comparison purposes, the UK’s Office for Budgetary Responsibility (OBR) forecast for growth in 
2014 (made in March 2014) and the median of independent growth forecasts for the UK made during the 
last three months for 2014 are 2.7% and 3.1% respectively, while for 2015 the respective figures are of 
2.3% and 2.6% respectively. 
 
Figure 3: Forecasts of annual real GVA (%) growth for Scotland, 2014 to 2016
 
Sources: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, November 2014  
 
In addition to the aggregate growth forecasts in our central scenario, Table 2 presents our forecasts for 
GVA growth in 2014, 2015 and 2016 for three broad sectoral groupings: the “production”, “construction” 
and “services” sectors of the Scottish economy. Much of the reduction in growth forecast for 2016 is in 
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the services sector, as household spending is projected to recover more slowly than previously 
anticipated and with slower growth in Scottish export markets. 
 
Table 2: Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2014 to 2016 
 2014 2015 2016 
GVA 2.7% 2.2% 2.1% 
 
   
Production 3.1% 2.6% 2.5% 
Construction 2.0% 1.3% 1.2% 
Services 2.5% 2.1% 2.0% 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, November 2014  
Employment and unemployment 
Detailed commentary on recent developments in the Scottish labour markets can be found in the 
Overview of the Scottish Labour Market section of this Commentary. Here we present our forecasts for 
the number of employee jobs in the Scottish economy. We forecast the number, sectoral breakdown and 
percentage changes in employee jobs at the end of 2014, 2015 and 2016 respectively, as well as the 
ILO measure of unemployment over the same period. 
The most up to date employee jobs series for Scotland shows that there were 2,358,000 employee jobs 
in Scotland in the second quarter of 2014. This was an increase of 13,000 jobs from the end of 2013 and 
saw an additional 5 thousand jobs created in the second quarter of 2014. The level of employee jobs is 
now 122,000 jobs (4.9%) lower than the peak of employee jobs in Scotland in Q3 2008 (2,480,000). This 
has improved from a trough in the second quarter of 2013 when there were 203,000 fewer jobs (8.5%) 
than at the pre-recession peak. 
Our new forecasts for employee jobs are shown in Table 3, alongside a sectoral breakdown of employee 
job numbers. The number of total employee jobs is forecast to increase in each year, and have been 
revised up slightly since our June 2014 forecasts. The number of jobs is now forecast to increase by 
2.0% in 2014 (up from 1.8%) with a slightly upward revision to the net annual change in employee jobs 
from 43,100 to 46,560 through to the end of 2014. Our forecast for 2015 is for the Scottish economy to 
add 41,600 jobs in 2015, down slightly from our June forecast. We continue to forecast the number of 
employee jobs in Scotland to breach its previous (2008) high by the end of 2016. The net change in 
employee jobs consistent with our upper, central and lower forecasts are shown in Table 4. 
We present out forecasts for unemployment at the end of 2014, 2015 and 2016 in our central scenario in 
our central forecasts in Table 5. In line with the forecasts produced since June 2013, we report the 
forecasted number (and rate) of those unemployed under the International Labour Organisation 
definition of unemployment. This is preferred to the claimant count measure as it gives a more complete 
picture of the extent of labour resources available for work but unable to find work, and so is a better 
measures of the level of spare capacity in the Scottish labour market. 
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Table 3: Forecasts of Scottish employee jobs (‘000s, expect where stated) and net change in employee 
jobs in central forecast, 2014 to 2016 
 2014 2015 2016 
Total employee jobs, Dec          2,391,560  
         
2,433,179          2,482,058  
Net annual change (jobs)          46,560  
         
41,600                48,900  
% change from previous year 2.0% 1.7% 2.0% 
 
   
Agriculture (jobs, 000s)          41  
         
44                        47  
Annual change          3,600  
         
3,050                  3,300  
Production (jobs, 000s)          252  
         
257                      262  
Annual change          2,100  
         
4,400                  5,400  
Construction (jobs, 000s)          121  
         
122                      124  
Annual change          1,600  
         
1,550                  1,900  
Services (jobs, 000s)          1,978  
         
2,011                  2,049  
Annual change          39,250  
         
32,600                38,300  
 
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, November 2014  
 
Table 4: Net annual change in employee jobs in central, upper and lower forecast, 2014 to 2016 
 
 2014 2015 2016 
 
Upper 
 
53,000 
 
53,450 
 
76,750 
Central 46,560 41,600 48,900 
Lower 33,400 19,900 29,900 
    
    
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, November 2014  
The recent labour market data at time of writing (7th November) indicates that the ILO unemployment 
rate in Scotland was 6.4% in the second quarter of 2014, down 0.2 percentage points on Q1 2014.In 
June we forecast that the unemployment rate would fall to 6.4% by the end of 2014. In light of stronger 
than anticipated growth in the first half of 2014 we have revised down our forecasts for the 
unemployment rate for the end of this year (although in line with an easing of growth in activity, we 
anticipate the rate of decline to slow). 
Our new forecasts for the unemployment rate in Scotland at the end of 2014 and 2015 are 5.3% and 
5.2% respectively. Figure 4 shows both the history of the ILO measure of the Scottish unemployment 
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rate since 2006 and our central, upper and lower forecasts for the ILO unemployment rate, now 
extended out to 2016. 
 
Table 5: Forecasts of Scottish unemployment in central forecasts, 2014 to 2016 
 
2014 2015 2016 
 
ILO unemployment 124,700 141,019 135,537 
 
Rate (%)1 5.3 5.2 5.0 
    
 
Note: Absolute job numbers are rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by 
total of economically active population aged 16 and over. The most recent labour market statistics are detailed in the 
Labour Market Section of the Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary. 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, November 2014  
 
Figure 4: Scottish ILO unemployment rate, 2006 to 2016 including forecasts from 2014 
 
Sources: ONS and Fraser of Allander Institute forecasts, November 2014  
 
 
Grant Allan 
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3 Review of Scottish Business Surveys 
Eleanor Malloy, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Abstract  
 
Business surveys are a useful tool to provide accurate and timely data and are extremely helpful in 
pinpointing subtle movements in the economy.  Recent Scottish business surveys paint a broadly 
positive picture, albeit perhaps slightly subdued compared to surveys from the start of 2014.  They 
continue to indicate that growth in output and jobs remains robust and many trends remain broadly 
favourable, although early indications are that the pace of recovery may be slowing and that some 
vulnerability may remain.  Many business surveys use net balances, determined by subtracting the 
percentage reporting declines from the percentages reporting increases,  and a number of recent 
surveys show more and more businesses reporting that trends have ‘remained constant’ indicating a 
degree of stability,  although the pace of recovery is slowing somewhat. .   
Bank of Scotland Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) 
The PMI which measures month-on-month changes in manufacturing and services output stood at 54.0 
in May 2014, rose to 55.9 in June, rose further in July to 56.8 (a six month high) then eased to 54.6 in 
August and eased still further to 51.5 in September 2014. These latest set of surveys add weight to the 
view that although the economy continues to grow, the pace of growth is beginning to ease. 
The PMI for July 2014 saw Business activity rise at its fastest rate for six months and also reported a 
robust increase in overall new business, although the weakness in manufacturers' export sales 
continued. In August the PMI reported that employment was rising at its fastest rate since 2007.  Despite 
the robust headline figure however, the pace of growth in Scotland remained below the UK-wide 
average, and the September 2014 index pointed to the slowest rate of growth for 18 months. 
Bank of Scotland Business Monitor 
The Bank of Scotland Business Monitor covers the production and services sectors and the latest survey 
(Summer 2014) showed the Scottish economy performing at pre-recession levels. Turnover trends 
showed their best results for over seven years since spring 2007; and encouragingly expectations for the 
rest of the year remain robust. 
In the three months ending August 2014, a net balance of 30% of respondents reported an increase in 
turnover; again this is the best result in over seven years and helped return the net balance figure to pre-
recession levels.  Volumes of repeat business remained at high levels and indeed improved compared 
to the previous quarter and to the same period in 2013. Trends in the volume of new business also 
continued to rise.  Total volumes of business continued the positive trend showing a net balance of 
+31%, a rise compared to both the +27% of the previous quarter and the +24% in the same quarter one 
year ago. The improvement was evident across both production and services firms.  The Business 
Monitor also reported that export activity, on balance, continued to rise 
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A net balance of 21% expect turnover to continue to rise during the period to the end of February 2015. 
Service firms are more optimistic than production firms, with service firms showing an overall net 
balance for turnover for the next six months at +26% compared to only +14% of production firms. 
Future expectations in the survey fell marginally but were still at pre-recession levels, suggesting that the 
recovery will continue throughout 2014 and into 2015. 
Manufacturing 
Respondents to the Fraser of Allander / Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly Business Survey 
(QBS) reported that although  business optimism continued to improve for a net  balance of +11.9% of 
firms, the rate of increase eased in Q3/14.  Respondents to the Scottish Engineering Quarterly Review 
for Q3/14 reported that general optimism levels remain positive, if slightly down on the previous quarter. 
Optimism levels were higher for fabrication  and machine shop sectors than for mechanical equipment 
and electronics. 
Total orders continued to increase in Q3 for a net balance of +30.6% QBS firms, while fewer than 20% 
of firms reported a decline.  Orders are set to continue to improve for a net balance of firms.   Order 
levels among Scottish Engineering firms eased in the third quarter compared to the second quarter of 
2014. This was particularly evident with regard to exports; however, encouragingly companies are 
predicting an improvement in Q4/14.  A small net balance of 4% reported a decline in their total order 
intake, the first negative balance since September 2013.  Small companies reported more positive 
trends in orders than did medium-sized and large companies and within the sectors, electronics and 
mechanical equipment were negative while  fabricators, metal manufacturing and transport firms all 
reported positive net balances. 
Investment plans in general remain upbeat for both Chamber of Commerce members and Scottish 
Engineering respondents.  The average capacity used eased from 79% in Q2/14 to 72% for QBS firms, 
while almost half of businesses (47%) reported operating at below optimum levels of capacity.  
Employment improved in Q3/14 for a net balance of QBS manufacturing firms, with only 7.1% of 
manufacturing firms reporting that overall employment levels had reduced and only 6% expecting a fall 
in Q4/14. Scottish Engineering reported that staffing levels in general eased in Q3 but remained positive, 
and that forecasts for the next quarter in general show a further increase. 
Construction 
While business optimism among QBS construction firms eased, only a quarter of firms reported a 
decline in business confidence.  The latest Scottish Construction Monitor (SCB) quarterly survey for 
Q3/14 also showed that construction firms remained positive but that confidence had eased somewhat.  
Orders continued to improve for QBS respondents albeit at a slower pace than in Q2/14 and a net 
balance of 20% expect a further rise in Q4/14.  Public sector orders declined in Q3/14 and a net balance 
expect a further decline in Q4/14.   
On average QBS construction firms were utilising 83% of available capacity and work-in-progress 
increased from +33.3 to +38.7. 
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Recruitment difficulties are becoming more apparent with more than 45% of QBS construction firms that 
had attempted to recruit reporting increased difficulties.  The average wage increase among QBS firms 
rose from 4% in Q2/14 to 5.7% in Q3/14, the highest figure for 7 years.  
Retail 
A net balance of -12.3% of QBS firms reported a decline in retail optimism.  A net of firms also reported 
a decline in sales although a small net balance are forecasting a rise in Q4/14.  Employment trends 
remained strong in Q3/13 with a net balance of 17% reporting a rise and only 7% reporting a reduction in 
total employment levels.  Prices are stabilising with net balance of firms expecting to raise prices. 
The Scottish Retail Consortium reported that sales September declined by 2.9% compared to the same 
period last year when they rose by 1/8% and like-for-like sales decreased by 4.2%.   
Tourism 
Optimism levels among Scottish hotels continued to improve in the three months to the end of 
September 2014, and Visit Scotland also recorded a rise in confidence.  
As forecast by firms in the Q2/14 QBS survey, the net trends in visitors continued to increase during 
Q3/14 with both domestic and overseas trends continuing to improve.   
Visit Scotland reported a 12% decline in domestic overnight tourism to Scotland (GB residents) in June 
2014 compared to June 2013.  International tourism in Q2/14, on the other hand, was at its highest level 
since 2007 and 13% up on the same period in 2013. The number of day trips for the year to August 
2014 was up 5.2% and spend was up 7.8%.   Hotel occupancy rates for July were fairly flat but rises 
were reported in Forth Valley, Ayrshire and Arran and Glasgow and the Clyde Valley.  
A net balance of +21.3% of QBS tourism firms reported an increase in employment during Q3/14 and 
not unexpectedly employment is expected to decrease in Q4/14 given the seasonality of the industry. Of 
the more than half of hotels to the QBS that had attempted to recruit in the 3 months to the end of 
September 2014 a quarter of them reported an increase in recruitment difficulties. 
Outlook 
A common theme permeating many of the latest set of business surveys in Scotland is that the rate of 
economic growth will continue though at slower rate of increase heading into 2015. Expectations for 
2015 are generally at historically high levels although they are beginning to ease from the recent record 
highs of 2014, suggesting that the recovery will continue and will become increasingly rooted.  Many of 
the surveys show that employment levels have improved and are expected to continue to rise. 
However, for some manufacturing sectors trading conditions remain more challenging than those 
experienced by service firms, most probably due to the situation internationally with signs of only a weak 
recovery in the Eurozone.  Growth remains, to a large extent, reliant on household spending and in order 
to sustain growth over the longer term, an increase in investment is required.  The recovery in Europe, 
which account for half of Scotland’s exports, remains fairly subdued.  This poses   a challenge to 
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exporters to widen their export markets and remain competitive to ensure that the recovery is 
sustainable in the longer term. 
In conclusion, recent Scottish business surveys paint a broadly positive picture, albeit perhaps slightly 
subdued compared to surveys from the start of 2014.  They continue to indicate that growth in output 
and jobs remains fairly robust and many trends remain broadly favourable, although early indications are 
that the pace of recovery may be slowing and that some vulnerability may remain.   
Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported by a number of business surveys. This report draws on: 
Lloyds TSB Business Monitor Issue 67  June 2014 – August 2014; 
Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey Q3 2014 
Scottish Engineering  Quarterly Review Q3 2014;  
The Bank of Scotland Markit Economics Regional Monthly Purchasing Managers’ Indices (PMI) for July 2014 – 
September  2014; 
The Scottish Retail Consortium’s KPMG Monthly Scottish Retail Sales Monitor for September 2014 
Visit Scotland Occupancy surveys for Q1 2014. 
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4 Scottish labour market 
Andrew Ross, Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
This section provides an overview of key labour market data in Scotland and contrasts these with both 
UK performance and changes over time. These data are from a range of the latest labour market data 
for Scotland and the UK, to August 2014. The Scottish unemployment rate stands at 5.5%, below the UK 
rate of 6.0%. The employment rate in Scotland is 73.9%, with the UK figure 73%. In 2014 the number of 
people in employment in Scotland has reached the highest on record. Growth in employment, however, 
is still sustained by part-time workers and self-employment. Wages have failed to show sustained growth 
suggesting that traditional wage setting mechanisms remain impaired. Thus, despite the positive signs of 
recovery in the Scottish labour market, there is still remaining slack and possibly even wider structural 
issues.  
Recent trends and statistics  
The latest comparable figures on the labour market between Scotland and the United Kingdom in the 
quarter to October 2014 are summarised in Table 1. Labour Force Survey (LFS) data show that in the 
quarter to October 2014 the level of employment in Scotland rose by 35 thousand, to 2,611 thousand 
and over the year by 52 thousand. For the same period, UK employment rose by 46 thousand and 736 
thousand respectively. The Scottish employment rate (16 – 64) – i.e. those in employment as a 
percentage of the working age population – was 73.9%, up 1.3% from one year earlier. For the same 
period the UK employment rate was 73.0%, up 1.5% compared to a year earlier. Scottish 
unemployment, in the quarter to October 2014, fell by 40 thousand to 151 thousand, a fall of 52 
thousand over the year.   
 
 
 
Table 1: Headline indicators of the Scottish and UK labour markets, June – August 2014 
 
  
Scotland 
Change 
on 
quarter 
Change 
on year 
United 
Kingdom 
Change 
on 
quarter 
Change 
on year 
Employment* 
 
Level 
(000s) 2,611 35 52 30,763 46 736 
Rate (%) 73.9 0.9 1.3 73.0 0.1 1.5 
Unemployment** 
 
Level 
(000s) 151 -40 -52 1,972 -154 -538 
Rate (%) 5.5 -1.4 -1.9 6.0 -0.4 -1.7 
Inactivity*** 
 
Level 
(000s) 739 8 9 9,028 113 -46 
Rate (%) 21.7 0.3 0.3 22.2 0.3 -0.2 
        
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland and UK, October 2014.  
Notes:   * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64). 
  ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64). 
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The relationships between employment, unemployment, total economically active and inactive are 
important in discerning the reaction of the labour market to overall economic conditions. It is important to 
appreciate that changing levels of employment and unemployment, and changes in employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in activity rates. For example, if people leave employment 
and become unemployed (i.e. are actively seeking work they remain economically active) the 
unemployment rate will increase, but the rate of those economically active will remain unchanged. 
However, if people leave employment and do not seek employment, as seems to be a continuing 
pattern, they are then categorised as economically inactive, and as such the unemployment rate will 
remain unchanged, whilst the activity and inactivity rates will change. Equally, the changing pattern 
between full and part time employment is of interest as we uncover how the labour market is reacting to 
the overall economic conditions. We return to this issue later in this section. 
 
Table 1 shows that for Scotland the preferred International Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of 
unemployment fell to 151 thousand, between June – August 2014, a fall of 52 thousand over the year. 
The ILO unemployment rate fell in the months to October 2014 and now stands at 5.5%. This represents 
a 1.4% fall over the last quarter and a 1.9% fall over the year. The comparable ILO unemployment rate 
for the UK stands at 6.0%, and is down 0.4% over the most recent quarter and down 1.7% over the year. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the trend in unemployment in Scotland and the UK since 2000. Between 2000 and 
2014 unemployment in Scotland was at its lowest (111 thousand) in May – June 2008, immediately 
preceding the worldwide financial crash and the subsequent Great Recession. Unlike the pattern of 
previous recessions, unemployment has fallen more rapidly than expected to just below 200 thousand, 
reflecting in part the more rapid rise in part time and self-employment (see Figure 2 and Table 5). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates how the employment ‘recovery’ continues to be driven by an increase in part time 
work and self-employment. Growth in full-time workers remains subdued and has failed to gain 
momentum over the past years. A strong and sustained recovery in the labour market would require a 
more robust growth in full-time workers. It is questionable whether the number of full-time workers will 
‘ever’ reach pre-recession levels. The data point towards a more permanent structural shift towards part-
time work and self-employment in the Scottish labour market. 
 
 
Note: In considering employment, activity and unemployment rates it is important to remember the 
bases and relationships of these figures. LFS data (estimated) is provided for: (1) all aged 16 and 
over and (2) for all aged 59/64. The first measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to higher numbers in 
employment, in the total economically active and economically inactive – but reduces the economic 
activity rates and unemployment rates, but at the same time increases the economically inactive 
rate. Conversely the second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads to lower numbers economically 
active, in employment and economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically active, 
employment and unemployment rates but lower economically inactive rates. See Scottish Parliament 
Information Centre briefing on Scottish labour market statistics: 
https://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/70894.aspx 
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Figure 1: Unemployment (in millions) in Scotland and the UK 2000 – August 2014 
 
 
 
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland and UK, October 2014. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in full, part time and self-employment January 2004 – June 2014 
 
 
 
Source:  ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, October 2014. 
Notes: October 2007 – September 2007 = 100. 
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The economically active workforce includes all individuals actively seeking employment and those 
currently in employment (i.e. self-employed, private sector and government employed, unpaid family 
workers and those in training programmes). Between June – August 2014 the number of economically 
active (16+) in Scotland decreased by 5 thousand, and the activity rate decreased by 0.2% to 63.2%. 
There were 2,762 thousand economically active in Scotland during June – August 2014. This comprised 
2,611 thousand in employment (2,524 thousand aged 16–64) and 151 thousand ILO unemployed. The 
level for those of working age but economically inactive increased by 10 thousand (0.6%) in the latest 
quarter, and increased by 21 thousand (1.3%) over the year to 1,606 thousand. 
 
Economic inactivity for men aged 16 – 64 decreased by 0.4% over the year, and decreased by 0.2% for 
women over the year to August 2014. In the year from July 2013 to June 2014 the key components of 
change in inactivity were fewer: students, down by 10 thousand;  people looking after family members 
and/or home, down 1 thousand; retirees, down 3 thousand; long-term sick, down 3 thousand; those 
temporarily sick remained unchanged. Though the majority of the inactive (215 thousand) did not want a 
job, 86 thousand wanted employment. 
 
Data on employment by age, derived from the Annual Population Survey, is available up to July 2013 – 
June 2014. Table 2 illustrates the changing employment rates by age group form July 2005 onwards. In 
the year to June 2014, employment rates fell for workers aged 16-17 (by 5.3%) and 16-24 (by 0.9%). 
The largest increase in the employment rate was seen by these aged 50 – 64 (increase of 2.6%). The 
employment rate for all workers aged 16 and over increased by 1.0 % over the year to June 2014 to 
58.6%.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Employment rates (%) by age and selected age cohorts, Scotland July 2005 – June 2014 
 
(In %)  
Jul-Jun. 
Jun-06 Jun-07 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Jun-13 Jun-14 
          
All 16+ 59.7 60.6 60.8 59.8 58.3 58.2 58.0 57.6 58.6 
          
16 - 64 73.0 73.9 74.2 72.8 71.0 70.9 70.9 70.6 72.0 
16 - 17 43.1 43.1 39.4 38.0 30.4 33.6 29.0 29.8 24.5 
18 - 24 68.1 68.7 68.5 65.9 62.2 61.2 59.9 59.1 59.2 
16-24 62.7 63.2 62.2 60.0 55.6 55.6 53.7 53.2 52.3 
25 - 34 79.5 81.1 81.6 80.3 78.3 79.0 79.6 79.2 80.2 
35 - 49 82.9 83.7 83.9 82.3 81.0 81.5 81.3 81.1 82.8 
50 - 64 63.0 64.2 65.5 64.8 64.4 63.3 64.2 64.0 66.6 
65+ 5.0 5.6 5.7 6.6 6.5 6.7 7.1 8.1 8.5 
          
Source: ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, October 2014.  
Note:  Denominator = all persons in the relevant age group. 
 
Table 3 provides some indications, although with reservations, of the changing pattern of employment 
since July 2006 to June 2014 for different occupational groups (SOC2010). 
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Table 3: Percentage in employment in Scotland, by occupation, July 2006 – June 2014  
 
(In %) Jul-Jun. Jun-07 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Jun-13 Jun-14 
         
Managers and directors  8   9   9   9   9   8   9   9  
Professional occupations  18   18   19   18   18   19   20   20  
Associate prof & tech  12   13   13   13   13   13   13   13  
Administrative & secretarial  12   12   12   12   11   11   11   11  
Skilled trades occupations   12   12   12   12   12   11   11   11  
Caring, leisure and service   10   9   9   10   10   10   9   10  
Sales and customer service   9   9   9   9   9   9   9   9  
Process, plant and machine   7   7   7   7   7   7   6   6  
Elementary occupations  12   11   11   12   11   12   11   11  
         
Source: Annual Population Survey, NOMIS, October 2014. 
Notes:  Occupation in Standard Occupational Classification (SOC). 
Rounding means totals do not add to 100. 
 
 
Total workforce job figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total seasonally adjusted 
workforce jobs in Scotland for June 2014 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,693 thousand, (i.e. 
2,359 thousand employee jobs, 315 thousand self-employed jobs, HM forces and supported trainees 19 
thousand). Table 4 indicates the sectorial breakdown and provides some indication of both the impact of 
the recession and the differential recovery in jobs across sectors.  As noted above, these trends need to 
be considered with some caution as workforce jobs measure jobs rather than people in employment and 
are subject to extensive revision.   
 
Table 5 outlines the changing patterns of full time and part time employment. The latest data indicates 
that from January 2013 to December 2013, the number of employees has increased by 26 thousand, 
whereas the numbers of self-employed have decreased by 16 thousand. Even though the numbers of 
part-time workers have decreased by 10 thousand over the year, the number of temporary employees 
has increased by 6 thousand.  
 
Table 5 also indicates that the numbers of full-time workers in Scotland has increased by 23 thousand 
(1.3%) over the year from January 2013 – December 2013. Part-time employment numbers have grown 
through the recession, though they did decrease by 10 thousand over the year to December 2013. The 
changing trends in full and part-time employment since January 2006 are shown in Figure 2. The rising 
number of self-employed indicates some substitution of self-employment for employment.  
 
The number of those working part-time because they could not find a full time job is 121 thousand (see 
Table 5), suggesting that increasing numbers of workers are taking par-time employment in the absence 
of available full time work. The number of people who cannot find a full-time job is still almost double 
compared to pre-recession numbers. This reflects continuing issues in the wider economy.  
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Table 4: Total workforce jobs by industry, Scotland, June 2009 – June 2014 
 
Industry (in thousands, SIC07) Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Jun-13 Jun-14 
       All jobs  2,650 2,576 2,613 2,628 2,605 2,693 
       
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 54 60 49 54 54 60 
Mining & quarrying 30 30 29 34 37 39 
Manufacturing 203 185 189 198 196 196 
Electricity & gas 16 21 20 17 13 15 
Water supply, sewerage, waste  16 14 16 18 15 17 
Construction 187 168 178 171 164 164 
Wholesale & retail trade 392 378 372 369 375 377 
Transport & storage 117 111 112 115 116 116 
Accommodation & food service  194 174 185 180 174 179 
Information & communication 76 70 65 72 69 70 
Financial & insurance activities 101 91 91 91 89 101 
Real estate activities 34 27 31 36 39 40 
Professional scientific & technical 176 171 192 211 197 187 
Administrative & support service 195 195 187 196 215 232 
Public admin & defence 162 160 155 154 153 150 
Education 197 198 206 197 197 204 
Human health & social work 367 375 387 375 373 398 
Arts, entertainment & recreation 70 77 87 81 76 79 
Other service activities 58 65 59 57 52 67 
People employed by households 3 5 2 2 1 3 
        
Source:  ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, October 2014 
Notes:  * Workforce jobs are a measure of jobs rather than people. There are extensive revisions from previous figures 
 
 
 
Table 5: Trends in Scottish total, full-time, part-time, self-employed and temporary employment etc. and 
those unable to find a full- time job 
 
All in employment  
Dec-06 Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 Dec-10 Dec-11 Dec-12 Dec-13 
(in thousands) Jan-Dec. 
 
        
Employees *  2,217   2,244   2,243   2,210   2,185   2,167   2,146   2,172  
Self-employed *  264   263   268   265   268   283   302   286  
Full-time workers **  1,867   1,892   1,900   1,844   1,796   1,785   1,772   1,795  
Part-time workers **  629   631   626   645   672   676   684   674  
Workers with 2nd job  96   93   99   102   97   96   101   95  
Temporary employees  129   128   116   133   125   121   127   134  
Could not find full-time job  59   60   64   84   107   114   115   121  
Total *  2,498   2,525   2,529   2,492   2,472   2,464   2,468   2,481  
                  
 
Source:  ONS Labour Market Statistics, Scotland, October 2014 
Notes: * Includes people who did not state whether they worked part time or full time 
 ** The split between full time and part time employment is based on respondents’ self-classification 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2)  Scottish economy 
November 2014  43 
Real wages 
This section revisits the prevailing issue surrounding the ‘slow’ growth in real wages, as discussed in the 
previous and more extensively in this issue of the Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary. 
The following builds on analysis by Blanchflower and Machin (2014a,b) whilst focusing on Scotland. To 
set the scene, Mark Carney (2014), the Governor of the Bank of England, argued the following in a 
speech on 9 September 2014:  
 
“As employment approaches its new higher level, wage pressures should increase and capital 
investment should continue to recover. Productivity growth should pick up bringing the higher, 
sustainable pay rises that British workers deserve. Specifically, the Bank’s latest forecast 
expects real wage growth to resume around the middle of next year and then to accelerate as 
the unemployment rate continues to fall to around 5½ percent over the next three years. By the 
end of our forecast, we see 4 percent nominal pay growth on average across the economy.” 
 
This forecasted wage growth would most certainly be welcomed by British workers as real wages have 
been in negative territory since 2008 (see Figure 3). With around 60 percent of total Scottish Household 
income stemming from wages (Emonts-Holley, Ross and Swales, 2014), it is particularly important that 
wages outpace, or at least stay par with inflation. Continuing weak performance of pay growth, however, 
does not provide sufficient evidence to support such positive forecasts on wage growth. Moreover, 
unemployment has seen big declines across the UK without any sign of a robust recovery in wage 
growth.  
 
As discussed in the previous issue of the Fraser Economic Commentary, until real wages move into 
positive territory the prospects for a sustained growth in UK household spending must remain uncertain. 
One critical factor here is whether labour productivity can begin to grow strongly. Without a step-change 
in the rate of growth of productivity the likelihood is that the recovery - as the economy begins to 
approach capacity - will see rising nominal wages but little increase in real wages as the growth of 
product prices matches that of nominal wage growth.  
 
Data suggest that Scottish real wage growth became positive in 2013 whilst UK growth has remained 
negative for the past three years (see Figure 4). This could be due to a faster growth in labour 
productivity in Scotland than in the UK, but we have no up-to-date data on labour productivity on this 
matter. 
 
The current state of the labour market can be summarised as follows: the Scottish unemployment rate 
stands at 5.5%, below the UK rate of 6.0%. The employment rate in Scotland is 73.9%, with the UK 
figure 73%. The number of people in employment in Scotland reached the highest on record (see 
Section 4 for more data on the Scottish labour market). One could expect real wages to be positive 
given this rather strong performance of the labour market. Real wages, however, have been largely 
negative since 2008.  
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The latest UK figures from the Labour Force Survey on Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) show that a 
sustainable growth of real wages in not in sight. Figure 3 shows the growth in UK real wages (UK AWE) 
- total pay (% changes year on year) deflated by CPI (% change over 12 months) – since January 2001. 
The data show little evidence that the UK real wage is aiming for positive territory. 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Real UK average wage growth January 2001 to August 2014 (%) 
 
 
 
Source:  ONS Labour Force Survey and Fraser of Allander Institute calculations. 
 
Data on pay that contain regional identifiers are significantly lagged. Latest data from the Annual Survey 
of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) are summarised in Figure 4 and show median gross weekly pay in real 
terms from 2007 to 2013.  
 
 
Data in Figure 4 for Scotland suggest that median real wages have increased into positive territory. In 
contrast, UK real wages have remained negative since 2008. This could suggest that Scottish real wage 
growth has also outpaced UK growth in 2014. More timely data, however, are not available (this 
highlights the need for real-time economic data see e.g. Ross (2013) and Boyd (2014) in this 
Commentary). As such, it is not clear whether the positive real wage growth in Scotland is pointing 
towards signs of sustainable recovery or just a ‘dead cat bounce’. The more recent data from the LFS 
shown in Figure 3, however, would indicate the latter. 
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Note: The median income is the income of what would be the employed person in the middle, if the 
income from all employed in the UK were sorted in a list from ‘smallest’ to ‘largest’. As it represents 
the middle of the income distribution, the median employment income provides a good indication of 
the income of the “typical” employee. It is thereby a better indicator than mean income as it is less 
likely to be skewed by outliers. 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2)  Scottish economy 
November 2014  45 
 
 
Figure 4: Median weekly pay gross, real terms, all employee jobs, from 2007-2013 (£) 
 
 
 
Source:  ONS ASHE and Fraser of Allander Institute calculations. 
Note: Data based on results for 2007-2009, revised 2010-2012, and provisional results for 2013. The calculation of real wage growth is 
based on the assumption that CPI inflation in Scotland is the same as in the UK. 
 
The recovery in employment since 2008 has largely been driven by an increase in part-time and self-
employment (see ONS (2014b) and D’Arcy & Gardiner (2014) for detailed analysis of UK self-
employment). Self-employment earnings, however, are not covered by the LFS AWE or ASHE. Hence,   
a significant proportion of the labour market - and the key driver of the recent labour market ‘recovery’ - 
is not taken into consideration. 
 
Figure 5 shows weekly median income for the self-employed in the UK, sourced from the Family 
Resource Survey (FRS). The data for the UK show that there has been a strong decrease in self-
employment earnings from 2007/08 onwards. Thereby a significant increase would be required here to 
outpace inflation and bring self-employment income growth into positive territory. 
 
A robust source for regional data on self-employment is Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC, 
2013). Figure 6 shows weekly median income of the self-employed from both the HMRC (UK, England 
and Scotland) and the FRS (UK only). The data are not compatible (due to significant differences in the 
underlying methodology) but give a broad indication of underlying trends. The HMRC data are not 
complete, and show less volatility compared to the FRS. Major peaks and troughs are, however, 
comparable. Thereby it can be expected that regional self-employment earnings will follow the 
downward trend that the FRS shows for 2012/13. Given this, neither HMRC nor FRS data would suggest 
sustainable growth in self-employment income.  
 (6.00)
 (5.00)
 (4.00)
 (3.00)
 (2.00)
 (1.00)
 -
 1.00
 2.00
 3.00
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Scotland
UK
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2)  Scottish economy 
November 2014  46 
 
 
Figure 5: UK median weekly self-employment income from 2002/03-2012/13 (£) 
 
 
 
Source:  DWP Family Resource Survey. 
Note:  Self-employed and employees are aged 16 and over. 
 (1) Income figures are in 2013 prices. 
 
 
Even though this topic can only be touched upon briefly herein, declining Trade Union membership may 
have played a significant role in the recent stagnant development of wage growth. Historically, Trade 
Union membership has played a significant role in generating sustainable wage growth (see e.g. 
Blanchflower 1986, Gregg and Machin 1991, 1992). Union influence over pay setting, however, has 
been in decline for three decades.  
 
The latest figures from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) indicate that by 2011 
only 7% of private sector workplaces in UK bargained with unions over pay for any of their employees 
and just under one sixth of private sector employees (16%) had their pay set by collective bargaining. 
These figures have remained fairly stable since 2004 (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013).   
 
Also, the percentage of all unionised workplaces normally negotiating over pay, hours and holidays fell 
from 32% in 2004 to 25% in 2011. This fall was concentrated in the private sector where the percentage 
declined from 27% to 18%, suggesting a hollowing out of recognition in that part of the economy (Van 
Wanrooy et al., 2013). Figure 7 shows Trade Union membership levels by sector from 1995 to 2013. 
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Figure 6: Median weekly income of the self-employed from 2003/04-2011/12 (£) 
 
 
Source: HMRC Personal income by tax statistics, DWP Family Resource Survey, and Fraser of Allander Institute calculations. 
Note: HMRC data for 2008-09 are not available. Data are not adjusted for inflation. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: UK Trade Union membership levels (000s) by sector from 1995-2013 
 
 
 
Source: ONS Labour Force Survey. 
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To conclude, the labour market has shown a rather robust recovery in Scotland (and in the UK). From 
this, it could be expected that there is more than sufficient pressure to push real wages into positive 
territory. Scottish real wages have seen an increase into positive territory in 2013. More timely data, 
however, suggest that the UK has not yet experienced significant enough growth in wages to outpace 
inflation. 
 
The recent recovery in the labour market has been largely driven by part-time and self-employment. 
Self-employment income, however, has been stagnating and even lacks any signs of healthy nominal 
growth. Thereby a large part of the labour market is experiencing a significant decrease in real income.  
 
There has been a decisive decline in Trade Union membership and, more importantly, Union influence 
over pay setting. Thereby, the traditional mechanism by which wage growth is supported has been 
impaired. Significant pressure on wages can therefore not be expected to feed through this channel. 
 
These rather bleak data, however, are somewhat selective. There are more positive signs on the horizon 
that could help accelerate wage growth in future (i.e. the current push towards a ‘living’ wage). 
Sustainable and balanced household consumption requires wages to grow at a faster pace than 
currently observed. Productivity will improve and pressure on wages will thereby mount over time 
pushing real wages into positive territory. Given current developments, however, one would not expect 
this to occur in the short-run.    
 
References 
Blanchflower, D., and Machin, S. (2014a) Real wages continue to fall in the UK, VoxEU.org, 29 September. Available 
from: http://www.voxeu.org/article/real-wages-continue-fall-uk 
 
Blanchflower, D., and Machin, S. (2014b) Falling real wages in the UK, VoxEU.org, 12 May. Available from: 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/falling-real-wages-uk 
 
Blanchflower, D. (1986) What effect do unions have on relative wages in Great Britain? British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 24: 196–204. 
 
Boyd, S. (2014) Labour market changes and implications for policy and Labour Market Information (LMI) in Scotland. 
Fraser of Allander Economic Commentary, 38(2), 63–80.  
 
Carney, M. (2014) Speech - the prospects for the UK labour market.  
 
D’Arcy, C., and Gardiner, L. (2014) Just the job – or a working compromise? Resolution Foundation. 
 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (2013) Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey, 2011. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA̺SN̺7226̺1 
 
Emonts-Holley, T., Ross, A., and Professor Swales, J.K. (2014) A Social Accounting Matrix for Scotland. Fraser of 
Allander Institute Economic Commentary, 38(1), 84–93.  
 
Gregg, P., and Machin, S. (1991) Changes in union status, increasing competition and wage growth in the 1980s. 
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 29: 603–612. 
 
Gregg, P., and Machin, S. (1992) Unions, the demise of the closed shop and wage growth in the 1980s. Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 54: 53–72. 
 
Ross, A. (2013) Nowcasting with Google Trends : a keyword selection method. Fraser of Allander Economic 
Commentary, 37(2), 54–64.  
 
Van Wanrooy, B., Bewley, H., Bryson, A., Forth, J., Freeth, S., Stokes, L., and Wood S. (2013) The 2011 Workplace 
Employment Relations Study: first findings (fourth edition). 
 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2) Economic perspectives 
November 2014 49 
 
 
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION  
 
This edition of the Fraser of Allander Commentary (Vol. 38, No.2, November 2014), the first after the historic 
Scottish Independence Referendum, has much to say about the current state and prospects for the Scottish 
economy.  Despite encouraging ‘headline’ indicators, the nature, strength and sustainability of output and 
employment growth appear balanced on a knife edge.  Many of the issues relating to any assessment of future 
prospects relate to the nature of the contemporary labour market. 
The article by Darby and McIntyre sets out the issues facing policymakers – especially macroeconomic policy 
makers – as they try to assess whether and when to tighten monetary policy by starting the process to raise 
interest rates.  Much of this issue revolves around whether there is still ‘slack’ in the economy; many, including 
the Fraser of Allander Institute, think there is.  A second article by Boyd focuses on the current Scottish labour 
market; its retention of people in the labour market post-crisis and well as the growth – evident before the crisis 
– of part time, self-employment and insecure forms of employment (eg zero hours contract etc.).  The 
implications both for labour market policy and timely labour market statistics in Scotland (and the UK) are 
noted. 
The development of Scottish economic statistics is outlined by Spowage. The importance of accurate, 
independent and timely economic statistics is noted as is their relationship to Scotland’s existing - and 
prospective (via the Smith Commission) - devolved powers.  Importantly, the point is made that the best 
(economic) statistics evolve from the direct engagement of users.  The article points out how interested parties 
can become engaged to help develop better economic statistics for Scotland, its policy makers and citizens. 
The timeliness of economic statistics is a key issue for policy makers. The article on ‘Nowcasting’  by Allan, 
Koop, McIntyre and Smith of the Economics Department and Fraser of Allander Institute at the University of 
Strathclyde provides as taster as to how to ‘nowcast’ the performance of  the Scottish economy.  This is an 
issue to which the Commentary will, no doubt, return.  
Scotland’s growth companies have an economic impact, disproportionate to their size.  Hopkins and 
Richmond’s analysis of a limited number of such companies, shows that acquisitions by Scottish companies 
are often the fastest way to grow a company and to add new markets and technologies.  They also show that 
the sale of such companies is not always a loss to the Scottish economy.  Their analysis raises questions as to 
the policy focus in Scotland to help develop fast-growth companies. 
Scotland’s progress in the current UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers is of interest to many (in Scotland).  How will 
Scotland progress in the tournament?  Analysing the literature and past international men’s football results, 
Scelles and Andreff provide a number of scenarios under which Scotland may indeed qualify to the finals in 
France in 2016. 
In the Commentary’s Policy Section, the article by Barbour, Morton and Schang speaks to how the very 
considerable financial challenges within the NHS in Scotland can be met.  The scale of the challenge is 
outlined as are a number of principles by which they might be successfully addressed.  Learning from other 
health systems, reconfiguring services, moving many out of hospitals and into the community and the positive 
patient support role of medical technologies are reviewed. 
The Scottish Independence Referendum was a defining moment in Scotland’s political and economic 
development.  How people voted is the subject of the article by Curtice.  He shows that the economic 
perspectives on the cases for and against independence were crucial to the outcome.  These economic 
perspectives are the subject of this Commentary’s final article by Young in which he notes that an unspoken 
aspect of both campaigns was the depth of the UK Union’s ‘single market’ that has been built up and 
developed over 300 years.  Far from being dead, as some have suggested, Young notes that voters’ 
understanding of the practical realities of the UK’s ‘single market’ was a critical factor in the final result. 
The Fraser Economic Commentary welcomes articles on economic and related policy issues, particularly as 
they relate to Scotland and other devolved nations and regions, in the UK, Europe and worldwide.  To do so, 
please contact the Editor. 
Kevin Kane 
Managing Editor 
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary 
k.kane@strath.ac.uk
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The post-crisis labour market and the challenges to 
policymakers 
 
Julia Darby & Stuart G. McIntyre, University of Strathclyde 
 
Introduction & Overview 
While headline figures on employment, the participation rate and the unemployment rate for the UK are 
encouraging, there is widespread agreement that the evolving changes in the labour market underlying 
these figures are more complex. One consequence is that headline labour market figures are less useful 
than they were previously for measuring the overall health of the labour market, not just in Scotland, but 
across the UK and many other countries.  
It is unclear at this stage whether many of the changes that have occurred will turn out to be temporary, 
and so can be expected to revert back to pre-crisis behaviour and norms as the recovery progresses, or 
whether the severity of the Great Recession has caused persistent changes in the functioning of the 
labour market.  This is important, not least since persistent structural changes may mean that policies 
that worked well in the past may no longer be appropriate.  
In this article we begin with a discussion of some key features of the post-crisis labour market. We then 
review a number of the challenges that the post-crisis labour market poses for policymakers, starting 
with how changes in the labour market impact on fiscal balances. We then emphasise that the UK 
Monetary Policy Committee’s assessment of the remaining slack in the labour market is critical to their 
decision as to how long monetary policy can be supportive of the recovery, without risking raising 
inflation above its target.   
We argue that it is critical to gain an understanding of the extent and nature of underemployment in the 
economy when making assessments of current labour market slack1. This understanding is also critical 
to motivating well designed policy interventions to deliver better labour market outcomes for those 
currently underemployed. We review a number of specific policy prescriptions, drawing on the existing 
literature, as well as on UK and Scottish government experiences. We argue that appropriate policy 
design is now of critical importance to reducing the risks of polarization of the labour market and secular 
stagnation.  
Recovery is progressing but evidence of a post-crisis hangover remains 
The most recent release of UK GDP data indicates that the 2008 peak in real GDP was finally surpassed 
during 2013 and the latest GDP growth figures are more buoyant, particularly when compared to those 
in much of the rest of Europe.  For some time now employment figures have been stronger than 
forecasts of the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) and the Bank of England. The path of 
                                                        
1
 The Scottish Parliament’s Economy, Energy and Tourism Committee published a report on “Underemployment in 
Scotland” in April 2013 . This report discusses the definition of the term, evidence on its prevalence, costs to 
individuals and the economy as a whole and sets out a number of policy options.  
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employment since 2010 has been markedly stronger than in previous recessions, although underlying 
the aggregate employment figures, the composition of employment is markedly different in the post-
crisis period and productivity and earnings have remained weaker than expected during the recovery. 
Much of the increase in total jobs has been concentrated in self-employment, part-time and temporary 
employment. Alongside this a small decline in numbers in full time employment is still evident relative to 
2008.   
These compositional changes are important. Self-employment has accounted for over one third of the 
rise in employment since 2010, and figures released by the Office of National Statistics ONS in August 
2014 show an increase of 732,000 since 2008:Q1 which accounts for 67% of the rise in total 
employment over the same period, see ONS (2014). This rise, in part, reflects a long-term trend, though 
the increase has been stronger than forecast. Prior to the crisis the construction industry was the most 
common sector for the self-employed, with around 40% of construction workers classified as self-
employed. However the crisis hit this sector the hardest, and between 2009 and 2014 it had seen the 
slowest growth in self-employment compared with other major industry groups. ONS figures show that 
the recent rise in self-employment was largest in professional, scientific and technical activities which 
include roles such as management consultant, book-keepers, photographers and chartered 
accountants.  
Reliable information on income from self-employment is only available with a long lag as early survey 
based estimates are replaced with data from self-assessed tax returns, but available information 
confirms that earnings of many of the new self-employed lie at the lower end of the income distribution. 
The Family Resource Survey indicates that in 2012/13 the average median income from self-
employment was £207 per week, a fall of 22% (after taking into account inflation) since 2008/091 
compared with a fall of around 6% for employees over the same period.  It’s likely that the aggregate 
figure includes some workers who became self-employed in response to temporarily low demand for 
labour and are working fewer hours than they desire. Some policy makers assume affected workers will 
prefer to switch back into employment as demand recovers. 
Another feature of the post-crisis labour market is underemployment. In broad terms underemployed 
include those working fewer hours than they would like or working in jobs that underutilise their skills; i.e. 
part-time workers that would prefer to be full-time and skilled workers currently in low paid, low skill jobs. 
Underemployment is distinct from unemployment in that the individuals are in work but are not working 
at their full capability. A benefit of underemployment, relative to unemployment, is that workers remain 
attached to the labour market. It is widely accepted that underemployment has contributed to the 
resilience of employment through the recession.  However, it also seems likely that underemployment is 
one factor that can help to explain the weakness of productivity in the face of rising employment, the so 
called productivity puzzle, which is evident both in terms of low output per worker and low output per 
hour, see for example Barnett et al. (2014). In our view, restoring productivity to pre-crisis trends is likely 
to require substantial outflows from underemployment into employment to better match desired hours 
and better utilise workers skills.  
It is particularly difficult to judge to what extent, and how quickly, underemployment of will dissipate. 
Janet Yellen, Chair of the Federal Reserve, touched on these issues and the challenges they pose to 
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those responsible for US monetary policy in her speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
Economic Symposium at Jackson Hole in August, Yellen (2014). UK policymakers face similar 
challenges, as we now explain. 
The implications of labour market developments for UK macroeconomic policy 
Policymakers have to make difficult judgments about the extent to which labour market developments 
such as those described above are cyclical and can be expected to revert to better understood norms as 
the recovery progresses, and the extent to which they are structural and can be expected to persist.  
Arguments that increases in participation, in part-time employment and in self-employment are likely to 
be temporary and will reverse as recovery progresses include suggestions that increased participation 
largely reflects firms’ and households’ responses to temporary impacts of the financial crisis. For 
example, increased participation of older workers can reflect postponement of retirement in response to 
reduced real asset values and lower income from savings.  At the same time, additional entrants into the 
labour force may be working to compensate for losses in household incomes associated with poorer 
outcomes for primary earners who have faced cuts in their hours and/or earnings. As asset values 
recover and primary earners return to their more usual hours of work, this form of participation may fall 
back, and could potentially do so quite quickly. It’s also possible that as the recovery progresses a lot of 
part-time workers should be able to get full-time jobs, although as Yellen points out, the ongoing shift in 
employment away from goods production and towards services, a sector which typically uses a greater 
portion of part-time workers, may well boost the share of part-time jobs in the longer term.  
From the fiscal policy perspective one key question is how much of the government’s budget deficit can 
be expected to narrow automatically as the economy recovers, and how quickly?  Labour market 
developments clearly matter here, given the importance of income tax and national insurance 
contributions paid by workers in total government receipts and the direct links between labour market 
developments and welfare payments, including those to the working poor.  
Reduced hours of work and earnings of primary earners have certainly reduced income tax receipts and 
the shortfall generated has not been offset by increased employment given that the new jobs have been 
disproportionately concentrated in low paid, part-time work. As the OBR have pointed out, this kind of 
employment-driven growth generates less in tax receipts because a given amount of labour income split 
between more people attracts a larger number of tax-free personal allowances, reducing the effective 
tax rate, see OBR (2014).  In this sense both the level and composition of labour income have become 
less favourable for public finances2. Indeed, this could well become more acute if there are further 
increases in the value of tax free allowances as some (political parties) propose. 
 
Successive OBR forecasts have assumed that recovery will broadly generate a return to pre-crisis 
norms, with relatively modest revisions made to potential output. When outturns have disappointed, their 
successive forecasts have broadly rolled forward the expected recovery and have made relatively 
modest revisions to potential output.  It would be more informative if forecast ranges were provided, and 
                                                        
2
 These issues have been discussed at length in recent weeks, see for example Cadman (2014), Houlder (2014) and 
Barrett and Giles (2014). 
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if implications of alternative speeds of recovery and alternative trajectories for potential output were 
discussed. For now, the OBR’s central forecasts do not appear to have taken on board the rather 
different characteristics of the most recent changes in the composition of employment, leaving them 
overoptimistic on income tax receipts and surprised by the continuing weakness in overall earnings 
growth.  Nonetheless, in its own recently published analysis of their forecast errors the OBR concludes 
that the biggest factors explaining the persistent errors in forecasts of income tax revenues have been 
weak earnings growth reflecting low productivity, along with lower dividend and interest income, OBR 
(2014). At the very least it would be helpful to see the implications of alternative scenarios discussed – 
admitting the possibility that the labour market may not recover to pre-crisis norms. 
 
In order for tax receipts to recover the OBR stress that the gap between actual and potential output 
needs to close and productivity needs to recover. It admits that considerable uncertainty remains in 
relation to how much productivity will recover as demand conditions improve and how much the shortfall 
in tax receipts reflects structural weakness that will not come back. Alongside errors in forecast income 
tax revenues it has been a challenge to for the OBR to accurately forecast welfare payments.  The main 
sources of errors that they’ve identified relate to housing benefits, tax credits, state pensions and job 
seekers allowance. The main theme being that in the post-crisis period a greater number of the working 
poor have been entitled to claim benefits and tax credits than before. Again, it is clear that a return to 
pre-crisis norms will only follow increases in productivity and wages.  
A second key question repeatedly asked of fiscal policymakers is can and should UK wide fiscal policy 
do more to support the recovery?  
 
A prominent policy of the UK Government has been to increase in the personal income tax allowance, at 
the same time as reducing expenditure across non-protected departments, and this is planned to 
continue. More specifically, the personal allowance has been increased in successive budgets by more 
than inflation, from £6,475 in 2010-11 to £10,000 by 2014-15 and will rise further on current plans, to 
£10,500 in 2015-16. There are some positive impacts of this policy: it takes some additional families on 
low incomes out of paying income tax and alongside welfare reforms further strengthens work incentives 
especially for some low earners. However, this is a policy that all tax payers benefit from, and while this 
may make it popular with voters in general, more targeted policies may be more effective in helping 
those with the lowest incomes/earnings. Those with the lowest incomes don’t benefit at all directly and 
are in fact could be worse off if the Government’s approach to funding tax giveaway involves reductions 
in welfare payments and public service provision. Other policy levers are available to the UK 
Government.  
 
Commentators including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UK’s Institute for Fiscal Studies 
(IFS) have pointed out that there are a number of other potential interventions that would have been 
better targeted at strengthening the labour market. The IMF has gone further in setting out a list of “job-
friendly” policies in their latest Fiscal Monitor, IMF (2014a), top among them are suggestions for targeted 
cuts in employer social security contributions (NICs), increased focus on growth enhancing public 
services; improving access to finance and training; safeguarding social needs by protecting social 
expenditure; and improving infrastructure, especially in the areas of transport, energy, and housing. The 
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IMF explains that this can be done at relatively low financing cost at present, with costs quickly offset by 
both short and long-term benefits. In conclusion, the IMF argue that the composition of fiscal policy can 
and should do more to support the recovery.  
 
From the perspective of monetary policymakers the challenge is to understand the implications of labour 
market developments for inflation3.  In the current low inflation environment key questions are: i) what 
degree of slack remains in the economy and ii) how far can monetary policy help to reduce this slack 
without boosting inflation above its target? 
 
UK monetary policy has maintained a highly accommodative stance since the crisis. Continuing this 
stance has helped to offset some of the adverse impact of reductions in government spending and is 
likely to continue to do so, provided that inflation is expected to remain below target. 
 
At present, and on balance, the majority of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), as 
well as external commentators including the IMF, believe monetary policy should continue to support the 
recovery as it has to date. Crucial to their assessment is evidence from the range of indicators that the 
Bank of England uses to assess how much spare capacity or “economic slack” remains. As noted at the 
outset, headline figures on the unemployment rate, employment growth and participation rates are 
currently less informative then they were in the past, and this has been recognised by the MPC when 
making judgements. In this regard it is perhaps surprising that the Bank of England referred to a specific 
employment rate when forward guidance was introduced, as did the Federal Open Market Committee in 
the United States. Nevertheless, the Bank has recognised the importance of indicators of 
underemployment and (still muted) wage growth in its policy decision making. 
 
Of course, policy decisions are sometimes based on finely balanced judgements. Members of the MPC 
are acutely aware that changes in monetary policy can only be expected to operate with a lag. On the 
one hand it is desirable that the MPC anticipate labour market pressures by raising the Bank Rate in 
advance of any inflationary response, on the other hand if the Bank Rate is increased too far ahead of 
any prospective pickup in wage growth and/or other emerging inflationary pressures there is a risk of 
increasing the vulnerability of highly indebted households.  
 
Minutes of the September 2014 meeting of the MPC (the most recent available at the time of writing) 
indicate that they are some signs that labour market slack is diminishing, see Bank of England (2014b). 
In particular job-to-job flows and voluntary resignations, which fell markedly during the crisis, are 
beginning to rise again. This shift seems indicative of improving confidence, and may in part reflect 
individuals finding work in roles that better match their skills and desired working hours. Likewise the 
minutes record growing evidence that some individuals who became self-employed in response to 
temporarily depressed demand for labour may be switching back into employment. The MPC expect 
these developments to reduce underemployment, while boosting measured productivity and earnings, 
while having only a modest impact on wage settlements and unit labour costs.  
 
                                                        
3
 Note that we focus here on policy within the remit of the UK’s Monetary Policy Committee and don’t, for reasons of 
space, include discussion of related policy in relation to financial stability objectives. 
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Nonetheless, considerable uncertainty remains as to the extent of these ongoing developments, and 
how quickly they will take effect. The views of two MPC members are that it is possible that the 
dislocation that has held back wage growth and productivity is now being corrected quite rapidly. The 
most sceptical on whether underemployment will in fact translate into increased labour supply as 
recovery progresses is external MPC member Martin Weale, see Weale (2014a,b,c). He’s pointed out 
that people whose partners lose jobs or face a significant drop in their earnings may well say that they 
would like to work longer, but that once the economy recovers and their partners’ earnings are restored 
the implied extent of the increase in desired labour supply may not materialise. He has set out his 
doubts on the validity of inferences from survey information on underemployment and has concluded 
that, at best, a very substantial margin of uncertainty remains. Weale's own view is that 
underemployment statistics overstate the underlying amount of spare capacity and he has cautioned 
that the stated intention of raising Bank Rate gradually implies that the first rise needs to come sooner 
than would otherwise be the case. At present, his view that Bank Rate should rise soon is not shared by 
the majority of the MPC, who still see muted inflation pressures from wage growth over the next year to 
18 months and it looks unlikely that they all share the view that Martin Weale expressed in a speech in 
October 2014 that the “best indicator” of future wage pressures wage pressures “is the rate at which 
unemployment is falling” Weale (2014c). It is therefore clear that changes in the labour market are 
central to the time path and strength of monetary policy decisions in the UK at present. 
 
Quality of jobs and zero-hours contracts 
 
Another area of concern for policymakers lies in the quality of jobs being created; this is partly reflected 
in the nature of contracts. A great deal of recent attention has focused on the growing prevalence of so-
called zero-hours contracts, described as a type of contract used by employers whereby workers have 
no guaranteed hours and agree to be potentially available for work (see for example Pyper and 
McGuinness (2014), Chandler(2014) and Freeman (2014).   
Awareness of the use of such contracts has been heightened in the post-crisis labour market. While it’s 
fair to say that there are severe limitations to the available data in this area, the ONS undertook the first 
survey of businesses to obtain an employer-based estimate of the number of employee contracts that 
did not guarantee a minimum number of hours, but which provided work in the survey reference period 
in January 2014 (covering the fortnight beginning 20 January 2014). A second such survey took place in 
September 2014 and results will be reported at the end of the year. This supplements employee based 
information collected through the Labour Force Survey. 
For employers, zero-hours contracts offer a means of flexibility to respond to uncertain and fluctuating 
demand. Flexibility is also welcomed by some kinds of workers, for example students and some 
pensioners4. However, for workers who would prefer more secure work, but aren’t able to find other 
openings, contracts with no guaranteed hours are a key source of financial insecurity and are not likely 
to be conducive to career development and progression.  Welfare benefits available to the working poor 
can ease the strain somewhat, but don’t actively help workers who are unhappy with their hours. Zero-
                                                        
4
 Students need to fit paid work around their other commitments, so having the ability to turn down work around exam 
times etc. is important. Pensioners who are seeking a little extra income may be able to live with the uncertainty of not 
having guaranteed hours. 
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hours contracts can create significant financial insecurity for employees, uncertainty around entitlements 
to benefits and the new auto-enrolment system for workplace contributions, high workplace stress, and 
lack of opportunities for career progression. As the recovery strengthens, some workers may be able to 
renegotiate their contracts or find permanent jobs, but zero-hours contracts are likely to remain a feature 
of the labour market.  
Several consultations on the use of zero-hours contracts have reported during the past year.  Vince 
Cable, Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills, led on the UK Government consultation 
which ran from December 2013 until March 2014, and reported in June 2014. The main outcome was 
the announcement of the Government’s intention to ban the use of exclusivity clauses which seek to 
prevent individuals on zero-hours contracts from working for another employer, even when no work is 
guaranteed. The use of such clauses undermines choice and flexibility for the individuals concerned, 
and seeks to prevent them from finding alternative ways to increase their earnings. The proposal to ban 
exclusivity clauses is now a provision in the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill, currently 
being considered by the UK Parliament.  
An additional issue, and where there is currently some confusion, is whether those people who are 
currently unemployed and refuse a zero-hours contract will face benefit sanctions. Although Vince Cable 
has tried to give reassurances in this regard, Minister for Employment Ester McVey has not ruled out 
imposing sanctions on those failing to accept a zero-hours contract, without good reason, under the new 
system of Universal Credit, see Pyper and McGuinness (2014). 
In April 2014 the Labour party published its own consultation in Pickavance (2014). This made a number 
of recommendations in addition to banning exclusivity clauses: i) that employers should be prevented 
from requiring zero-hours workers to be available for work; ii) that zero-hours workers who in practice 
work regular hours should, after a specified period, have a right to a contract with fixed minimum hours; 
and iii) that zero-hours workers should have a right to compensation when shifts are cancelled at short 
notice. 
Policy changes have also been proposed in Scotland, and may well have an impact relatively soon. 
While employment policy is a reserved power of the UK Government, the Scottish Government is 
seeking to influence the types of employment contract that firms tendering for Government work use via 
its procurement procedures5. New Scottish legislation is expected to be in place towards the end of 
2015.  
So far we have concentrated on the actual versus desired hours dimension of underemployment, but 
two further dimensions are also important and potentially have even greater implications for the future 
productive potential of the economy and for the persistence or elimination of sub-optimal outcomes. 
These dimensions relate to geography and skills. 
Geographical and skills dimensions to underemployment 
The geographical dimension of underemployment is sometimes referred to as geographical mismatch 
and stems from the fact that jobs are often located where poorer people cannot afford to live.  The skills 
                                                        
5
 See the Procurement Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, which was passed by the Parliament on 13th May 2014 and 
received Royal Assent on 17th June 2014. 
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dimension of underemployment refers to workers who are in jobs that don’t fully utilise their skills or 
qualifications. One of the clearest examples of the skills dimension of underemployment is the 
prevalence of a proportion of recent graduates working in non-graduate jobs6. 
The policy prescriptions that have be advanced to reduce geographical underemployment include i) area 
based policies aimed at incentivising companies to locate/expand in areas of high unemployment and ii) 
helping workers move to, or commute to, areas with lots of jobs. There are many examples of past 
policies that fall into the first category including Regional Selective Assistance, Enterprise Zones, 
European Union Structural Funds, and industrial cluster policies. However, for a range of reasons, 
evaluations of such policies tend to conclude that they have not generated the hoped for outcomes, see 
for example Lawless et al. (2011) and Neumark and Simpson (2014).  
The objective of helping workers move to areas with lots of jobs has motivated policy prescriptions of 
liberalising planning laws, removing zoning restrictions and incentivising provision of cheaper housing, 
all of which can be expected to have impact albeit with varying time lags. The objective of helping 
workers to commute to areas with job vacancies recognises that a lack of affordable and efficient public 
transport can constitute a barrier that makes it harder for people to access appropriate work. Some 
powerful recent evidence comes from a US study of job search among nearly 250,000 Americans in nine 
cities in the Midwest who lost their jobs during mass lay-offs at the start of the crisis.  
Their engagement with the labour market was tracked over a six year period and findings suggest that 
the typical American city dweller can access just 30% of available jobs in their city within 90 minutes 
using public transport, see Andersson et al. (2014). Spending money on transport infrastructure to 
improve job accessibility is consistent with the IMF’s call for a well-designed fiscal stimulus discussed 
earlier. Indeed, in England, the economic case put forward for HS2, and now HS3, stresses the intention 
to create a network of cities that are more accessible to workers by cutting journey times.  However 
there’s been vocal debate on how large the potential employment effects of such initiatives really are, 
with critics focusing on the need to help those in areas of social deprivation outside cities to access 
available jobs, rather than improved city to city links, see for example Overman (2012). 
Initiatives to improve the accessibility of low skilled workers to existing vacancies need not involve 
massive infrastructure investment of the scale of HS2 or HS3. In fact, researchers looking at the US data 
have suggested that the amount of money involved could be relatively small: simply buying buses and 
having them pick up workers in lower-income, outer neighbourhoods and then running them from those 
places — not stopping along the way — all the way into commercial centres can greatly increase the 
accessibility of jobs to low-income workers, see Andersson et al. (2014). We believe that serious 
consideration should be given by UK and devolved policy makers to an assessment of geographic 
mismatch and what steps can be taken to improve accessibility of vacancies, particularly for low skilled 
workers.  
Returning now to skills mismatch, much of the focus of policy has been on improving education to work 
transitions. For example, a number of specific policies were recommended by the Commission for 
                                                        
6
 Considerable media attention focused on an ONS report from November 2013 which found that 47 per cent of those 
who completed a degree in the past five years were working in non-graduate jobs (predominantly in roles such as 
sales assistants and care workers) in April to June 2013 as compared to 39 per cent in 2008, see Office of National 
Statistics (2013). 
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Developing Scotland’s Young Workforce, chaired by Sir Ian Wood which reported in June 2014, Scottish 
Government (2014). The recommendations can be broadly described as encouraging a closer 
relationship between schools and industry; a better tailoring of college level education to the needs of 
employers; improvements in the modern apprentice scheme and work to encourage employers to hire 
young people. While undoubtedly important, policy needs to recognise that those currently in education 
and transitioning into the labour market represent only one dimension to the skill match issue. As we 
have emphasised above, seeking to increase outflows from underemployment is critical if the workers 
are to achieve their potential and if the economy’s growth potential is to be restored.  
In some ways the challenge faced by policy makers here is similar to that posed by youth unemployment 
and long-term unemployment. So discussion of interventions that seek to improve incentives for firms to 
take on younger workers, for example by targeting a reduction in non-wage labour costs via a reduction 
in employers’ national insurance contributions; taking actions that improve SME’s access to graduate 
labour markets and to better match those firms with vacancies to access a suitably qualified pool of 
applicants are all relevant. Reports prepared for the Department of Business Innovation and Skills and 
by the Small Business Federation have made important contributions here, see Sear et al. (2012) and 
Federation of Small Businesses (2009). The focus particularly on small businesses is warranted 
because a considerable proportion of the new jobs created during both the recession and the on-going 
recovery are in successful small businesses that are innovative and are drivers of growth in the 
economy as a whole, see Department for Business Innovation and Skills (2013). 
However, in this article we have emphasised that it is important to have a clear focus on improving 
labour market outcomes for as many as possible of those currently in a situation of underemployment. If 
policymakers, commentators and agencies such as Job Centres are too focused on headline 
employment, participation rates and unemployment rates there is a real danger that poor outcomes will 
persist. Ironically, where in-work benefits and tax credits make underemployment more bearable this 
may erode incentives for workers to keep looking for better employment matches during recovery and 
may result in them staying underemployed for longer. In the absence of other interventions, there should 
be real concern that polarization within the labour market will persist and recovery in fiscal balances will 
be delayed. In our view, failure to take policy action to tackle underemployment in all its guises is a 
recipe for greater polarization in the labour market and a continuation of productivity growth that does 
not fulfil its potential. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, after previous recessions policymakers focused on getting people back into work and 
avoiding lasting negative impacts from long-term unemployment. This time, the fact that a higher 
proportion of the working age population has retained engagement with the labour market has been a 
positive achievement. Nevertheless, as we argued that there is a need to upgrade the nature of some of 
this engagement as the recovery progresses in order to address underemployment and the persistence 
of associated bad outcomes for individuals, for fiscal balances and for the productive potential of the 
economy as a whole.   
In particular some workers are in jobs that don’t fully utilise their skills; have limited prospects for 
advancement and/or their jobs fail to provide the hours of employment desired. These workers, and 
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others, may face barriers in accessing available vacancies that better suit their abilities and 
requirements as a result of geographical mismatch. We have argued that there is a clear need for 
policies that facilitate transitions out of poorly matched jobs to reducing the risk of sustained polarization 
of labour market outcomes and underperformance of the economy as a whole.  
In our view the most promising policies to improve the strength of the labour market include policies to i) 
improve transport infrastructure, helping people commute to access suitable jobs; ii) help people 
relocate to access jobs; iii) help SMEs with vacancies to achieve better matches of workers to jobs; and 
iv) remove exclusivity clauses in zero hours contracts and for the Government to show leadership in 
incentivising improved contractual arrangements via its own procurement rules. While it is feasible for 
zero-hours contracts to play an important role in a well-functioning labour market, it is clear that the 
growth in these contracts in recent years does not reflect a robust and well-functioning labour market – 
and indeed may undermine the strength of the economy as we continue to emerge from the Great 
Recession.  
The success or failure of policies to improve labour market outcomes will have profound implications for 
both fiscal and monetary policy. For the reasons outlined earlier, there are important interactions 
between welfare policy and the feasibility of attaining sustainable fiscal balances in the future. If 
unchecked, the persistence of each of the elements of underemployment we have highlighted will 
contribute to stagnation of median incomes and be reflected in persistently lower tax receipts and higher 
spending on in-work benefits. And importantly, from the monetary policy perspective, the prospects for 
wage pressure from these groups is likely to remain muted until significant inroads are made into 
eroding remaining labour market slack in the economy and returning hourly productivity back toward pre-
crisis norms. 
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Labour market changes and implications for policy 
and labour market information (LMI) in Scotland 
 
Stephen Boyd, STUC1 
 
Abstract 
 
The recovery from the deep recession of 2008/09 has been weak and somewhat unusual: employment 
has been stronger than anticipated given the slow recovery in output. The labour market’s recovery is 
undoubtedly impressive when it is measured by headline employment, unemployment and activity 
statistics. However a focus only on headline statistics risks masking a number of trends which conflate to 
justify a less optimistic assessment. Of particular interest has been the rapid embedding of labour 
market trends which had started to emerge pre-recession such as underemployment, self-employment, 
youth unemployment and insecure forms of working. The unprecedented collapse in real wages since 
2009 is proving more durable than many commentators believed and the remarkable increase in people 
aged over 65 remaining in work has hardly featured in public discourse. Though ambiguity persists as to 
the extent to which these trends reflect structural shifts or the remnants of a cyclical downturn, it is 
argued that at least some of these trends reflect structural shifts. The potential impacts of these 
domestic and global trends on the Scottish labour market and their implications for policy at Scottish 
level are discussed. In doing so, a number of ongoing and serious issues with the range and quality of 
Scottish labour market data are discussed.  
 
I Introduction 
 
The timing could hardly have been more fortuitous for Alex Salmond MSP, First Minister when he 
addressed the STUC conference Decent Work, Dignified Lives on 15 October 2014; for the embargo on 
the latest labour market statistics for Scotland had ended just as he took the podium at 9.30am. This 
allowed the First Minister to announce another set of ‘stunning’ figures: in the three months to August 
2014 unemployment had fallen by 40,000 and employment had risen by 35,000. The data had once 
again confirmed the remarkable resilience of Scotland’s labour market. 
 
Yet perhaps surprisingly for an audience more concerned than most with job numbers, the response 
was muted. Over the course of the day a number of conference participants questioned the veracity of 
the figures which they struggled to reconcile with their own experience. Their perception was not of a 
booming labour market but one characterised by falling real wages, rising insecurity of work, record 
underemployment and stubbornly high youth unemployment. The salient lesson they had drawn from the 
turbulent period since 2008 wasn’t that flexible labour markets had triumphed but that quality of 
employment was deteriorating and jobs increasingly lacked what they considered to be an acceptable 
degree of economic security.  
 
                                                        
1
 The views expressed are those of the author and not of the Scottish Trades Union Conference (STUC). 
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The statistics announced by the First Minister and the sceptical reaction of the audience point towards a 
growing problem. The headline statistics might be strong but they’re also increasingly inadequate to 
describe the ways in which labour market trends are affecting real people in real time.  
 
This article will argue that at least some of these trends reflect structural shifts. It will seek to describe 
both the potential impact of domestic and global trends on the Scottish labour market and the 
implications for policy at Scottish level. In doing so, a number of ongoing and serious problems with the 
range and quality of Scottish labour market data are discussed.  
 
II The triumph of flexibility? 
 
Given the length and depth of the 2008/09 recession and the prolonged period of stagnation that 
followed, the performance of the labour market has been remarkable in a number of respects: 
employment has been stronger than could have been anticipated throughout this period and although 
unemployment did surge it never hit the rates feared in late 2008 as the financial crisis gripped the 
globe. The old trope that unemployment is a lagging indicator was proved somewhat redundant when 
the unemployment figures subsequently recovered significantly quicker than GDP. 
 
The performance of headline employment has led to a dominant narrative of a strong recovery that 
doesn’t entirely stand up to scrutiny. Some six and a half years after the start of the Great Recession in 
the spring of 2008, neither employment nor unemployment has yet attained its pre-recession rate. 
Employment may well be at its ‘highest ever’ level in Scotland but that is not uncommon: since the 
Labour Force Survey was established in 1992, the level of total employment has breached its ‘highest 
ever‘ level on no fewer than 50 occasions (41 occasions for 16-64 years category)2 – as the Scottish 
working age population continued to expand. Indeed, the 16-64 employment rate in June-August 2014 is 
still a full one percentage point below that achieved in April-June 2007. 
 
It is salutary to note that using the internationally comparable International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
measure of unemployment, unemployment in June-August 2014 was still 1.5% above that of March-May 
2008 and the number of ILO unemployed people at 151,000  is  36% higher. 
 
The trajectory of long-term unemployment has followed a more traditional path than other trends 
witnessed over the past few years. From a low in 2008, the number of those claiming Job Seeker’s 
Allowance (JSA) for over 6 and 12 months rose to peak in 2012; the peak for those aged over 25 
claiming for over 2 years peaked one year later. On all three measures, long-term unemployment has 
fallen encouragingly and sharply over the last year, though it remains significantly above its pre-
recession levels. 
 
So headline levels are undoubtedly impressive but maybe not quite as impressive as the political 
narratives at Scottish and UK level would suggest. The relevant question however is whether headline 
                                                        
2
 Unless otherwise specified, all labour market statistics (including Labour Force Survey, Annual Population Survey and 
experimental LFS) included above drawn from the latest Regional Labour Market Release, Office for National Statistics, October 
2014 
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statistics continue to provide a sufficiently accurate overview of the state of the labour market? The 
trends discussed here suggest they might not. At the very least the growing number of low wage, self-
employed, older and underemployed workers means that there is a greater degree of labour market 
slack than that suggested by the headline figures. 
 
 
Figure 1 Numbers claiming Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA) for over 6, 12 and 24 months, Scotland, 
               2007-2014  
 
Source: ONS, Nomis, 17 October 2014 
 
 
Figure 2  Full and part-time employment (000s), Scotland, 2007-2014  
 
 
Source: ONS, Regional Labour Market, October 2014 
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Full, part-time and self-employment 
 
Total jobs may have recovered to their pre-recession level but full-time jobs have not: in the June-August 
2014 period the number of full-time jobs stood at 1,832,000, still 84,000 below their pre-recession peak. 
There were 688,000 part time jobs during this period; 64,000 or 10.26% higher than the pre-recession 
level. 
 
Perhaps of more concern is the rise in self-employment. Since 2007 self-employment in Scotland has 
increased by 27% to from 248,000 to 315,000 while employee jobs have fallen by 120,000 or 5% from 
their peak in September 2008.  
 
 
Figure 3  Employee and self-employed jobs (000s), Scotland, 2004-2014 
 
 
Source:  ONS, Regional Labour Market, Scotland, October 2014 
 
Although data is limited in Scotland, evidence from across the UK as a whole indicates that the recent 
surge in self-employment does not reflect an entrepreneurial boom; rather it suggests a large new cohort 
of self-employed workers who currently work less hours and earn less by doing what they used to do as 
employees (CIPD 2012, ONS 2014). 
 
Underemployment 
 
Two factors behind stronger than anticipated employment since 2008 are falling real wages and cuts in 
working hours; two obvious ways in which a labour market can adjust to falling demand without a 
concomitant increase in unemployment. One consequence has been historically high levels of 
underemployment: those who report as wanting to work more hours in their current job (the majority), or 
want a new job with more hours or an additional job.  
 
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
2,000
2,050
2,100
2,150
2,200
2,250
2,300
2,350
2,400
2,450
2,500
2,550
M
ar
 
96
De
c 
96
Se
p 
97
Ju
n
 
98
M
ar
 
99
De
c 
99
Se
p 
00
Ju
n
 
01
M
ar
 
02
De
c 
02
Se
p 
03
Ju
n
 
04
M
ar
 
05
De
c 
05
Se
p 
06
Ju
n
 
07
M
ar
 
08
De
c 
08
Se
p 
09
Ju
n
 
10
M
ar
 
11
De
c 
11
Se
p 
12
Ju
n
 
13
M
ar
 1
4 
(r)
Employee jobs (LH axis) Self-employment jobs (RH axis)
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2) Economic perspectives 
November 2014 67 
Underemployment increased by 44% between 2007 and 2012 to nearly one in ten (9.9%) workers. It’s 
important to note that average underemployment in Scotland between 2005 and 2008 was 7.2% of the 
workforce – hence underemployment is not, as is sometimes presented, a new, post-recession feature 
of the Scottish labour market (Scottish Government 2014).  
 
 
Figure 4 Underemployment in Scotland (‘000s), 2004-2013 
 
 
Source: Scottish Government, Local Area Labour Markets 2013 
 
Recent work by the Trades Union Congress (TUC) suggests that the slight fall in underemployment 
between 2012 and 2013 might not have been sustained (TUC 2014). The underemployment level 
between March-January 2014 was 252,305 -perhaps reflecting the impact of another year of falling real 
earnings. When combined with the underemployed, self-employed workers the total rises to 279,495. 
Therefore, despite the strong growth in employment through 2014, the best current information indicates 
that underemployment may also have risen since 2013. 
 
Insecurity 
 
Since 2008, the anecdotal evidence fed back from trade union workplace representatives has focused 
less on redundancies or the threat of redundancies (although clearly these have happened) than on the 
growing use of insecure forms of employment contracts. These include pay between assignment 
contracts, illusory forms of self-employment designed to avoid responsibilities such as paying tax, 
aggressive forms of performance management and, above all else, zero hours contracts. These trends 
are not picked up in official labour market surveys and therefore the quality of information we have is, 
once again, scant. 
 
Extracting from recent Office of National Statistics (ONS) work, the Scottish Trades Union Congress 
(STUC) estimated that around 120,000 workers in Scotland are employed on zero hours contracts (ONS 
2014, STUC 2014). Again, it’s important to stress that such contracts weren’t invented during the 
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recession; rather the economic circumstances of the past few years have seen the increasing 
normalisation of such insecure forms of employment. 
 
Employment by age 
 
Interestingly, the trend with perhaps the most profound long-term implications is the one that has been 
the least discussed. Stubbornly high youth unemployment has been firmly on the political agenda but not 
one of the contributory factors: that is the significant rise in the number of those aged 65 and over who 
are remaining in work and in the labour market.  
 
 
Figure 5 Percentage change in the employment rate, by age groups, Jan-Mar 2008 to May-July 2014,  
 Scotland (experimental Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
 
Source ONS, Regional Labour Market, October 2014 
 
The latest experimental ONS statistics for employment by age (refer Figure 5), show that between Jan-
March 2008 and May-July 2014 the employment rate of the over 65 age group increased by 4.7% 
compared to a decline of 2.9% for the 16-24 age groups (accounted for by 16/17 year olds). 
 
More reliable, but older, statistics drawn from the Annual Population Survey tell an even starker story 
(refer Figure 6): between Jan-Dec 2008 and July 2013/June2014 the 50-64 age group increased its 
employment rate by 1.4% and the over 65s by 2.6%. These were the only age groups to register any 
increase in the employment rate over the period since the financial crash in 2008.  
 
However, it is important to emphasise that the numbers of the over 65s staying in the workplace are still 
relatively very low; employment for this group has risen from 49,000 in January 2008 to 78,000 in 
July’13-June’14 but the increase has been rapid, as demonstrated in Figure 7 which shows the growing 
absolute gap in employment between measurers of total employment and those aged between 16-64 to 
May-July 2014. 
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Figure 6 Percentage change in employment rate, by age groups, Jan-Mar 2008 and May-July  
 2014, Scotland  
 
 
Source ONS, Regional Labour Market, October 2014 
 
 
Figure 7 Gap between total employment and 16-64 years employment (000s), 1992-2014 
 
Source ONS, Regional Labour Market, October 2014 
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falling real wages, forcing people to work for longer when their own and/or partner’s pension 
entitlements are eroded or wages fall.  
 
The unprecedented decline in real wages 
 
Real wages have declined across the UK for all but three of the last 74 months under report and the 
cumulative fall in the median real wage is around 10%. As the Bank of England recently reported this fall 
is without precedent since records began in the mid 1800’s (Haldane 2014).  
 
Scotland has seen a fall in the real median wage similar to that for the UK as a whole. Between 2009 
and 2013 (the latest Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings Data are for the year to April 2013) the 
Scottish median real wage fell by 7.6% representing an annual loss in 2013 of £1,760. 
 
Table 1 Declining real wages in Scotland, percentage change for selected groups 2009-2013  
 
Total Full-time Part-time 
Median 
Worker 
Male  Female Male Female Male Female   
%-7.7 -8.2 -7.1 -5.8 -6.8 -8.8 -7.6 
£-1,993 -1,406 -2,002 -1,372 -545 -789 -1,760 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2013 
 
In 2013, the median worker would be earning £1,760 more if wages had kept pace with inflation over the 
period 2009-13. Female part-time workers have seen the biggest fall in real wages at a time when the 
numbers of people working in part-time jobs has increased. 
 
Perhaps even more concerning is that young workers and workers at the very bottom of the wage 
distribution (10th percentile) have seen the biggest proportionate fall in their real wages of 10% (refer 
Figure 8). 
 
The situation of falling nominal wages is even more acute when specific occupations are considered 
(refer Figure 9) which shows the percentage change in nominal wages by occupational groups, for the 
lowest paid (10th percentile, median workers and the highest earning (90th percentile). 
 
The bottom 10% of the 70,000 workers in elementary occupations suffered a fall in nominal wages 
(wages before adjusting for inflation) of 14.8% over this period. The bottom 10% of the 180,000 workers 
in elementary administrative and service occupations suffered a decline in nominal wages of 9%. Given 
the protection afforded by the minimum wage, it is safe to conclude that nominal wage falls have been 
driven by cuts in working hours. 
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Figure 8  Percentage change in nominal and real wages for selected percentile groups, 2009-2013 
%  
       
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2013 
 
 
Figure 9 Nominal gross weekly wages, percentage change by selected income percentile, 2009-2013  
 
 
Source: Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2013 
 
Whilst real term wage cuts have been a fact of life for a significant majority of workers across all 
occupations some have received real terms increases; the largest going to the top 10% of corporate 
managers and directors. This group received an increase in gross weekly wages of £82 per week or 
£4,290 a year above inflation. 
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To put this fully in perspective, the gross wages of the top 10% of corporate managers and directors are 
now £283 a week or £14,176 a year higher than in 2009. In 2013, the average weekly gross wage of the 
bottom 10% of all workers was £125 a week or £6,500 a year. 
 
So, while a large majority of workers have suffered a decline in the real value of their wages over 2009-
2013, the pain has not been evenly distributed with the lowest paid workers in the lowest paid sectors 
experiencing significant nominal wage cuts. 
 
III Structural or cyclical change? 
 
Only the passage of time will provide a complete answer as to whether the trends outlined above are 
structural shifts or an ongoing hangover from the economic downturn of the Great Recession. However, 
the case that current trends signal significant structural change is becoming more persuasive.  
 
The shift towards the ‘hour glass’ labour market is likely to continue and possibly accelerate; a labour 
market characterised by increasing opportunity (and rewards) at the top and growing employment in low 
pay, low skill, low productivity sectors at the bottom (Resolution Foundation 2013). The next wave of 
automation is anticipated to curtail job creation in middle income, middle status jobs in manufacturing 
and some services although the extent to which this will happen is hotly contested and many economists 
worry more about the impact of technology on inequality rather than employment levels per se 
(Brynjolfson, McAfee 2014; Cowen 2013).  
 
Should pay growth continue to be muted it is reasonable to assume that underemployment could remain 
above pre-recession levels. Slow pay growth and pension reforms will continue to exert pressure on the 
over 65s to remain in the workplace. The shift from employee jobs to low wage self-employment has 
been apparent since before the recession and has accelerated significantly over the past two years. 
 
And there are good reasons to believe that real wages will not improve even if the recovery in GDP and 
employment endures. Over the past 18 months forecasts of rising real wages have proved consistently 
optimistic.  
 
The unprecedented decline in real wages is a consequence of a number of factors including the long-
term decline of union membership and collective bargaining coverage and the prioritisation of policies 
aimed at enhancing flexibility for employers. Very poor productivity growth post-recession has limited the 
scope for wage rises but it would be a mistake to assume that real median wages will recover with 
productivity; indeed growth in median wages had decoupled from productivity growth prior to the 
recession of 2008/09 due to rising wage inequality (Machin, Blanchflower 2014).  
 
Stephen Machin of the LSE argues that these trends are compounded by: 
 
‘…the increased substitutability of the unemployed with low wage workers – driven by increase in ‘welfare 
conditionality’ and breaches are associated with sanctions, reductions in cash payments, which in turn have 
become more severe. At the same time has occurred the development of a system of tax credits which 
supplement low wages for those with children. The increased pressure to take low waged work and 
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compensation for doing so may have increased the willingness of workers to trade lower wages for 
employment, and also their substitutability for low wage workers”. (Machin 2014) 
 
The UK coalition government is committed to extending the flexibility of the UK’s labour market. 
Measures that would directly and substantially tackle employment insecurity and low wages are unlikely 
to be forthcoming. Indeed, the commitment to maintaining the UK’s relative flexibility is deeply 
embedded across the mainstream parties and proposed new approaches to the minimum wage by the 
Labour Party and SNP might best be described as timid. 
 
IV Data issues – UK and Scotland  
 
The UK does not compare favourably with other OECD nations in the quality of its labour market 
statistics or in the speed of their collection and publication (Blanchflower 2014). The employment and 
unemployment statistics published in October 2014 are an average for the period June-August 2014. 
The three month average is published because the sample sizes are too small to allow for an accurate 
single month figure. By October 2014, most other developed nations had published single month figures 
for August and some, including the US, for September 2014.  
 
Unfortunately, the unfavourable international comparison is further compounded at the Scottish level (as 
it is for any one of the twelve ONS nations and regions). The ONS regional release does not provide a 
Scottish version of the UK release. The all UK release provides information in most categories for the 
latest rolling three month period but in some key categories (e.g. full-time /part-time /temporary 
employment; hours worked, employment and unemployment by age and duration) Scottish data is only 
updated four times a year and even then the data is an average for the latest year under report.   
 
The situation is particularly acute with regard to employment by sector and wages. Sectoral employment 
data is derived from the Workforce Jobs Survey which simply estimates Scottish jobs on the basis of an 
all UK survey. This ignores the different compositions of both public and private sectors and leads to 
figures which are scarcely credible. It is no exaggeration to say that at present using current official 
statistics our understanding of where people actually work in Scotland is very limited.  
 
On a monthly basis the only data published by ONS – Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) – is derived 
from the Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS) which does not include self-employed workers or 
those workers employed in a firm with fewer than 20 employees. Given these are significant groups – in 
sum around a third of all workers – and ones in which wage growth might be expected to be slowest, the 
survey fails to provide an accurate account of what is happening with wages. 
 
Again, the data is much worse at Scottish level where the best current data is an annual survey (the 
Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings or ASHE).  In short, here in autumn 2014, Scottish policymakers 
have to make do with data for the year ending April 2013, data that are effectively (at best) 18 months 
old.  This is not a satisfactory position if we want to develop policies to improve and strengthen the 
Scottish labour market and help reduce inequality. 
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V The Global Picture 
 
A quick look at Eurostat will confirm that the UK has relatively high employment and low unemployment 
but high underemployment and low wages. It is tempting to pick any one of these indicators and use it to 
paint a simplistic picture of the UK labour market and how it compares to those of other developed 
nations. And many seem unable to resist this temptation! 
 
It is therefore important to note that large employment gaps, quality of employment, insecurity and falling 
wages remain a concern in many developed nations. In the period since 2008 wage growth has failed to 
recover with productivity in most G20 nations. A declining labour share and rising wage inequality are 
not unique to the UK and US (ILO, OECD, World Bank 2014).  
 
But recent OECD and ILO (2014) work also found that ‘there does not appear to be any necessary 
trade-off between job quality and job quantity: some countries manage to do well on both counts. There 
are also considerable differences in job quality between socio-economic groups within countries. Youth, 
low-skilled workers and those with temporary jobs appear to cumulate many disadvantages’. 
 
The policy remedies suggested by these global institutions are a mix of the orthodox (increasing 
participation, investing in skills and training) plus a new emphasis on tackling labour market inequality 
and supporting aggregate demand (the latter has not been considered orthodox since the 1970s – at 
least by the global institutions). It is illuminating that the IMF and OECD now acknowledge that ‘supply 
side interventions to increase participation may not yield the desired positive impact on growth unless 
accompanied by successful interventions to increase labour demand’. 
 
The pressures facing the UK labour market are not dissimilar to those facing other countries. There are 
of course lessons to be learned from other approaches to labour market management and in particular 
how various models have coped with the turbulence of the ‘great recession’ (Schmitt 2011).  
 
Crude characterisations of the UK and other models do not assist the learning process. Neither does the 
(peculiarly Scottish?) tendency to ignore or discount global trends. It’s remarkable that the ongoing and 
raging debate about the state of the economy and Scotland’s constitutional future managed to almost 
completely ignore the challenges of automation, digitisation and secular stagnation – the IMF’s Christine 
Lagarde’s characterisation of the outlook for the global economy as the ‘new mediocre’ - with which the 
rest of the global economic community is currently obsessed. Global trends do and will exert profound 
influence on the shape of the Scottish labour market and must be acknowledged, discussed and 
addressed. 
 
VI Policy responses 
 
A reasonable (and often not so reasonable) debate about the structure and regulation of the UK labour 
market will continue. Advocates of retaining flexibility as the defining characteristic will feel emboldened 
by the trajectory of employment and unemployment over the past few years. Others will wish to see 
reforms aimed at improving wages and the security and quality of employment. They will point not only 
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to trends discussed above but the ongoing experience of other countries that manage to combine both 
higher wages and better quality work with employment rates similar to or higher than the UK. The policy 
responses discussed below unashamedly flow from the latter perspective. However it is also suggested 
that some caution is appropriate when seeking to draw lessons from experience elsewhere. 
 
The Smith Commission will soon make recommendations on a new package of powers for the Scottish 
Parliament. Employment law, active labour market policy and economic development are – as they were 
during the referendum campaign – very much viewed as secondary issues; powers over taxation and 
welfare continue to dominate the debate but the obvious connections between the labour market and 
taxation and welfare are rarely if ever drawn. This is unfortunate especially when the issue of inequality 
remains to the fore. There are good arguments on both sides as to whether the devolution of 
employment would be good for Scotland in the long run, but these are insufficiently aired.  
 
Given the active debate on Scotland’s new constitutional settlement, the following labour market policy 
responses are critical under whatever constitutional changes emerge. 
 
Facilitating better policy  
 
The data deficit described above should be addressed as a matter of urgency; whilst it’s impossible to 
see these problems being resolved without additional investment by the Scottish or UK Governments the 
absolute sums involved would be very small in the context of total budgets. There is a compelling case 
that better information will lead to better policy design which will save money in the longer term. The 
minimum aspiration should be for the ONS regional labour market monthly release to provide the same 
information for Scotland as it does for the UK as a whole. The next step should be to improve the quality 
of the main surveys and speed up the process in order to allow publication of single month, reliable 
estimates within two months (as is currently the case in the US). 
 
There also needs to be a discussion about the ongoing relevance of key labour market indicators. For 
instance, as more over-65s remain in or return to the labour force, using the 16-64 age group as the key 
employment measure might need to be revisited. This is one area that would benefit from additional 
focused, qualitative research to help determine the reasons why greater numbers of older people are 
working past retirement age. 
 
The use of the ILO unemployment rate as the main gauge of young people’s position in the labour 
market should also be revisited. There are fiercely compelling reasons why tackling youth 
unemployment should be a priority for government; the ‘scarring’ effect of youth unemployment will 
remain with young people affected and the costs to the public purse are well documented. But using the 
ILO youth unemployment rate can overstate the extent of youth unemployment as the denominator (all 
economically active people in the age group) is less relevant for this group when so many are in full-time 
education. Using the ‘youth unemployment ratio’ (where the denominator is the total population of the 
group) would better define the problem and allow for more accurate comparisons with other nations 
(Eurostat 2014). 
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Measuring outcomes 
 
Does it make sense to continue to extol the strength of the labour market on the basis of headline 
employment and unemployment figures if real wages are falling, people are unable to find the working 
hours they need to make ends meet and employment is becoming more insecure? 
 
Building Oxfam’s Human Development Index and a range of other work, the STUC is currently working 
with the Scottish Government through the Scotland Performs Roundtable to develop indicators for the 
National Performance Framework (NPF) to better measure work and well-being. Recognising the data 
deficiencies above and that Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) – the one survey that 
seeks to measure quality of work issues - isn’t disaggregated by nation or region, discussions are 
ongoing as to how a basket of indicators might measure more effectively peoples’ experience of the 
labour market. Whilst this work is important and it is encouraging to see Government committed to 
improving the NPF, it is difficult once again to envisage real progress being made until investment in a 
new Scottish survey is forthcoming. 
 
Towards more and better jobs 
 
The Scottish economy has failed to generate sufficient good jobs or ensure that those that are created 
are distributed evenly around the country. This is a structural problem with no easy remedy. Those 
proposing populist solutions whilst ignoring the realities of 40 years of increasing globalisation do 
nothing to improve the lot of workers in low wage, insecure jobs or even help generate a better quality of 
debate about economic development in Scotland.  
 
Much of the ‘new industrial strategy’ literature adds little to the debate. With policies focused on a few 
‘higher value’ sectors employing relatively few people it is hardly surprising that policy fails to resonate 
with the majority of workers (Williams, Johal et al 2013, 2014) – or indeed businesses.  
 
Whilst space isn’t available here to discuss full proposals for a new approach to economic development 
in Scotland it is worth stressing that under any constitutional scenario, the creation of ‘more and better’ 
jobs in Scotland is necessarily a difficult, uncertain and long-term process. It will be necessary to 
supplement current policy with an approach that addresses the ‘mundane’ sectors where employment is 
highest and likely to grow. An approach that simply reinvents existing strategy and rearranges 
institutions is unlikely to deliver much of a ‘good jobs’ dividend.  
 
Social Partnership 
 
In Scotland’s Future, the ‘white paper’ on independence, the Scottish Government promoted a European 
style social partnership approach to labour relations: 
 
“We will work with the STUC and the business community on mechanisms to formalise the relationship 
between government, employer associations and employee associations with a particular focus on 
encouraging wider trade union participation and in recognition of the positive role that can be played by 
collective bargaining in improving labour market conditions”. (Scottish Government 2013) 
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It will be interesting to see post referendum how this agenda develops in Scotland. The First Minister’s 
announcement in October 2014 that a new Fair Work Convention would be established in response to 
the Working Together Review signals that this approach will be pursued, even if no further relevant 
powers are devolved at the end of the Smith Commission process.  
 
There are however likely to be some significant institutional and cultural barriers to creating a genuine 
and substantial social partnership focused on the availability and quality of work in Scotland. 
 
As the OECD has argued, ‘National industrial relations structures and practices are part of the social and 
political fabric, implying that bargaining structures are not easily changed by government action’. (OECD 
2011)  
 
It needs to be recognised that a set of societal factors exists in the Nordic nations which enable social 
partnership to flourish. Institutional, cultural and historic factors have led to different if similarly 
successful arrangements in countries such as Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. These conditions 
do not currently apply in Scotland.  
 
It remains to be seen if it is possible to establish a coherent, durable system of social partnership in 
Scotland. The employer pillar in Scotland currently lacks  coherence with a range of overlapping 
representative business organisations including: the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), (non-
statutory) Chambers of Commerce, a Scottish Chambers of Commerce, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), the Institute of Directors (IOD), as well as the multipartite Scottish Council Development 
and Industry (SCDI). Most, if not all,  lack any substantive analytical capacity  and some have  an 
ideological outlook.  This is clearly a challenge if we wish to build in Scotland an effective social 
partnership approach to the labour market  that helps move us towards a northern European model.  
 
Nevertheless it is an approach worth pursuing. With appropriate investment a new approach to the 
labour market with strong social partner buy-in is a necessary component of making the Scottish 
economy less short-termist and closer in nature to the productive and innovative economies of western 
and northern Europe. 
 
An active labour market policy 
 
If better outcomes in the labour market are to be achieved then higher and more consistent investment 
is required in active labour market policy (ALMP) measures. AMLP measures or ‘active interventions’ 
cover policies aimed at providing people with new skills or experience of work such as: training, job 
rotation and sharing, employment incentives, supported employment and rehabilitation, direct job 
creation and start-up incentives; they do  not include welfare benefits or support services such as 
jobsearch). In the EU, the UK is an absolute outlier in how little is spends on such ALMP measures 
(refer Figure 10).   
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Figure 10 Spending  on active labour market measures as % of GDP, 2001-2011 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2014 
 
It should be noted that this low spend is not explained by the UK’s relatively low unemployment rate as 
both high and low spending levels are observed among countries with high or low employment. It can be 
argued that spending is consistently and significantly higher in those countries with the most enduringly 
successful labour markets. And, it is a remarkable fact that Denmark spends more in cash terms on 
AMLP measures than does the whole of the UK. Spending on active ALMP measures is also higher in 
countries that manage to reduce labour market inequalities still prevalent in the UK.  
 
Though there are no separate figures for ALMP spend in Scotland, it is difficult to envisage that any 
additional Scottish Government spend will help shift Scotland much higher in the EU rankings. 
Developing a nascent social partnership – no matter how challenging - is not sufficient to create a Nordic 
style labour market in Scotland; it will also take the investment of hard cash to achieve. 
 
V  Conclusions 
 
Rapidly improving headline employment and unemployment statistics through 2014 should not be 
allowed to distract from the profound changes taking place in the Scottish labour market. The Great 
Recession and the prolonged stagnation which followed provided the economic and political conditions 
for the trends discussed above to take firm root. The consequences are that relatively high employment 
levels are accompanied by very weak pay growth, rising insecurity and hidden unemployment. Those 
groups already disadvantaged within the labour market, especially the young, increasingly struggle to 
access secure, decent job opportunities. 
 
A twin-track policy response is required. First, a properly resourced effort to dramatically improve the 
range, quality and timeliness of Scottish labour market information is essential to facilitate better analysis 
and enable the design and implementation of effective interventions. Second, Scottish policymakers 
need to build on both the aspirations set out in Scotland’s Future and the Working Together Review’s 
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recommendations to develop a distinctly Scottish system of social partnership. This will require – as a 
minimum - significant, sustained investment in ALMP measures and a radical overhaul of employer 
representation.  
 
The extent of the challenge is great but the development of a labour market which meets the needs of all 
of Scotland’s citizens will not be achieved through tinkering with current policy responses. 
 
Please … 
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The development of Scottish economic statistics 
Mairi Spowage, Head of National Accounts, Scottish Government 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The economic statistics produced by the Scottish Government have evolved markedly over the last 
decade. As part of this, in 2008, the Scottish National Accounts Project (SNAP) was launched with the 
aim to develop a full set of National Accounts for Scotland. This has been a significant undertaking, and 
the work is only partly complete. However for the first time, there now exists a fully integrated and 
coherent Scottish National Accounts system which continues to expand its coverage of economic data in 
Scotland. This article sets out what has been put in place to date, and highlights key areas for further 
improvement.  It shows how this work fits with an historic programme to improve Scottish economic 
statistics by the Scottish Government. New priorities are outlined and users – including Commentary 
readers - are invited to engage with the Scottish Economic Statistics Consultation network to feed in 
their  views as to how Scotland’s vital economic statistics can be developed further to better describe, 
measure and analyse the Scottish economy for the public benefit. 
 
I Introduction 
 
Economic statistics are an essential source of information for policy makers and government, 
parliament, the media, academics and researchers. The financial crisis and subsequent recession 
alongside Scotland’s constitutional debate has only served to emphasise the critical importance of the 
production of impartial, accurate, respected and timely statistics that inform our understanding of the 
Scottish economy and its performance. 
 
The National Accounts Unit in the Scottish Government is responsible for producing many of the 
headline figures of the Scottish economy and its public finances. It sits in the Office of the Chief 
Economic Adviser (OCEA) which is the central economic analysis and economic statistics unit in the 
Scottish Government.  
 
What are National Accounts, and why are they produced? In broad terms, National Accounts are an 
internationally comparable and consistent set of accounts that measure the economic activity of a given 
country. They are produced to measure the progress of the economy, assess the impacts of policy 
changes, monitor and evaluate the scale of economic ‘events’ or ‘shocks’ such as the financial crisis, 
and – in the case of Scotland - to place Scottish economic performance in a comparable international 
context.  
 
One of the most important figures produced in National Accounts (and Scotland is no different) is Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).  This measures the total output of the economy, including from firms, 
households, government and non-profit institutions in one single figure - with no double counting. 
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Another high-profile ‘output’ or ‘product’1 of any set of National Accounts is information on public sector 
finances. The Government Expenditure & Revenue Scotland publication – more popularly known by its 
acronym as GERS (GERS, Scottish Government, 2014) - is produced in March each year.  It provides 
information on the total amount of public sector expenditure on behalf of Scottish residents and the total 
amount of revenue raised in Scotland.   
 
The article describes how the Scottish National Accounts have been developed over the past decade, 
and discusses the current range of products and plans for further development to meet the increased 
demands for accurate, detailed and timely Scottish economic statistics.   
 
II History of Scottish National Accounts 
 
Prior to 2008, economic statistics in Scotland were focussed mostly on short-term indicators to monitor 
current economic conditions. This meant a focus on GDP growth and its component series. The index of 
production, index of services and index of manufactured exports were the first outputs produced and 
were followed by a composite index of GDP.  
 
While relatively limited, the development of a distinct ‘Scottish GDP’ series post-devolution was a major 
step-forward. Most countries only publish such regular economic statistics at a national level. Indeed in 
the UK, Scotland is the only part of the UK to publish its own quarterly GDP series.   
 
Periodically, the Scottish government has also constructed Input-Output (I-O) and Supply-Use tables. In 
simple terms these provide an overall measure of the value of the economy in cash terms – as opposed 
to seeking to measure growth – and importantly they seek to capture the flow of goods around an 
economy and the important linkages between industries.  These tables underpin virtually every model of 
the Scottish economy both in academia and private sector, including the model used by the Fraser of 
Allander Institute.   
 
Since the launch of these statistics, there has been a growing demand for ever more detailed 
information on the Scottish economy. In light of this in 2008, the Scottish National Accounts Project 
(SNAP, Scottish Government, 2008) was launched with the aim to move towards the creation of a full 
set of National Accounts for Scotland.  
 
The United Nations describes the System of National Accounts as: 
“The System of National Accounts (SNA) is the internationally agreed standard set of 
recommendations on how to compile measures of economic activity. The SNA describes a coherent, 
consistent and integrated set of macroeconomic accounts in the context of a set of internationally 
agreed concepts, definitions, classifications and accounting rules. 
In addition, the SNA provides an overview of economic processes, recording how production is 
distributed among consumers, businesses, government and foreign nations. It shows how income 
                                                        
1
 Here the term ‘output’ and ‘product’ is used interchangeably and simply refers to any unified set of economic 
statistical series produced by the Scottish Government within the context of the Scottish National Accounts.  
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originating in production, modified by taxes and transfers, flows to these groups and how they 
allocate these flows to consumption, saving and investment. Consequently, the national accounts 
are one of the building blocks of macroeconomic statistics forming a basis for economic analysis and 
policy formulation.” (United Nations, 2008) 
In essence this is what the Scottish National Accounts Project seeks to deliver for Scotland. The original 
aims of the specific SNAP work streams were to: 
 
• Produce different component breakdowns of GDP, on expenditure and income methods; 
• Produce consistent multi-year Input Output tables 
• Present quarterly revenue estimates  
• Investigate the production of Gross National Incomes, and consider the production of per capita 
Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI)  and a Household Savings Ratio 
• Present comprehensive trade estimates, including a Balance of Trade, and investigate the 
flows between Scotland and the North Sea. 
• Improve investment estimates for Scotland, including consideration of the collection of primary 
data through tailored surveys. 
• Investigate the quality of price information for Scotland 
 
There have been significantly advances in this work over the past few years, but much work still has to 
be done.  
 
III So, what economic statistics does the Scottish Government produce? 
 
The Scottish Government has a fully integrated system of National Accounts, with our Input-Output and 
Supply-Use tables forming the foundation of a balanced accounts. Each time a new set of I-O tables is 
released, it is on a consistent basis back to 1998. This approach ensures that all data are coherent, 
accurate and comparable over time and across all our products for balanced years. It also allows for a 
much more fluid programme to improve data sources and methods and to enable positive incremental 
change in the quality of all estimates.  
 
The following are some of the key economic statistics produced by the Scottish Government. 
 
Table 1: Summary of main Scottish Government economic statistics publications 
 
Product 
 
Frequency 
Latest Release 
was for 
 
Released on 
   
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Quarterly Q2 2014 41927 
Index of Manufactured Exports (IME) Quarterly Q2 2014 41935 
Retail Sales Index for Scotland (RSIS) Quarterly Q3 2014 41948 
Quarterly National Accounts Scotland (QNAS) Quarterly Q2 2014 41955 
Oil and Gas Statistics Quarterly Q2 2014 41955 
Supply-Use and Input-Output tables for Scotland Annual 1998-2011 41836 
Government Expenditure & Revenue Scotland (GERS) Annual 2012-13 41710 
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Gross Domestic Product (GDP – Scottish Government, 2014) is the most high profile quarterly 
Scottish economic statistic. It shows how the economy has grown (or contacted) over the previous 
quarter, using pure volume measures or turnover adjusted for inflation. Figure 1 shows the headline 
results from the most recent release (15 October 2014). This shows the quarterly growth rates for each 
quarter from 2007, including over the period of the recession.  
 
 
Figure 1: GDP Quarterly Growth Rates 2007 - 2014 Q2 
 
 
Figure 2 (a): Quarterly Growth Rates 2007 - 2014 Q2, Production 
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Figure 2 (b): Quarterly Growth Rates 2007 - 2014 Q2, Construction 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (c): Quarterly Growth Rates 2007 - 2014 Q2, Services 
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There is also significant interest in the industrial or general sectoral breakdown of GDP and how they 
have been performing (see Figures 2a, 2b and 2c). They show the performance, over the last few years, 
of the three broad components of the Scottish economy, namely the production, construction and 
services sectors. 
 
Two quarterly outputs on specific sectors of the economy are also produced. The Index of 
Manufactured Exports (IME, Scottish Government, 2014) provides quarterly real terms movements for 
exports from manufacturing industry to the rest of the world. We also produce the Retail Sales Index for 
Scotland (RSIS, Scottish Government, 2014), which seeks to capture the performance of the retail 
sector of the Scottish economy. These products both rely on the same core data – the Monthly Business 
Survey – used for turnover in GDP estimation. 
 
The Input-Output and Supply Use tables at the very aggregate level produce the weight – or scale - of 
each sector in the Scottish economy, in each year. Figure 3(a) shows the weight of each sector in the 
economy for the latest balanced year, 2011, and Figure 3(b) shows a breakdown for manufacturing.  
 
 
Figure 3 (a): GVA Weights by Broad Industry Group, 2011 
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Figure 3 (b): Manufacturing Weights by Broad Industry Group, 2011 
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Work to develop these strands has not stopped with creation of QNAS. In November 2013, the first 
estimates of Scotland’s Gross National Income for 2010 (Scottish Government, 2013) was produced. In 
addition, quarterly oil and gas statistics (Scottish Government, 2014) are now produced with estimates of 
production, operating costs and sales revenue. This also includes estimates of trade flows between 
‘onshore’ and ‘offshore’ (i.e. the UK continental shelf) Scotland which allows for the calculation of an 
overall balance of trade.  
 
In 2014, capital investment data were collected by the Scottish Government for the first time from 
Scottish businesses. These are currently being analysed and will lead to improvements in estimates of 
investment in the 2012 Input/Output (I/O) tables, and a follow-up survey is planned for autumn 2015. 
 
Finally, there is the public sector finances publication, GERS or Government Expenditure and 
Revenue Scotland. GERS estimates the contribution of revenue raised in Scotland towards the goods 
and services provided for the benefit of the people of Scotland under the current constitutional 
arrangement. In essence, GERS provides an estimate of Scotland’s overall fiscal position - the current 
budget balance and the net fiscal balance – as well as a detailed account of over 1,000 expenditure 
budget lines of the Scottish, UK and local governments and all taxes raised and collected in the UK. It 
also addresses the question of the North Sea and its contribution to public sector finances in Scotland. 
 
IV What’s next for Scottish National Accounts? 
 
The construction of National Accounts for Scotland has been likened to building Scotland’s own 
“Sagrada Familia” 2 , a journey towards a beautiful construction that will never be complete. It is 
unarguable that there are many areas that one could seek to improve Scottish economic statistics but 
given existing resources, improvement need to be prioritises - in conjunction with feedback and 
engagement with users.  
 
Migration to the European System of Accounts 2010  
 
Over the next six months, work will take place to migrate the Scottish National Accounts System to 
conform to the European System of Accounts 2010 (EuroStat, 2014). This conversion has already taken 
place at the UK level and across Europe in September 2014, but in Scotland we need to wait until the 
UK level information is available to be able to convert the Scottish Input-Output tables and therefore all 
products on to this new basis.   
 
In the meantime, users have been alerted to the (interim) comparability problems that this presents. Of 
particular interest in Scotland is how Scotland’s economy or ‘numbers ‘compare to that of the UK as a 
whole. Recognising this, users have been advised that while comparisons over the previous quarter and 
year are likely to be valid, comparisons over a longer time period are likely to be subject to a greater 
degree of uncertainty than normal.  
 
 
                                                        
2
 Sandy Stewart, who started the SNAP and has developed economic statistics for Scotland for the past 20 years. 
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GERS 2013-14 
 
Alongside this programme of work, GERS 2013-14 will be published in March 2015 and a consultation 
on this publication will be launched before the end of 2014. 
 
New programme areas 
 
Post April 2015, the focus will be on three main programmes of improvement work to continue to 
develop SNAP: 
x Trade – to improve the coherence between estimates of exports from the National Accounts 
and Global Connections Survey (in conjunction with the Business and Digital Analytical Unit in 
OCEA); 
x Oil and Gas – to improve Scottish oil and gas statistics in conjunction with a sub-group of 
users, including how to understand better the flows between onshore and offshore Scotland 
(i.e. the continental shelf); 
x GDP – to review the timeliness of the main GDP publication and the sequence of release of key 
economic statistics. 
 
However, these are our broad plans and the Scottish Government is keen to discuss these with users 
over the coming few months to December 2014.  
 
Scottish Government economic statisticians and statistics  
 
The Scottish Government National Accounts Unit has nine professional statisticians. It works in three 
broad areas, although the integrated nature of the National Accounts calls for a significant degree of joint 
working across the following steams: 
 
x Input-Output – A team produces the supply-use and Input-Output tables, which form the 
foundation of the Scottish National Accounts system.  
x Short term indicators – A team produces 3 quarterly publications – GDP, Index of 
Manufactured Exports and the Retail Sales Index. It has the responsibility for the highest profile 
outputs of the National Accounts Unit. 
x Scottish National Accounts – This is, in essence, a development team and is the newest and 
most flexible part of National Accounts Unit. It was established in 2008, and publishes new 
products, including the now-well established QNAS. 
 
The National Accounts Unit works closely with other areas of the Office of the Chief Economic Adviser.  
This includes the Business and Digital Analytical Unit which has responsibility for business data - which 
it receives from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) - and it produces many products on the 
nature, structure and performance of businesses in Scotland. It is also responsible for publishing the 
Global Connections Survey that estimates Scotland’s exports to both the rest of UK and the rest of world 
and which is an essential source of information for the Scottish National Accounts. 
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Input from government economists is essential to our work, both to provide context and to allow quality 
assurance from the wider range of economic intelligence that is monitored by OCEA. Our products often 
underpin key economic publications, such as the Chief Economist’s State of the (Scottish) Economy 
(Scottish Government, 2014) which is published approximately every four months. 
Professional Standards   
 
Professional statisticians in government work to a Code of Practice for Official Statistics (UK Statistics 
Authority, 2009). This is overseen by the UK Statistics Authority, which routinely assesses our products 
to ensure they meet the standards set out in the Code and to meet the quality threshold of being 
deemed “National Statistics”. To explain, the different labels statistics produced by Government can be 
categorised as follows:  
 
x National Statistics: are statistics assessed by the UK Statistics Authority as   meeting the 
Code of Practice (i.e. they meet an identified user need, are well explained and readily 
accessible, produced according to sound methods and are managed impartially and objectively 
in the public interest. 
x Official Statistics: are statistics that meet many of the parts of the Code and which in time will 
be presented for assessment as ‘National Statistics’. 
x Experimental Statistics: is a term used for official statistics which are in the early stages of 
development, are subject to methodological developments and likely to be revised more often 
than other types of estimates. They are published in a way to allow them to be developed in 
conjunction with user feedback and to allow their methodology to evolve openly.   
 
All fully developed products – such as GERS, GDP, I-O tables and the Quarterly National Accounts – 
have been kite marked by the UK Statistics Authority as National Statistics products.  
 
 
 
V The way ahead, how users can get involved 
 
User consultation is critical to the development of the Scottish National Accounts and is an essential part 
of operating under the Code of Practice for Official Statistics. As the Code points out, user involvement 
and engagement ultimately makes for better (economic) statistical products and higher quality 
methodologies. 
 
There are many ways that users of Scottish Government economic statistics can get involved with on-
going work and future developments. 
 
The simplest way is to sign up to ScotStat (Scottish Government, 2014), the Statistics Consultation 
Network. Users can select their statistics of interest and be kept updated on their development. If one 
selects ‘Economy’, you will be alerted to new publications and consultations and to any issues with our 
statistics.  
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Users can feed back comments and views directly about certain products, or raise questions or requests 
for different or further types of analysis, by simply emailing the Unit’s economic statistics mailbox – 
economic.statistics@scotland.gsi.gov.uk.   
 
Finally, to engage more directly and to help shape the Unit’s work programme, there is the Scottish 
Economic Statistics Consultation Group (SESCG). This is composed of users of our statistics, 
people with an expertise in using National Accounts information and other economic statistics as well as 
National Accounts Team staff. This group also oversees Business & Digital and Labour Market 
Statistics. The group meets annually   – usually in February / March - and sub-group meetings take 
place on an ad-hoc basis throughout the year. 
 
If any users – including Fraser Economic Commentary readers - would like to get involved in this group 
or wish to simply find out more about the Business & Digital or Labour Market Statistics areas then they 
are encouraged to email the Unit at economic.statistics@scotland.gsi.gov.uk.  
 
VI Conclusion 
 
The production of Scottish economic statistics is vital to Scotland, not only to government and policy 
makers, but to business and civic Scotland more generally - individual businesses and business 
representative bodies, Trade Unions, local authorities, the third sector as well as academics and 
academic commentators such as the Fraser of Allander Institute.  Scotland’s economic statistics also will 
play a vital role in the debate over the powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament. As the Code of 
Practice for Official Statistics makes abundantly clear, it is only through ongoing user involvement, 
feedback and engagement that the Scottish Government will be able to produce Scottish economic 
statistics that are fit for purpose for Scotland and her citizens. 
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‘Nowcasting’ the Scottish economy 
Grant J. Allan, Gary Koop, Stuart G. McIntyre and Paul Smith, University of Strathclyde 
 
 
Introduction and overview 
In 1956, when he was Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Wilson observed that: “…some of our 
[economic] statistics are too late to be as useful as they ought to be. We are always, as it were, looking 
up a train in last year’s Bradshaw [timetable]”. In some respects little has changed, the timeliness of 
official statistics of economic performance continues to be a concern with initial estimates of key 
macroeconomic variables (e.g. GDP, or the equivalent at the subnational level in the UK, GVA) being 
released long after the end of quarter they refer to. This delay has fostered an interest in providing short 
term forecasts or even ‘nowcasts’: forecasts of the current state of economy. Nowcasting was well 
defined in a recent Commentary (Volume 37 No 2) article by Andrew Ross as the attempt to “provide 
real time assessment of current activity i.e. to nowcast rather than forecast1” or as Hal Varian, Chief 
Economist at Google puts it, nowcasting is about ‘predicting the present’2.  
 
While producing timely economic indicators is a difficulty at the UK level, it is more of a problem for the 
regions and nations of the UK. Though Scotland is particularly well served in terms of the production of 
economic data within the UK, even here the initial estimate of Scottish GVA for the second quarter of 
2014 was not released until 15 October, 2014 (and this initial estimate is liable to be revised in upcoming 
months). Thus, policymakers in 2014Q2 did not know the current value of GVA when making decisions 
and would not know what it actually was until over three months after the end of the quarter.  
Given these prolonged delays in the release of data, nowcasting is of particular interest at the sub-
national level. However, producing nowcasts poses particular challenges, mostly related to the 
timeliness of predictors and the availability of data. One additional dimension, which we are at the early 
stages of exploring, is the importance of developments in neighboring regions.  
This short note is intended to highlight some work currently being undertaken by a group within the 
Department of Economics at the University of Strathclyde, including members of the Fraser of Allander 
Institute, whose aim is to produce nowcasts of the Scottish economy. While this research is very much a 
work in progress, we are keen to highlight the potential of such approaches to improve our 
understanding of the current performance of the Scottish economy.  
Methods 
Nowcasting methods have been utilized in many countries. Perhaps the best-marketed example of this 
is found on the website: http://now-casting.com, which was established by two academic leaders in the 
field of nowcasting: Domenico Giannone and Lucrezia Reichlin. Several excellent surveys of nowcasting 
(or closely related topics such as short-term forecasting) have recently appeared. These include 
                                                        
1
 https://pure.strath.ac.uk/portal/files/30683812/FEC_37_2_2013_RossA2.pdf 
2
 https://www.thinkwithgoogle.com/articles/predicting-the-present.html 
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Banbura, Giannone and Reichlin (2011)3, Banbura, Giannone, Modugno and Reichlin (2013)4, Camacho, 
Perez-Quiros and Poncela (2013)5 and Foroni and Marcellino (2013)6. 
Methods of nowcasting involve the use of different econometric models (for instance those developed by 
Ghysels et al7 which we also use and are known as the MIDAS - Mixed Data Sampling). An important 
issue is that the variable being nowcast (GVA) is calculated on a quarterly basis, while many variables 
we use to inform our nowcasts (e.g. business and consumer surveys, employment statistics) are 
calculated on a monthly basis. This mismatch between the frequencies of variables poses econometric 
issues that must be addressed. 
The nowcasts for Scotland that we aim to produce will rely upon a range of predictors. These will cover a 
range of factors, which we feel, are likely to be important in predicting the evolution of the Scottish 
economy. Examples include: trade data (e.g. on exports from Scotland), retail sales index, index of 
services, and employment data. A full list of variables will be included in the working paper.  
This short note is not the place to discuss issues of methodology in more detail. However, a 
website/blog (http://nowcastingscotland.com/) has been established for this project which will go live in 
the near future. There will be a working paper available on this site which will provide comprehensive 
details on the data and methodology that will be used in this project.   
Release of nowcasts 
While this project is only at the pilot stage, we intend to release some experimental results in the coming 
months and refine both our methodology and the data used. Readers should expect experimental 
monthly nowcasts to appear on the blog, and in due course we will provide a transparent evaluation of 
the performance of this type of model on the blog. If things go well, our goal is to provide regularly 
updated (and non-experimental) nowcasts on the blog site and add nowcasts to the set of forecasts 
produced in the Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary. 
Concluding thoughts 
Given the significant lag between the end of a quarter and the release of Scottish GVA estimates, there 
are considerable advantages to be gained from improvements in short term forecasting or nowcasting. 
In addition, with the planned devolution of further economic powers to the Scottish Parliament, a better 
understanding of the nature and evolution of the Scottish economy is likely to be particularly valuable. In 
the coming months we will begin to release estimates of Scottish GVA using our nowcasting model, and 
we hope that this work will be of interest and use to readers of the Fraser Economic Commentary.  
                                                        
3
 Banbura, M., Giannone, D. and Reichlin, L. (2011). Nowcasting, chapter 7 in the Oxford Handbook of Economic 
Forecasting, edited by M. Clements and D. Hendry. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
4
 Banbura, M., Giannone, D., Modugno, M. and Reichlin, L. (2013). Nowcasting and the real time data flow, chapter 4 
in the Handbook of Economic Forecasting, Vol 2A, edited by G.Elliott and A. Timmermann. Elsevier-North 
Holland:Amsterdam. 
5
 Camacho, M., Perez-Quiros, G. and Poncela, P., (2013). Short-term forecasting for empirical economists: A survey 
of the recently proposed algorithms, Bank of Spain Working Paper 1318. 
6
 Foroni, C. and Marcellino, M. (2013). A survey of econometric methods for mixed frequency data, Norges Bank 
Research Working Paper 2013-06. 
7
 Ghysels, E., Sinko, A. and Valkanov, R. (2007). MIDAS regressions: Further results and new directions, 
Econometric Reviews, 26, 53-90 
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The role of sales and acquisitions in company 
growth in Scotland 
 
Paul Hopkins and Kenny Richmond, Scottish Enterprise 
 
 
Abstract  
The paper presents an overview and analysis of company acquisition activity in Scotland over the period 
2003-12. An acquisition remains a rare avenue for company growth, and data demonstrates that Scottish 
companies are less likely to acquire other companies, or be bought, than those in other comparable 
countries. Scottish companies are also less likely to be involved in international acquisition activity. 
Company motivations for pursuing acquisition as a growth model appear to relate to speed and risk and 
include: securing investment, accessing skills and knowledge, expanding products and services ranges, 
quicker entry to new markets and being able to compete for larger contracts. This research demonstrates 
that acquisition activity can be an important trigger for sustained growth for Scottish companies.  
 
I Background 
Existing evidence of the impact of acquisitions paints a complex picture. The Mergers and Acquisitions 
Research Centre 1  (MARC) note the gains of a minority of successful firms 2  make it appear that 
acquisition activity is a positive contributor to the UK economy when the overall picture is more 
uncertain3. Whilst there are differing opinions regarding larger takeovers, there is a prevailing view that 
smaller acquisitions have a greater chance of success4. 
 
Harris (2009) found that inward acquisition leads to an increase in labour productivity but a decrease in 
labour intensity as the acquirer makes investment not only to achieve the desired profitability gains but to 
bring the acquired company’s operations in line with the new owners’ requirements.  
 
Evidence of the impact of acquisition on employment suggests that while there are examples of 
increases in employment at corporate level, most acquisitions are generally followed by a reduction in 
employment within the acquired firm5.  Previous research by Scottish Enterprise (SE) on corporate 
headquarters found acquisition has the potential to lead to a loss of autonomy and loss of functions in 
the domestic HQ; that acquired companies are more vulnerable to closure; and that within about a 
decade of acquisition, employment in the acquired company had more or less halved6.  
 
However, Denison et al note little evidence that considers the “role of M&A in a corporate growth 
strategy”7 and as such organic growth and growth via acquisition are often presented as alternative 
strategies. Research by SE (2012) demonstrates that company growth typically occurs periodically 
through a series of ‘trigger points’ which suggests organic growth can be complemented by acquisitions 
                                                        
1
 Based in CASS Business School at City University London 
2
 Such as BP, AstraZeneca and Reckitt Benckiser 
3
 2011, p.5 
4
 Cardinali & Wikren (2012), Gotton, Kahl & Rosen (2005) and KPMG (2007) 
5
 Harris, (2009) 
6 Botham, & Clelland (2005)  
7
 2011, p.112-113 
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which trigger or accelerate a period of growth. Subsequent work by Nesta (2014) has identified that 
acquisition is increasingly becoming a feature of high-growth firms8.  
 
Whether a trade sale can be seen as part of a growth strategy with benefits to the economy depends in 
part on the location of the acquired firm and the actions of the acquiring firm. The acquiring firm may 
choose to keep activity (for example employment and output) at the acquired firm’s current location. If 
activity remains domestic following a sale, the economic impacts are likely to be restricted to the potential 
‘loss’ of profits should the acquirer choose to repatriate them back to their home nation. Any shift in the 
high value aspects of the acquired company would similarly result in a loss to the economy.  However, 
within this perspective there has been little analysis of the shape and scale of acquisition activity in 
Scotland and how companies use acquisitions to help their growth.  
 
The ZEPHYR database9 provides detailed statistical data to give a robust and accurate indication of the 
nature of acquisitions within the Scottish economy, and is considered to be one of the most 
comprehensive and authoritative sources of such data in the UK.   
  
The analysis of the ZEPHYR database was complemented by face-to-face interviews with a group of 
Scottish Enterprise Account Managed companies10 that have either been subject to a trade sale or 
acquisition. The aim was to explore the underlying motivations that drive and influence this activity.  
 
It is important to note that SE Account Managed companies are selected for their high-growth potential; 
therefore the evidence presented here may not therefore fully reflect the range of acquisition activity 
across Scotland’s wider business base.  
 
II The Scottish acquisitions market in an international context 
From 2003 through to 2012, ZEPHYR recorded the following number of deals involving Scottish 
companies: 
x 664 inward acquisitions (a non-Scottish company acquiring a Scottish company) 
x 458 outward acquisitions (a Scottish company acquiring a non-Scottish company) 
x 284 intra-acquisitions (a Scottish company acquiring another Scottish company). 
 
Comparing acquisition activity in Scotland with other European countries shows that inward acquisition 
activity is less common in Scotland than in other similarly-sized economies. The same can be said of 
outward acquisitions made by Scottish companies. Scotland’s performance more closely resembles that 
of the major Western European economies of Great Britain, Germany and France; though this may not 
be surprising given that the Scottish economy is an integral part of the UK economy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
8
 Nesta, 2014 
9 Owned and managed by the Bureau van Dijk, the owners of the FAME business database 
10
 SE works with companies that will make the biggest difference to Scotland’s economic performance through our 
Account Management Service, selected as a result of their significant growth potential.   
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Diagram 1 Total inward and total outward acquisitions as a percentage of the overall business base 
(2003-12), by country 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1  Location of companies acquired by Scottish companies and acquiring Scottish companies 
(2003-12) and Scotland’s top export markets (2012)  
Location of companies acquired 
by Scottish firms 
Location of firms acquiring 
Scottish companies 
Top 10 Scottish export trading 
partners (2012) 
Rest of the UK  42% Rest of the UK  44% Rest of the UK £47.6bn 
Scotland  38% Scotland  31% United States £3.6bn 
United States  6% United States  8% Netherlands £2.7bn 
Ireland  2% Norway  3% France £2.2bn 
Australia  1% France  2% Germany £1.5bn 
Netherlands  1% Ireland  1% Norway £920m 
India  1% Australia  1% Switzerland £870m 
Norway  1% Netherlands  1% Spain £830m 
Canada  1% Germany  1% Ireland £815m 
France  1% Canada  1% Belgium £735m 
Source: ZEPHYR and The Scottish Government, Global Connections Survey (2013) 
 
Data for both inward and outward acquisitions strongly mirror current export flows for Scotland with a 
dominant majority of activity with the United States, France, Ireland and Norway (refer Table 1) 11.  
                                                        
11
 Ernst & Young (2013). No Room for Complacency. 20013 UK Attractiveness Survey – Scotland 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/2013_Scotland_Attractiveness_Survey/$FILE/EY_2013_Scotland_Attracti
veness_Survey.pdf  
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Despite their increasing importance in global trade and investment flows12, less acquisition activity takes 
place between Scottish companies and those of BRIC countries. 
 
The vast majority of acquisition activity involving Scottish firms takes place within the UK market. This 
rate of intra-country acquisition is noticeably higher than in other comparator nations.  This lower 
international propensity to acquire or be acquired perhaps reflects the low level of internationalisation of 
the Scottish business base (a lower proportion of Scottish SMEs export than those to other countries) 
and the importance of the UK market  to Scottish  companies.  
 
The greatest proportion of Scottish firms being acquired (be that from outwith or within Scotland) as well 
as making acquisitions are companies that are under ten years old. Between 2003 and 2012 such 
companies accounted for:  
x 52% of all inward acquisitions 
x 39% of outward acquisitions 
x 52% of intra-acquired companies 
x 37% of intra-acquirers 
 
Acquisition activity by younger companies is greater in Scotland, and to a lesser extent the UK, than in 
other European countries. The reasons for this are unclear as there is no evidence that Scottish firms 
engaged in this activity are different in any other way e.g. company size. This is a potential area for 
future research. 
 
Diagram 2  Scottish companies involved in sales and acquisitions, by company age (2003-12) 13.       
 
 
                                                        
12
 UNCTAD Global Investment Trends Monitor, No.11 (January 2013), No.12 (March 2013) and No.13 (October 
2013). 
13
 The spike in outward acquisitions of 41+ is influenced by The John Wood Group PLC which made fifteen 
acquisition deals over the period thus abnormally inflating the data for this cohort. 
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The median deal size for Scottish companies bought by non-Scottish companies suggests that whilst 
both the purchase and sale companies involved are young, they are not necessarily small (when 
compared to other nations’ median deal sizes). Similarly, Scotland’s median outward acquisition deal 
size is similar to that of other countries, but as the Scottish companies are younger than their European 
counterparts, this may be an indication that these Scottish companies have undergone a period of early 
growth. 
 
The post-deal status of a company can give some indication of the motivations behind, and the 
consequences of, each deal. Dissolution and an inactive status suggests the principal objective (or at 
least a strong consideration) may have been to acquire a company to eliminate it; either to extract 
valuable aspects (e.g. market share) or simply to eliminate a market competitor14.  
 
In contrast, a company that remains active once it has been acquired suggests a different set of 
motivations behind the deal. It suggests that the company has been targeted because it is, or has the 
potential to be, profitable and has, or has the potential to be, of significant value to the acquirer in its 
current location, with its current market and current customer base.  This suggests that the strategy 
behind the acquisition/trade sale recognises the potential to achieve synergies from bringing together the 
two firms, which evidence shows is a key factor in achieving post-acquisition  success15. 
 
 
Diagram 3  Percentage of companies remaining active post-acquisition (2003-12) 
 
 
                                                        
14
 It should be noted that the period of this study covers Recession of 2008 – 2014 and this may be a factor in many of 
the dissolutions and inactivity of companies.  
15
 Cardinali, A., Wikren, B. (2012), Berkovitch & Narayanan (1993), Raj, M. & Forsyth, M. (2004) 
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Analysis of the trading status of firms shows lower post-acquisition active rates for acquired Scottish 
companies (54% for those acquired from overseas, and 42% for those acquired from within Scotland) 
than for those companies who make acquisitions. 
 
Scotland has one of the stronger post-acquisition active rates in Europe across all types of deal. For 
inward acquisitions, Scotland’s rate of (54%) is higher than other countries such as France, Netherlands 
and Ireland.  Scotland is also ahead of the UK and is only 3% behind top-placed Sweden at 57%. 
 
The post-acquisition active rate for acquired Scottish companies is higher than some other countries. 
This suggests that acquirers recognise the value of Scottish targets in terms of the existing market as 
well as their supply chain and networks.  This may reflect the acquired company’s ‘embeddedness’ in the 
Scottish economy as well as other benefits such as access to markets and public sector support.  In this 
regard, Scotland’s acquisitions market may potentially offer an avenue to benefit not only Scottish firms, 
but also the Scottish economy through an expansion in jobs, supply chains and potential future unrelated 
activity within Scotland.  
 
Median deal sizes suggest that most acquisitions take place at the SME level.  The median figure for 
both inward and outward acquisitions is around £11m.  
 
In comparison to other countries, Scotland performs within the mid-range for inward acquisition deal 
sizes, at around €12.9m (£10.8m); lower than the Netherlands but higher than Norway and Sweden as 
well as the United Kingdom. 
 
 
Diagram 4   Median deal size by acquisition type and country (2003-12) 
 
 
 
In terms of outward acquisitions, the median Scottish deal size of €13.25m (£11.1m) is higher than 
comparable countries (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the UK).  The data suggests that 
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Scottish companies that make cross-border acquisitions are very similar to Scottish companies subject to 
trade sales.  
 
The greatest numbers of deals are by companies in the following sectors: technologies and advanced 
engineering; financial and business services; creative industries; and, energy sectors.  This is true for 
each type of acquisition ‘deal’ (inward, outward and intra). 
 
In summary, the Scottish acquisitions market demonstrates that:  
x Compared to other similar-sized economies, a lower proportion of Scotland’s business base is 
involved in acquisition and trade sale activity; 
x Scotland is strongly dependent on the UK market for company sales and acquisitions, more so 
than comparable, independent countries;  
x Scottish companies involved in acquisition are younger than those in other countries, but deal 
sizes are comparable, as are post-acquisition activity rates; 
x Companies in technologies and advanced engineering; financial and business services; 
creative industries and energy are more active in acquisition activity both across borders and within 
Scotland. 
III  BUSINESS’ EXPERIENCE OF ACQUISITION 
In order to better understand some of the underlying factors behind sales and acquisitions activity, a 
series of interviews were conducted with twelve companies that are account managed by Scottish 
Enterprise. These highlighted three principal reasons for sales and acquisitions activity, namely to:  
x achieve growth; 
x facilitate a management exit ; and 
x provide a return to investors.  
 
(i) To Achieve Growth 
The primary objective for many companies’ acquisition activity was to realise growth, using acquisition or 
a trade sale to either trigger a new phase or continue a current growth phase. Companies provided a 
range of reasons why they felt acquisition was the best route to maximise their growth potential, with 
strong similarities between companies subject to a trade sale and those making an acquisition. These 
included to: 
 
x Source the quickest way to achieve and/or accelerate growth; 
x Lower the risk attached to acquiring a company with knowledge, skills and customers compared to 
investing in the existing company and activities; 
x Realise synergies and shared goals between companies;  
x Access products and services and add more products and services to the company’s offer; 
x Give the Scottish company a stronger presence and/or a base in either an existing market or in a target 
market, particularly internationally, at a pace that could not be realised any other way;  
x Provide instant access to skilled, trained and qualified staff; 
x Provide instant access to networks, contacts and relationships to be exploited for further growth plans; 
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x Provide the company with a healthier financial position, a stronger balance sheet; often to remove debt 
and other financial constraints; 
x Secure investment, particularly capital investment, which the Scottish company alone was not able to 
find or attract; 
x Provide a level of technical support and expertise not previously available;  
x Increase their customer base and reduce risks to the company 
A common factor raised by the interviewees was the importance of finding the right acquisition or trade 
buyer.  As one Chief Executive put it “It’s not the biggest cheque, it’s who would work with us to grow in 
the long-term. It also showed our staff that they were valued and part of what we wanted to achieve.”  
Scottish companies interviewed showed a desire to secure the best fit for their company and staff, with 
some spurning larger financial returns in order to achieve this. 
 
The overall conclusion is that each company felt that acquiring another company, or being acquired, was 
the quickest route to realising growth and also the safest option, providing the right condition were set. 
Companies were consistently of the view that alternative strategies would have found it harder to 
penetrate further into markets, make necessary investment and access the required knowledge, 
expertise or contacts. To build their companies organically would have, in their view, take too long, been 
too costly and have had a lesser chance of success.  For each company, therefore, their decision to 
acquire or be acquired was the most logical step to ensure they grew. 
 
(ii) To Achieve a Management Exit 
In the case of two companies, the explicit aim of the owners from the outset was to achieve an exit and a 
return on investment.  For a further two companies, an exit had gradually become the preference of the 
owner.  The exit was ultimately used in each of these four cases as a ‘trigger’ point for further growth of 
the company as the experiences and skills of new members of the management team took the company 
“to the next level”. 
 
Often, exiting owners sought to ensure that the company remained in Scotland by stipulating that sale 
contracts retain brand names, key accounts and guarantees to retain staff.  This shows that despite 
seeking a management exit, it was not simply about securing an exit at any price or any effect and 
leaving the business to the whims of its acquirer. 
 
“We spent years on this company; it’s our legacy so we weren’t going to hand it to just anyone.  They 
had to make sure it worked for us beyond the sale, otherwise we’d have looked elsewhere.” 
 
One motivation was a desire by the owner to maintain their reputation to allow them to continue to work 
in their chosen field within Scotland. This also helped therefore to secure continuing benefits from the 
company’s operation on the Scottish economy.  
 
This desire to remain active after exiting the company, and the requirement that the replacement owner 
had to have relevant skills, expertise and experience, highlights the potential of acquisitions activity to 
‘recycle’ individuals and entrepreneurs within the Scottish economy. 
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(iii) To Provide a Return to Investors 
Interviews highlighted that companies with investment from angel investors and private financiers 
possessed a greater awareness of the potential role a trade sale could play in facilitating their growth 
plans.  The eventual exit of existing funders was a central part of their overall business plan, which 
enabled the company to ensure their funders received a return as well as ensuring the deal enabled the 
company to continue to grow.  Each such interviewee believed that a sale presented the best opportunity 
for them to facilitate this exit and achieve growth. 
 
Reaching these growth goals only arose because of the drive to facilitate an exit for initial investors.  It 
allowed the Scottish company to secure investment and higher growth in jobs, not just in the company 
but also the supply chain, whilst providing investors with a financial return and enabling them to re-invest 
in further companies. 
 
Companies repeatedly highlighted that they companies are presented with opportunities for trade sales 
and acquisition on a consistent basis.  As one Managing Director noted “they’re always coming across 
my desk, some I take a few minutes to think about, others I just ignore … They’re always there and you 
never know when something might just appear at that right time.” 
 
Some companies admitted that they were “…always looking.  We never stop.  You just don’t know what 
opportunities you’ll miss… we’re always talking with customers, clients.  That’s how these come about.”  
 
Interviews highlighted not only the approach of some Scottish companies but also their acumen in using 
economic conditions to secure attractive deals.  Whilst their long-term ambition is to grow turnover and 
profitability, management have been flexible in their approaches to achieve this. Rather than being rigidly 
committed to any particular strategy, they remained open to all viable opportunities as the economy, their 
industries and markets evolved. 
 
IV   Alternatives to Acquisition 
 
Whilst both trade sales and acquisitions provide an avenue for growth, they are not the only option 
available to companies.  Other routes include investing in existing structures (growing organically), a 
stock market listing, employee ownership or joint ventures.  
 
Companies believed these other avenues would not have allowed growth to occur as quickly and not to 
the level desired and subsequently realised. The reasons for pursuing a trade sale or acquisition above 
other available alternatives seem to relate to risk and speed.  On completion of the deal, companies had 
a ready supply of skilled staff, machinery, networks, knowledge and markets/orders. Securing these 
benefits almost instantly allowed growth to be realised much more quickly than attempting to build these 
organically.  
 
It could also be interpreted that companies saw a trade sale or acquisition as a better value/lower cost 
route to growth. Companies had considered investment and diversification but concluded there was no 
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guarantee if, or when, such a strategy would pay off.  One cited an example of a competitor in Scotland 
who had chosen to invest to grow organically, but “hadn’t seen anywhere near the return they might have 
hoped for, and they have no real indication as to when they will, if indeed they ever, do.” 
 
Some companies acknowledged that they did not perhaps consider all potential growth options open to 
them, giving two reasons for this.  The first was knowledge of where to seek advice.  The second was 
that, in some cases, the owner made a quick decision to sell and did not take time, or involve existing 
management, to explore other options. In such cases, outcomes had been ultimately beneficial for the 
company, but on reflection, one interviewee felt some external advice on alternative growth strategies 
may have been beneficial.  
 
For those companies that considered their objectives and options and set out a clear plan to deliver 
these either via acquisition or trade sale, their experiences were positive.  They had a stronger belief that 
they had achieved and, in some cases, surpassed their expectations. Whilst pre-deal diligence was 
viewed as exhausting and thorough, their reflection was that it was worth the time and effort.  
 
Companies for which acquisition decisions arose more out of circumstance than any strategy, did not 
regret decisions that were taken, but acknowledged that post-acquisition benefits had emerged more by 
chance than design and that more due diligence could have been undertaken to ensure the deal was the 
absolute best outcome for the company. 
 
VI Conclusions 
It is clear that trade sales and acquisitions can and do form part of the growth plans for companies, 
bringing with them wider benefits for the regional economy. Scotland’s market is similar to many 
countries, although acquisition activity involving Scottish companies is notably lower than similar sized 
countries. This suggests that the challenge to grow companies in Scotland is not a consequence of too 
many companies being acquired.  
 
The motivation for companies to acquire others (or seek a sale) appears to be the speed and ease of 
access to markets: secure sufficient investment needed to grow; to enter new markets or deeper into 
existing markets through attracting larger clients. Companies that had these motivations had found 
themselves unable to fund additional investment from within or lacking the confidence to be able to 
attract sufficiently skilled staff, hence preventing them from adding new products and services in order to 
grow, both within their sector and geographically. 
 
Evidence points to a correlation between the networks of companies and successful, growth-led, 
acquisition activity.  Hence, increasing the level of Scottish firms trading internationally would most likely 
lead to an increase in company acquisitions. This fact heightens the importance of successfully 
embedding companies within the Scottish economy in order to maximise post-acquisition (or sale) 
economic activity in Scotland. We know from the research that the greatest benefits to both the company 
and the economy arise when companies that are acquired are embedded within the Scottish economy, 
with established links to growing markets, skilled staff, supply chains and strong growth potential.  
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The potential downside of acquisitions of Scottish-based companies is the leakage and loss of profits 
from the Scottish economy. However companies saw this loss as being an acceptable trade-off in order 
to access higher growth. Interviews highlighted that in the absence of a trade sale companies would not 
have experienced subsequent growth in sales and jobs, not have secured required investment nor been 
able to access international networks via attracting larger contracts without the acquisition.  
 
This issue of how to further embed companies within the Scottish economy is worthy of further 
consideration given that acquisition activity increases as companies seek to internationalise. Future 
research could also develop a greater understanding of the extent to which post-sales ‘recycling’ of 
knowledge, skills and funds occurs and assess its benefits to the Scottish economy. Research could also 
consider the extent and impact of some of the barriers that companies face (e.g. access to investment 
finance, innovation and skills) which led to the choice of a trade sale or acquisition, as the best means to 
growth. 
 
The evidence gathered in this study found a prevailing view amongst Scottish Enterprise Account 
Managed companies that acquisitions and trade sales had formed a central part of their growth plans.  
As such sales and acquisitions should be seen by policy makers as a regular characteristic of the 
modern business economy and be recognised as an effective route through which company growth can 
be achieved.  
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Determinants of European national men’s football 
team performance:  Scotland’s potential progress in 
the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers 
N Scelles, University of Stirling and W Andreff, Université Paris 1 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this paper, we estimate the potential outcomes for Scotland in the 2016 Euro qualifiers, based on a 
model of the outcomes of previous European men’s football matches. The sampled dataset includes all 
matches played between European national men’s football teams between August 2012 and December 
2013, that is 368 matches in all. According to our model, Scotland should fail to progress to the UEFA 
Euro 2016 playoffs by only one goal in Group D. This result is confirmed when we correct our model to 
take into account the difference between real scores and scores provided by the model for each team in 
Group D. Nevertheless, in a third model – which is a better predictor – Scotland should come third in 
Group D and thus proceed to the playoffs in which it could hope to qualify for the Euro 2016 Finals. A 
fourth and final approach predicts that Scotland could even come second in Group D, behind Germany, 
and thus qualify directly to the UEFA Euro 2016 Finals in France. 
 
I Introduction 
The UEFA Euro 2016 Finals will take place in France and will be the first Euro Finals to include 24 
teams. This increase in the number of teams provides more chances for some countries to take part in 
the Finals, including Scotland which has qualified only in 1992 (when 8 teams competed) and 1996 
(when 16 teams competed). Indeed, in the 2016 Euro Finals instead of having only the teams ranked 
first in their groups plus the best second teams, all teams ranked first and second in their groups will 
qualify directly, plus the best third team across all groups, plus four other teams that will have beaten the 
four other third-ranked teams in the playoffs. 
 
In this paper, we estimate the potential outcomes for Scotland in the 2016 Euro qualifiers, based on a 
model of the outcomes of previous European international men’s football matches. The sampled dataset 
includes all matches played between European national men’s football teams between August 2012 and 
December 2013, 368 matches in all. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section II we present our model. In Section III the data are 
described and in Section IV we report our results. In Section V we then apply these results to the 
forthcoming UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers, with a focus on Scotland. In Section VI we note some limitations 
in the model and its resulting predictions. We conclude in Section VII. 
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II Model specification 
 
In our model a score equation is specified and then estimated using variables identified in a review of 
the literature (Allan and Moffat, 2014; Andreff and Andreff, in press; Baur and Lehmann, 2007; 
Berlinschi, Schokkaert, and Swinnen, 2013; Gelade and Dobson, 2007; Hoffmann, Lee, and Ramasamy, 
2002; Hoffmann, Lee, Matheson, and Ramasamy, 2006; Houston and Wilson, 2002; Leeds and Leeds, 
2009; Macmillan and Smith, 2007; Yamamura, 2009, 2012). In addition, we introduce seven new 
variables which have not yet been tested as potential determinants of national men’s football team 
performance. The relevant variables from the literature are: 
 
x Population: (Log POPi - Log POPj) / Log [min (POPi, POPj)], 
with POPi the population of team i’s nation and POPj the population of team j’s nation; 
x GDP per capita: (Log GDPi - Log GDPj) / Log [min (GDPi, GDPj)]; 
x Climate ([temperature - 14°C]2): (CLIi - CLIj) / [min (CLIi, CLIj)]; 
x Experience: EXP equals the number of matches played by a country in its history, thus (Log EXPi - 
Log EXPj) / Log [min (EXPi, EXPj)]; 
x Percentage of players: is the number of football players in a country (PLA) divided by its population: 
[(Log PLAi / Log POPi) - (Log PLAj / Log POPj)] / min [(Log PLAi / Log POPi), (Log PLAj / Log POPj)]. 
The expectation is that a large population is not sufficient as a precondition to perform in the football 
World Cup while the percentage of players within this population should be a crucial determinant of 
scores and wins; 
x Home advantage: is a dummy equal to 1 if team i plays home, -1 if team j plays home. 
 
In addition to the above variables drawn from the literature, we introduce seven new variables to test the 
determinants of the outcome of men’s international football matches.  They are: 
 
x Player Quality: is the number of players who are on the roster of the 10 most valuable European 
football clubs and have been fielded in at least 20 games per season: (PLQi - PLQj) / min (PLQi, 
PLQj)]. 
The 10 most valuable clubs in Europe are Real Madrid, Manchester United, FC Barcelona, Arsenal, 
Bayern Munich, AC Milan, Chelsea, Juventus, Manchester City and Liverpool (more than $650m for 
every team against $520m for the 11th (i.e. Tottenham); Forbes, 2013). The underlying assumption is 
that best players have an incentive to play in those teams with the best financial resources to pay 
them; 
x Foreign Managers: from the core group of western European countries: FOMi - FOMj, 
with FOM as a dummy: equal to 1 for countries with a national team coached by a foreign manager 
from Belgium, France, Germany, Italy or the Netherlands. 
This dummy is derived from Kuper and Szymanski (2012) who contend that the five above-
mentioned western European countries have discovered the secret of football and all adhere to the 
basic tenets of rapid collectivised western European football. 
x Technology Transfer through managers: TTMi - TTMj, 
with TTM a dummy equal to 1 for countries with a manager who has coached a team in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy or the Netherlands or has been trained himself / herself by a manager 
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operating in one of these five countries (the dummy equals 0.5 if the club was in the second 
division); 
x Prize: is a dummy equal to 1 if team i is favourite, -1 if team j is favourite in a match with sporting 
prize for the two teams. 
Sporting prize means that a team is in contention for a specific sporting prize: 
 winning the final (eg UEFA Euro Finals or FIFA World Cup) 
 a qualification to the next round of a Finals’ competition 
 first rank (rather than the second) in the group stage in a Finals’ competition (eg the FIFA World 
Cup) – even when being ranked second allows a team to qualify to the next round. As a first-
ranked team it automatically faces a second-ranked team from another group in the next round, 
hence, to be first rather than second should allow a team to avoid a supposedly best team in the 
next round. It is notable that in the 2014 World Cup, every team ranked first in its group stage 
qualified into the round of 16. 
A team is considered as favourite if there is a difference of 0.1 or more between the two opponents 
in betting odds. When betting odds are not available, dummies are allocated to teams only in those 
cases where an obvious favourite can be assessed. 
x Prize difference in favour of the favourite: is a dummy equal to 1 if team i is favourite, -1 if team j is 
favourite when it occurs that the favourite team has a sporting prize whereas the underdog has no 
sporting prize. 
x Prize difference in favour of the underdog: is a dummy equal to 1 if team i is the underdog, -1 if team 
j is the underdog the latter having a sporting prize whereas the favourite has no sporting prize. 
x No prize: is a dummy equal to 1 if team i is favourite, -1 if team j is favourite in a match without a 
sporting prize. 
 
A linear specification for the predicted score between team i and j is written as follows: 
Sijtsd  ȕ0 ȕXXij ȕZZijt ȕWWijts ȕKKijtsd İijtsd  (1) 
where:  
 
Sijtsd is the score of a match between team i and team j in year t, during the semester s and on day d, ȕ0 
is an intercept term, ȕX stands for the coefficients of explanatory variables Xij which depend on team i 
and team j (Climate and Percentage of players), ȕZ the coefficients of explanatory variables Zijt which 
depend on team i and team j in year t (Population and GDP per capita), ȕW the coefficients of 
explanatory variables Wijts which depend on team i and team j in year t and semester s (Player Quality), 
ȕK the coefficients of explanatory variables Kijtsd which depend on team i and team j in year t, semester s 
and on day d (Experience, Foreign Managers, Technology Transfer, Home advantage, Prize, Prize 
GLIIHUHQFHIRUWKHIDYRXULWH3UL]HGLIIHUHQFHIRUWKHXQGHUGRJDQG1RSUL]HDQGİDVWRFKDVWLFHUURUWHUP 
 
III Data description 
 
The sample used to test the above-specified model gathers together all game-specific data from August 
2012 to December 2013 for European men’s international football (368 observations); Montenegro is 
excluded from the sample since data about the number of players are missing. Data regarding Score, 
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Experience, Percentage of players and Home advantage have been collected or calculated from FIFA 
sources; Population is available on the United Nations website; GDP per capita from the International 
Monetary Fund website; Temperature from the World Bank website; Player Quality from ESPN and 
Wikipedia; Foreign Managers and Technology Transfer from Wikipedia; and Prize, Prize difference for 
the favourite, Prize difference for the underdog and No prize from BetBase1. Table 1 exhibits descriptive 
statistics for the sample as a whole. 
 
IV Results 
 
The results are shown in Table 2. Population, Experience, Percentage of players and Prize difference in 
favour of the favourite team have a significantly positive impact at the 1% threshold.  Player Quality, 
Home advantage and Prize a significantly have a positive impact at the 5% threshold. GDP per capita 
has a significantly negative impact at the 10% threshold, while all other variables are insignificant. 
Though the latter variables are not all significant, it is worth noting that using the same model applied to 
all the men’s national football team matches in the world over the period 2011-2013 (2,854 
observations), all variables are significant, save for Climate. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Abs Score 1.5897 1.4735 
Population 16,054,388 25,967,538 
Abs Log-population difference 0.1476 0.1599 
GDP per capita 32,663 30,553 
Abs Log-GDP per capita difference 0.1290 0.1034 
Temperature 8.4674 4.3833 
Abs Climate difference 30.22 123.33 
Experience 536.36 225.93 
Abs Log-experience difference 0.1059 0.1114 
Percentage of players 7.4118% 5.2134% 
Abs Percentage of players difference 0.0438 0.0377 
Quality of players 1.9674 5.2167 
Abs Quality of players difference 3.1087 6.2400 
Foreign managers 0.1114 0.3146 
Abs Foreign managers difference 0.1957 0.3967 
Technology transfer 0.1780 0.3762 
Abs Technology transfer difference 0.2826 0.4396 
Home advantage 0.9565 0.2039 
Abs Prize 0.5326 0.4989 
Abs Prize difference / favourite 0.0978 0.2971 
Abs Prize difference / underdog 0.0136 0.1158 
Abs No prize 0.3315 0.4708 
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Table 2: Results. 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Population 2.6291 0.0002 
GDP per capita -1.3179 0.0967 
Climate -0.0004 0.3879 
Experience 2.1463 0.0198 
Percentage of players 7.2387 0.0035 
Player quality 0.0272 0.0452 
Foreign managers 0.1632 0.3652 
Technology transfer 0.0579 0.7449 
Home advantage 0.6771 0.0368 
Prize 0.3522 0.0254 
Prize difference / favourite team 0.8107 0.0031 
Prize difference / underdog -1.4087 0.3240 
No prize 0.0667 0.6348 
Constant -0.4867 0.1172 
Observations 368 
Adjusted R² 0.470 
 
 
Table 3: Results without Netherlands-Hungary. 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
Population 2.5462 0.0003 
GDP per capita -1.3717 0.0818 
Climate -0.0004 0.3915 
Experience 2.4032 0.0069 
Percentage of players 6.7136 0.0060 
Player quality 0.0292 0.0297 
Foreign managers 0.1786 0.3189 
Technology transfer 0.0169 0.9225 
Home advantage 0.6747 0.0366 
Prize 0.3513 0.0245 
Prize difference / favourite team 0.8088 0.0032 
Prize difference / underdog -0.1098 0.8947 
No prize 0.0694 0.6213 
Constant -0.4998 0.1059 
Observations 367 
Adjusted R² 0.476 
 
Surprisingly, the absolute value of the coefficient for Prize difference in favour of the underdog is higher 
than those for Prize difference in favour of the favourite team and Prize. This would mean that the 
advantage for the favourite team is higher when it has no prize to defend. This is counter-intuitive as one 
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would expect favourites to have a smaller incentive to play at their best level and thus one would expect 
their coefficient to be lower. It is worth noting that the results for Prize difference in favour of the 
underdog could be biased by one score difference: that between Netherlands and Hungary (+7). We 
thus re-ran our model without this game (refer Table 3). These results are now more consistent with our 
expectations. Consequently, we applied this revised model to predict Scotland’s potential outcomes in 
the 2016 UEFA Euro qualifiers. 
 
V Scotland’s potential progress in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers 
 
Model 1 
 
Table 4 provides the outcomes in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying Group D according to our model. First, 
the differences between teams in each individual game are given, resulting from the application of 
coefficients outlined in Table 3 to each game. The coefficient for home advantage is 0.6747, which 
should mean for example that if Scotland loses by two goals against Germany in Germany, it should 
theoretically lose by less than one goal at home (2 - 0.6747 - 0.6747 = 0.6506: Germany loses its home 
advantage (-0.6747) and has even now an away disadvantage (-0.6747 again)). Actually, we considered 
that the constant in our model (-0.4998) counterbalances the strength of home advantage and reduces it 
to 0.1749 (0.6747 - 0.4998). Of our 367 observations, 351 took place at a national stadium while 16 took 
place at a neutral ground.  Hence that is why we apply 0.1749 for home advantage. Second, below 
Table 4 we provide the standing resulting from the differences between teams in each individual game, 
based on the UEFA rules for the allocation of points at the end of each game (i.e. 3 points for a win, 1 
point for a draw, 0 point for a loss) and deciding between teams with the same number of points (i.e. 
goal difference in all games – as noted in brackets). 
 
Table 4: Outcomes in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying Group D according to our model 
 Germany Ireland Poland Scotland Georgia Gibraltar 
Germany  +2 +2 +2 +2 +6 
Ireland -1  0 0 +1 +4 
Poland -1 +1  +1 +1 +5 
Scotland -2 0 0  +1 +4 
Georgia -2 0 -1 0  +4 
Gibraltar -6 -4 -4 -4 -4  
1. Germany 30 
2. Poland 20 
3. Ireland 13 (+5) 
4. Scotland 13 (+4) 
5. Georgia 8 
6. Gibraltar 0 
 
Scotland should be in contention with Ireland in Group D to take part in the playoffs for the UEFA Euro 
2016 Finals, but fail to do so by one goal. Germany – the current World Champions – should win all its 
matches, taking advantage of its population, experience, percentage of players and its player quality 
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(Table 5). Poland should take advantage of its population and lower GDP per capita compared to 
Germany, Ireland and Scotland. The latter two countries have very similar data, with Scotland having 
better experience and Ireland a larger percentage of players. 
 
Table 5: Data in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying Group D 
 Population 
GDP per 
capita 
Temperature Experience 
Percentage 
of players 
Player 
quality 
Foreign 
manager 
Technology 
transfer 
Germany 
80 640 
000 40369.97 8.50 887 20.22% 10 0 0 
Ireland 4 662 000 40267.27 9.11 505 9.04% 0 0 0 
Poland 
38 548 
000 21679.39 7.87 756 5.19% 1 0 0 
Scotland 5 300 000 44339.62 8.31 726 7.94% 0 0 0 
Georgia 4 489 000 6007.129 7.36 516 4.95% 0 0 1 
Gibraltar 29 259 34177.52 18.60 52 7.00% 0 0 0 
 
Model 2 
 
It seems proper that we should compare real score and the score provided by the model based on the 
period August 2012 to December 2013 for every men’s international football team (except Gibraltar that 
did not play) to assess potential over or under-performance (refer to Appendices 1 to 5). We took this 
into account to correct our model. According to our new model, Scotland should be in contention with 
Poland to take part in the playoffs for the qualification in the UEFA Euro 2016, but still fail to do so by 
one goal (Table 6). However, an encouraging point to note is that Scotland has performed strongly since 
June 2013, after having underperformed up until March 2013 (Appendix 1). This could mean that 
Scotland could outperform Poland. 
 
Table 6: Outcomes in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying Group D according to our corrected model 
 Germany Ireland Poland Scotland Georgia Gibraltar 
Germany  +2 +2 +2 +3 +6 
Ireland -1  +1 +1 +2 +5 
Poland -2 0  0 +1 +5 
Scotland -2 0 0  +1 +4 
Georgia -3 -1 -1 -1  +3 
Gibraltar -6 -4 -4 -4 -3  
1. Germany 30 
2. Ireland 20 
3. Poland 15 (+6) 
4. Scotland 15 (+5) 
5. Georgia 6 
6. Gibraltar 0 
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Model 3  
 
We then replaced our previous model by using a regression in which we explain score difference by way 
of home advantage and dummies for every team instead of by the previously used determinants. For 
example, for Scotland, we use 1 when it played at home and -1 when it played away; we use the same 
principle for other teams. The advantage of this approach is that it directly captures team strengths over 
the period August 2012 to December 2013. Given that Gibraltar did not play over this period, we 
arbitrarily chose to allocate San Marino’s coefficient to Gibraltar. Using this updated model – which is the 
most powerful for predictions (adjusted R² = 0.527) – Scotland should come third in Group D and qualify 
for the playoffs (Table 7). The best third team among all groups will be directly qualified for the UEFA 
Euro 2016 but our model predicts that it will not be Scotland; rather it predicts it will be Sweden. The 
other teams it predicts that will take part in the playoffs will be: Iceland, Israel, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark. According to our coefficients, the hierarchy among Scotland and these 
teams is as follows: Israel (5.647), Slovakia (5.550), Romania (5.499), Scotland (5.494), Slovenia 
(5.341), Bulgaria (5.272), Iceland (5.148) and Denmark (5.100). In taking into account home advantage 
(+0.281), this would mean that Scotland should qualify against Bulgaria, Iceland and Denmark (+1 at 
home, 0 away) whereas other confrontations should be very uncertain (0 at home, 0 away). Using this 
model based on team strengths over the period August 2012 to December 2013, the standings in the 
different groups for the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers should be as set out in Table 8. For each team we 
indicate its coefficient in our model and not its number of points; but the ranking is the same using either 
approach. 
 
Table 7: Outcomes in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying Group D according to home advantage and team 
strengths over the period August 2012 to December 2013 
 Germany Ireland Poland Scotland Georgia Gibraltar 
Germany  +2 +3 +3 +3 +8 
Ireland -2  +1 +1 +1 +6 
Poland -2 -1  0 +1 +5 
Scotland -2 0 +1  +1 +5 
Georgia -3 -1 0 0  +5 
Gibraltar -7 -5 -4 -5 -3  
1. Germany 30 
2. Ireland 22 
3. Scotland 15 
4. Poland 11 
5. Georgia 8 
6. Gibraltar 0 
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Table 8: Standings in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers according to team strengths over the period 
August 2012 to December 2013 
A 
1. Netherlands (7.036), 2. Czech Republic (5.661), 3. Iceland (5.148), 4. Turkey (5.138), 
5. Kazakhstan (4.606), 6. Latvia (4.403) 
B 
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.385), 2. Belgium (6.887), 3. Israel (5.647), 4. Wales 
(5.129), 5. Cyprus (4.137), 6. Andorra (2.535) 
C 
1. Spain (7.140), 2. Ukraine (6.558), 3. Slovakia (5.550), 4. Belarus (5.333), 5. Macedonia 
(5.148), 6. Luxembourg (3.910) 
D 
1. Germany (7.776), 2. Ireland (5.935), 3. Scotland (5.494), 4. Poland (5.083), 5. Georgia 
(4.950), 6. Gibraltar (0.408) 
E 
1. England (6.574), 2. Switzerland (6.245), 3. Slovenia (5.341), 4. Lithuania (4.753), 5. 
Estonia (4.142), 6. San Marino (0.408) 
F 
1. Greece (6.244), 2. Finland (5.914), 3. Romania (5.499), 4. Hungary (4.901), 5. Northern 
Ireland (4.679), 6. Faroe Islands (3.607) 
G 
1. Russia (6.653), 2. Austria (6.266), 3. Sweden (6.191), 4. Montenegro (5.755), 5. 
Moldova (3.745), 6. Liechtenstein (3.344) 
H 
1. Italy (5.949), 2. Croatia (5.831), 3. Bulgaria (5.272), 4. Norway (5.027), 5. Azerbaijan 
(4.961), 6. Malta (3.201) 
I 
1. Portugal (6.470), 2. Serbia (6.355), 3. Denmark (5.100), 4. Albania (4.999), 5. Armenia 
(4.760) 
 
 
Model 4 
 
A fourth and final approach attempts to predict Scotland’s progress in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers by 
thinking in terms of cycles and observing the performance of countries in Group D over 2011, 2012 and 
2013 (Table 9). Ireland and Scotland are quite similar: good performances in 2011, not so good in 2012 
and better in 2013. By contrast, Poland’s performance was poor in 2013. The best situation for Scotland 
would be for it to continue its improvement evident over 2012 and 2013. In 2013, Scotland came close to 
Ireland (difference of 0.123) with a stronger increase (+1.399 vs. +1.050). It is difficult to anticipate 
whether countries will perform in the same way. However, it seems possible that Scotland could become 
as good as Ireland and perhaps even slightly better. Consequently, it is possible that Scotland could 
secure second place in Group D and gain direct qualification to the UEFA Euro 2016 Finals. 
 
Table 9: Performance of countries in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifying Group D in 2011, 2012 and 2013 
 2011 
European 
rank 
2012 
European 
rank 
2013 
European 
rank 
Germany 7.275 3 6.954 5 7.757 1 
Ireland 6.611 9 4.974 36 6.024 15 
Poland 5.871 19 6.069 17 4.926 36 
Scotland 6.288 12 4.502 39 5.901 17 
Georgia 5.236 29 5.013 34 4.577 41 
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VI Limitations of the model 
 
The above results improve our knowledge about the determinants of national men’s football team 
performance by taking on board some new explanatory variables. However, some limitations must be 
underlined. For example, we define Player quality as the number of players who play in the 10 most 
valuable clubs and who have been fielded at least in 20 games per season. Using this definition, Atletico 
Madrid, which has reached the Champions League final in 2013-2014, is not among the most valuable 
clubs. In 2012-2013, Borussia Dortmund, which also reached the Champions League final, was not 
listed in the 10 most valuable clubs either. These teams performed well due to their team spirit and 
coach influence, as much as to their player quality. Hence, sampling the most valuable clubs can be 
improved and besides, money does not always guarantee both victories on the pitch or appropriate 
player recruitment. For example, Liverpool, which has appeared each year in the Top 10 most valuable 
clubs, did not achieve to qualify in the Champions League four years in a row (from 2009/2010 to 
2012/2013). This raises the question whether Liverpool players really were among the best in the world. 
In this paper, we have chosen to follow Kuper and Szymanski (2012) in confining the importance of 
Foreign Managers and Technology Transfer dummies to Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and 
Netherlands. However, this can be criticised. Choosing these dummies implies accepting Kuper and 
Szymanski’s underlying implicit hypotheses. For instance, if a manager has been transferred from one of 
the five core countries, he is automatically considered to be a good manager - even if he has never 
played at a professional level. Also, if a manager originates from a country other than the core and has 
never played in one of the five core countries or been trained by a manager from these countries, he is 
automatically considered as not being a good manager. This would mean that Gordon Strachan 
(Scotland manager) is not considered a good manager, which seems highly questionable considering 
Scotland’s performance since June 2013. Similarly, it would also mean that Alex Ferguson could not be 
considered a good manager, whereas he is regarded as one of the most successful managers in the 
history of the game (Hoye, Smith, Nicholson, Stewart & Westerbeek, 2008). It is worth noting that Alex 
Ferguson trained Gordon Strachan from 1978 to 1984 at Aberdeen and from 1986 to 1989 at 
Manchester United. Despite their rivalry (Austin, 2006), it is possible that Gordon Strachan takes 
advantage from skill transfer from Alex Ferguson. A finer identification of the most successful managers 
and the test of skill transfer from these managers could be improved in our model. 
As noted above, our “predictions” are mainly based on outcomes of the results of European men’s 
international football matches over the period August 2012 to December 2013. Nevertheless, there is no 
reason to expect that national team strengths over the period August 2014 to December 2015 will be the 
same that over the same period 2012 to 2013. Table 10 provides European national team strengths over 
the periods January 2011 to July 2012 and August 2012 to December 2013. It can be seen clearly that 
the hierarchy of European national teams has largely evolved between the two periods. For this reason, 
it is necessary to be careful about our “predictions”. 
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Table 10: European men’s national football team strengths and rankings over the periods January 2011 
to July 2012 and August 2012 to December 2013 
 01/2011-07/2012 Rank 08/2012-12/2013 Rank Rank difference 
Albania 4.419 42 4.999 36 +6 
Andorra 3.183 52 2.535 52 0 
Armenia 5.647 25 4.760 40 -15 
Austria 5.230 29 6.266 12 +17 
Azerbaijan 4.119 45 4.961 37 +8 
Belarus 4.692 38 5.333 27 +11 
Belgium 5.985 16 6.887 6 +10 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
5.692 23 7.385 2 +21 
Bulgaria 4.955 35 5.272 28 +7 
Croatia 6.391 11 5.831 19 -8 
Cyprus 4.100 46 4.137 46 0 
Czech Republic 6.086 13 5.661 21 -8 
Denmark 6.465 10 5.100 33 -23 
England 6.917 4 6.574 8 -4 
Estonia 4.094 47 4.142 45 +2 
Faroe Islands 3.473 50 3.607 49 +1 
Finland 5.191 32 5.914 18 +14 
France 6.500 9 6.976 5 +4 
Georgia 5.207 31 4.950 38 -7 
Germany 7.007 2 7.776 1 +1 
Greece 6.002 15 6.244 14 +1 
Hungary 5.906 19 4.901 39 -20 
Iceland 4.720 37 5.148 29 +8 
Ireland 6.114 12 5.935 17 -5 
Israel 5.208 30 5.647 22 +8 
Italy 6.505 8 5.949 16 -8 
Kazakhstan 4.277 44 4.606 43 +1 
Latvia 5.130 33 4.403 44 -11 
Liechtenstein 3.896 48 3.344 50 -2 
Lithuania 4.428 41 4.753 41 0 
Luxembourg 3.703 49 3.910 47 +2 
Macedonia 4.690 39 5.148 30 +9 
Malta 4.451 40 3.209 51 -11 
Moldova 4.375 43 3.745 48 -5 
Montenegro 5.038 34 5.755 20 +14 
Netherlands 6.854 5 7.036 4 +1 
Northern Ireland 3.411 51 4.679 42 +9 
Norway 5.652 24 5.027 35 -11 
Poland 5.770 20 5.083 34 -14 
Portugal 6.715 6 6.470 10 -4 
Romania 5.693 22 5.499 24 -2 
Russia 6.977 3 6.653 7 -4 
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San Marino 1.581 53 0.408 53 0 
Scotland 6.019 14 5.494 25 -11 
Serbia 5.576 26 6.355 11 +15 
Slovakia 4.942 36 5.550 23 +13 
Slovenia 5.258 28 5.341 26 +2 
Spain 7.750 1 7.140 3 -2 
Sweden 6.600 7 6.191 15 -8 
Switzerland 5.967 18 6.245 13 +5 
Turkey 5.977 17 5.138 31 -14 
Ukraine 5.510 27 6.558 9 +18 
Wales 5.723 21 5.129 32 -11 
 
VII Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we propose a score equation based on 13 variables which we apply to assess  Scotland’s 
likely progress in the UEFA Euro 2016 qualifiers. In our first two models, Scotland fails to progress to the 
UEFA Euro 2016 playoffs by only one goal. Nevertheless, in our third model which is better, it predicts 
that Scotland should be third in Group D and thus progress to the playoffs and thus hope to qualify for 
Euro 2016 Finals. Using our fourth model – and assuming a continuing improvement in Scotland’s 
performance – allows us to posit that Scotland could even come second to Germany in Group D and 
thus allow Scotland to qualify directly to the UEFA Euro 2016 Finals in France. Bonne chance, l’Écosse! 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Comparison between real score and score provided by the model for Scotland over the 
period 08/2012-12/2013. 
Date Match Real score Score provided by the model 
08/09/2012 Scotland-Serbia 0 0 
11/09/2012 Scotland-Macedonia 0 +1 
12/10/2012 Wales-Scotland +1 0 
16/10/2012 Belgium-Scotland +2 +1 
14/11/2012 Luxembourg-Scotland -1 -1 
06/02/2013 Scotland-Estonia +1 +1 
22/03/2013 Scotland-Wales -1 +1 
26/03/2013 Serbia-Scotland +2 +1 
Total Scotland till 03/2013 -4 +2 
07/06/2013 Croatia-Scotland -1 +1 
14/08/2013 England-Scotland +1 +2 
06/09/2013 Scotland-Belgium -2 -1 
10/09/2013 Macedonia-Scotland -1 0 
15/10/2013 Scotland-Croatia +2 -1 
19/11/2013 Norway-Scotland -1 0 
Total Scotland since 06/2013 +2 -5 
Total Scotland -2 -3 
Average gap +0.071 
 
Appendix 2: Comparison between real score and score provided by the model for Germany over the 
period 08/2012-12/2013. 
Date Match Real score Score provided by the model 
07/09/2012 Germany-Faroe Islands +3 +4 
11/09/2012 Austria-Germany -1 -1 
12/10/2012 Ireland-Germany -5 -2 
16/10/2012 Germany-Sweden 0 +2 
14/11/2012 Netherlands-Germany 0 -1 
06/02/2013 France-Germany -1 0 
22/03/2013 Kazakhstan-Germany -3 -2 
26/03/2013 Germany-Kazakhstan +3 +3 
06/09/2013 Germany-Austria +3 +2 
10/09/2013 Faroe Islands-Germany -3 -4 
11/10/2013 Germany-Ireland +3 +3 
15/10/2013 Sweden-Germany -2 -1 
15/11/2013 Italy-Germany 0 0 
19/11/2013 England-Germany -1 0 
Total Germany +28 +25 
Average gap +0.214 
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Appendix 3: Comparison between real score and score provided by the model for Ireland over the 
period 08/2012-12/2013. 
Date Match Real score Score provided by the model 
15/08/2012 Serbia-Ireland 0 0 
07/09/2012 Kazakhstan-Ireland -1 -1 
12/10/2012 Ireland-Germany -5 -2 
16/10/2012 Faroe Islands-Ireland -3 -2 
14/11/2012 Ireland-Greece -1 0 
06/02/2013 Ireland-Poland +2 0 
22/03/2013 Sweden-Ireland 0 +1 
26/03/2013 Ireland-Austria 0 0 
29/05/2013 England-Ireland 0 +2 
02/06/2013 Ireland-Georgia 4 0 
07/06/2013 Ireland-Faroe Islands +3 +2 
11/06/2013 Spain-Ireland +2 +1 
14/08/2013 Wales-Ireland 0 0 
06/09/2013 Ireland-Sweden -1 0 
10/09/2013 Austria-Ireland +1 +1 
11/10/2013 Germany-Ireland +3 +3 
15/10/2013 Ireland-Kazakhstan +2 +1 
15/11/2013 Ireland-Latvia +3 +1 
19/11/2013 Poland-Ireland 0 +1 
Total Ireland +5 -4 
Average gap +0.474 
 
Appendix 4:  Comparison between real score and score provided by the model for Poland over the 
period 08/2012-12/2013. 
Date Match Real score Score provided by the model 
15/08/2012 Estonia-Poland +1 -1 
11/09/2012 Poland-Moldova +2 +2 
17/10/2012 Poland-England 0 -1 
14/12/2012 Poland-Macedonia +3 0 
06/02/2013 Ireland-Poland +2 0 
22/03/2013 Poland-Ukraine -2 0 
26/03/2013 Poland-San Marino +5 +4 
04/06/2013 Poland-Liechtenstein +2 +4 
07/06/2013 Moldova-Poland 0 -1 
14/08/2013 Poland-Denmark +1 0 
10/09/2013 San Marino-Poland -4 -4 
11/10/2013 Ukraine-Poland +1 +1 
15/10/2013 England-Poland +2 +2 
15/11/2013 Poland-Slovakia -2 0 
19/11/2013 Poland-Ireland 0 +1 
Total Poland +7 +13 
Average gap -0.4 
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Appendix 5:  Comparison between real score and score provided by the model for Georgia over the 
period 08/2012-12/2013. 
Date Match Real score Score provided by the model 
15/08/2012 Luxembourg-Georgia -1 -1 
07/09/2012 Georgia-Belarus +1 0 
11/09/2012 Georgia-Spain -1 -1 
12/10/2012 Finland-Georgia 0 0 
16/10/2012 Belarus-Georgia +2 +1 
22/03/2013 France-Georgia +2 +1 
02/06/2013 Ireland-Georgia +4 0 
05/06/2013 Denmark-Georgia +1 +1 
14/08/2013 Kazakhstan-Georgia +1 -1 
06/09/2013 Georgia-France 0 -1 
10/09/2013 Georgia-Finland -1 0 
15/10/2013 Spain-Georgia +2 +2 
Total Georgia -12 -5 
Average gap -0.582 
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The Scottish NHS: meeting the financial challenge 
ahead 
 
James Barbour, Alec Morton, Laura Schang 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The Scottish NHS faces a crisis of affordability in the next couple of decades as the population 
ages and demands on services intensify. This presents two challenges: the first is how to 
redesign services to achieve greater efficiencies, and the second is how to engage the public so 
that there is a realistic public view about what is affordable, against which a mature discussion 
about the hard choices about funding and provision can take place.  We refer to these as the 
innovation and openness challenges.  In the paper we outline the current state of the system and 
discuss possible policy options.  We conclude with some recommendations for next steps. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As one of the four countries of the UK, Scotland is a proud inheritor of the original “National Health 
Service” or NHS.  The reason for the enduring popularity of the NHS in Scotland and indeed in the other 
countries of the United Kingdom is that it is a mechanism for providing universal coverage, enabling 
“everyone to obtain the services they need at a cost that is affordable to themselves and to the nation as 
a whole” (WHO, 2013).  Universal coverage has been described by Margaret Chan, the Director of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), as “the single most powerful concept that public health has to offer”, 
but this, if anything understates its importance: it has become a central idea in the political history of the 
last sixty years, as one country after another has made the journey to universal coverage, many inspired 
by the example of the UK.   
 
A challenge facing virtually all high-income countries, however, is how to continue to provide universal 
coverage as their populations age over the next couple of decades.  This applies whether or not 
countries have implemented universal coverage through NHS-like systems, which are funded out of 
general taxation, or social insurance systems on the German model, where people are enrolled with a 
social insurance fund (typically prevented from discriminating on the basis of pre-existing conditions to 
ensure universality). It also applies irrespective of the ownership structure of hospitals, the existence or 
otherwise of a split between purchasers and providers, the details of the financing mechanism, and so 
on.  
 
Domestically, the Scottish NHS has become a central battleground in the recent independence 
referendum with both sides arguing that the Scottish NHS and the communitarian values which underpin 
it would be best protected under their preferred constitutional arrangements. This debate has 
underscored the popularity of universal coverage: it is an idea with deep and passionate support, and 
the NHS, which instantiates it, is regarded with passionate devotion.   
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During the Scottish independence campaign, various claims were made about the NHS. Future viability 
and levels of funding were debated. A leaked discussion paper, apparently prepared for NHS Scotland 
Chief Executives (reported by BBC Scotland, 16/09/14) argued “The status quo and preservation of 
existing models of care, are no longer options, given pressures we face.” As reported, the paper alleged 
a funding gap of £400m for the coming year.  Such concerns are not confined to Scotland. In an open 
letter to the UK Prime Minister (The Independent, 05/10/14) the Chair of the British Medical Association 
and Leaders of Medical Royal Colleges and Charities wrote “The NHS and our Social Care Services are 
at breaking point and things cannot go on like this”. The letters claims a funding deficit of £30bn by 2020. 
In the USA, which spends almost double on health care compared to the UK, 16.9% of GDP against 
9.3% in 2012 (OECD, 2014) a leading physician Director has described the need to reduce spending on 
health care, as “The central domestic challenge of our time. It is not only harming families and choking 
our economy, but it also threatens our national well-being and economic security” (Cochran and Kenney, 
2014). 
 
We believe the Scottish Government has been on balance a good steward of the NHS over the last 
several years: realistic in its assessment of the future challenges facing the system and responsible in 
providing a consistent policy framework for the development of the system in the years since devolution.  
However, given that the referendum has now happened, now is a good time to look at the long term 
prospects for the system.  In this paper we take the opportunity to look beyond the next few years, to the 
mid-2030s. Unfortunately in the years to come the pressures on the system from demographic and 
technological change look set to intensify.  We believe that the Scottish NHS will continue to exist, but 
services will look different and, indeed, the contract between government and citizens will have to be 
different.  In this paper we explore a few options and scenarios. 
 
In Section 2, we review where the Scottish NHS is currently, noting that demographic change will 
present the system with demands substantially in excess of those which it is able to deal with currently.  
One way to respond to these pressures is to seek to make the system more efficient, that is to say its 
ability to service needs with existing inputs can be enhanced.  This seems unlikely to be possible without 
significant innovation, and service redesign and consolidation – we review some of the ways in which 
this innovation challenge can be met in Section 3.  However, even with significant innovation, the 
coming resource pressures mean that the public will have to face up to what their tax money can and 
cannot buy for them.  In Section 4, we discuss some ways in which this openness challenge could be 
addressed. 
 
2. Background: The Scottish NHS now     
 
Following devolution in 1999, the Scottish NHS has benefitted from relative organisational stability and a 
consistent policy focus on improving population health, reducing health inequalities and enhancing the 
quality of healthcare (for an in-depth review of the Scottish health system and policy developments, see 
Steel and Cylus, 2012). In 2010, the Healthcare Quality Strategy reaffirmed commitment to a 
comprehensive service that is effective, safe and person-centred (Scottish Government, 2010). Progress 
has been made in relation to each of these ambitions. For example, healthcare associated infections 
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and rates of emergency bed days have fallen considerably. 1  The current reform agenda seeks to 
strengthen health and social care integration and aims to shift the balance of care away from episodic, 
acute care in hospitals towards preventive medicine and support for self-care in the community for the 
rising number of people with long-term and complex conditions (NHS Scotland, 2013). However, flat 
funding with increasing demand poses a challenge to the financial sustainability of the system. This 
section sets out the scale and nature of the financial challenge the Scottish NHS will be facing over the 
next years and reviews what has been achieved so far. 
2.1. Level of spending on health and the funding ‘gap’  
In 2012/2013, the Scottish Government allocated £11.58 billion (about 41% of its budget) for health 
(Scottish Government, 2012). Between 2000 and 2009, public spending on health more than doubled in 
cash terms and increased by almost 40% in real (inflation-adjusted) terms (Audit Scotland, 2009). Since 
then the annual rate of growth has been declining and the Scottish Government’s budget plans for 2012 
to 2014 set out a nominal growth of between 1.2% and 1.9% per year. This entails a real decrease of 
2.8% over this timeframe (Scottish Government, 2011). 
 
In international comparison, the United Kingdom as a whole spent about 9.3% of its Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) on health in 2012 (OECD, 2014). This is similar to the Nordic countries Finland, Norway 
and Sweden (with about 9.1%, 9.3% and 9.6% of GDP, respectively, in 2012). However, there is a gap 
with respect to some countries with competitive economies including Denmark, Germany and 
Switzerland (with about 11%, 11.3% and 11.4% of GDP, respectively, in 2012 (OECD, 2014), indicating 
that higher expenditure on healthcare does not necessarily inhibit economic performance. In this 
respect, Scotland may have some headroom to increase spending on health to meet the financial 
challenges ahead; provided that, crucially, the resources that are currently in the system are effectively 
used, and that any extra resources are invested in high-value care to improve population health and 
reduce health inequalities. 
 
Table 1 Government spending on health per head in the United Kingdom, by nation 2000/01 and 
2012/13 [percentage spending relative to Scotland] 
 
 
Scotland England Wales Northern Ireland 
 
2012/13 £2072 £1,912 [92%] £1,954   [94%] £2,109   [102%] 
 
2000/01 £1,064 £891    [84%] £985     [93%] £1,099   [103%] 
Source: adapted from Bevan et al (2014). 
 
                                                        
1
 Between 2007 and 2012, Clostridium difficile infections fell by 78% and Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA/MSSA) 
bacteraemia fell by 37%. Over the same period, there was a 12% reduction in rates of emergency bed days for 
people over 75 years from about 5,466 to 4,814 per 1,000 population. See Health Protection Scotland (2014) and ISD 
(2013). 
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Compared to the other countries of the United Kingdom, public spending on health per head in Scotland 
was second highest after Northern Ireland in 2012/13. Over the years since 2000/01, the spending 
differential to England, Wales and Northern Ireland has narrowed (Table 1). 
 
In Scotland, health is the only policy sector with an increasing resource budget (in cash terms) over the 
current spending period to 2015. This is due to the Scottish Government’s decision to pass on increased 
funding from the Barnett consequentials 2  in full following the Department of Health 2010 UK 
Comprehensive Spending Review (Scottish Government, 2011b). 
 
However, this protection of the health budget is relative: in the face of inflationary pressures arising from 
demographic changes, pharmaceutical and staff costs, the Scottish Government estimates that the NHS 
will need to make efficiency savings of at least 3% of allocated baseline funding to break even and meet 
rising demand for services (Scottish Government, 2011). At the beginning of 2012/13, the 14 territorial 
NHS boards forecast they would need to achieve savings of £271.7 million to break even. This 
amounted to 3.1% of the baseline revenue budget across all boards (with substantial geographic 
variation ranging from 1.7% at NHS Grampian to 7.1% of allocated baseline funding at NHS Shetland; 
Audit Scotland, 2013). There are therefore, significant challenges to financial sustainability even in the 
near term. 
 
Table 2 Budget plans for Scottish Government spending on health, 2012/13  
 
 
£m 
 
% 
 
NHS and Special Health Boards  
8,862.30 76.51 
Primary and Community Care Services 1,388.00 11.98 
Capital 453.5 3.92 
Improving health and better public health 226.7 1.96 
Education and Training 179.6 1.55 
NHS Impairments 100 0.86 
eHealth 90.3 0.78 
Research 69.5 0.60 
Clean Hospitals/MRSA Screening Programme 28.4 0.25 
Access Support (waiting times management)  27.1 0.23 
Distinction Awards 24 0.21 
Quality and Efficiency Support  18.9 0.16 
Self-Directed Support Programme 5.5 0.05 
Other 109.20 0.94 
Total 11,583.00 100.00 
Source: Scottish Government (2011a). 
                                                        
2
 For each extra pound spent on a public service in England, the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland receive increases in their block grants proportionate to the size of their population. While this funding 
is not earmarked for the public service to which it was allocated in England, the Scottish Government has pledged to 
pass on in full the health related shares. 
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2. 2. Distribution of expenditure on health 
Of the £11.58 billion budgeted for health in 2012/13, just over 76% consists of baseline allocations to the 
14 territorial NHS boards and the nine special health boards (Table 2). The rest is transferred to boards 
for specific programmes or spent directly by the Scottish Government.  
 
In 2012/13, about £10.20 billion was spent on care directly provided to patients in hospital, community 
and family health services within the 14 health board areas and at two special boards, the State Hospital 
and Golden Jubilee National Hospital. Figure 1 shows how this expenditure is distributed between 
sectors. This illustrates that, despite the national strategy to move care to the community, the Scottish 
NHS is, in terms of its resource use, still dominated by the hospital sector.  
 
The share of the budget spent on different sectors of care has remained largely constant between 
2008/09 and 2012/13: from 57.8% to 57.0% on hospital care; from 15.0% to 16.4% on community care; 
from 23.9% to 23.3% on family health services; and from 3.4% to 3.3% spent on resource transfers to 
local authorities in support of community care services. 
 
Nevertheless, in nominal terms, all sectors have seen increasing expenditure over the period from 
2008/09 to 2012/13, albeit at different rates of growth (ranging from +7% in family health services and 
+8.1% in hospital care to +20.3% in community care). In real terms, there is evidence of a modest 
resource shift between community and hospital care: spending on hospital care has declined by -1.5% in 
real terms between 2008/09 while expenditure on community care increased during that period by 
+9.6% in real terms. Extra resources spent on community care largely went into three areas of 
expenditure: 
x pharmacy (up by 35% in real terms compared to 2008/09);  
x allied health professions and other paramedical staff (up by 15%); and  
x administrative costs (up by 8%).  
 
Figure 2 shows the amount and share of health spending by category in 2012/13, plus percentage 
changes since 2008/9. Staff costs continue to make up the largest item of spending, over two thirds of 
expenditure on hospital and community care. Almost 12% was spent on prescription drugs and 
associated pharmacy spending, an increase by 11.2% in real terms (22.1% in cash terms) compared to 
2008/09. This means that pharmacy spending was the only category with real-term increases in 
spending over that four-year period. 
 
Drug costs are often regarded as an easy place to look for short term savings so it is worth drilling down 
in more detail.  Although general practice accounts for the largest net prescribing cost (about £1.12 
billion in 2012/13), spending has decreased in cash and real terms compared to 2011/12. This is linked 
to a drop in the cost per item of high volume proprietary costs which came off patent during 2012. These 
drugs could hence be substituted with cheaper generic alternatives (e.g. Atorvastatin for the lowering of 
blood cholesterol to prevent events associated with cardiovascular disease; ISD 2014a). 
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Figure 1 Distribution of health spending in Scotland and percentage changes between  2008/9 and 
2012/13, by sector (s14 territorial NHS boards, Golden Jubilee Hospital and the State Hospital)  
 
Source: ISD (2013). 
 
 
Figure 2 Distribution of health spending in Scotland, plus percentage changes (2008/9 and  2012/13), 
by category (hospital and community care) 
 
 
Source: ISD (2013). 
 
 
The growth in pharmaceutical expenditure (Figure 2) is largely driven by prescribing in hospital, in 
particular spending on high-cost, low-volume (HCLV) drugs (Table 3). In 2012/13, NHS Boards spent 
over £115 million on the top ten HCLV drugs, a third of total pharmaceutical expenditure in hospital. 
These are expensive specialist drugs which are provided in hospital for cancer, irritable bowel conditions 
(anti-TNFs) and rheumatic conditions for comparatively few patients. Expenditure on these drugs tends 
£5.81bn, 57.0% 
1.68bn, 
16.4% 
£2.34bn, 23.3% 
£0.3bn, 3.3% 
Hospital sector (down -1.5% in real
terms from 2008/09)
Community sector (up +9.6% in real
terms from 2008/09)
Family health sector (down -2.6% in
real terms from 2008/09)
Resource transfer to local authority
(down -1.1% in real terms from
2008/09)
£4.82bn, 66.7% 
£0.86bn, 11.9% 
£0.74bn, 
10.2% 
£0.81bn, 
11.2% 
Staff (down -0.9% in real terms
from 2008/09)
Pharmacy (up +11.2% in real
terms from 2008/09)
Administration (down -3.6% in
real terms from 2008/09)
Facilities (down -2.1% in real
terms from 2008/09)
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to increase at a faster rate than other drugs and is also less predictable, hence creating a particular cost 
pressure on NHS boards (Audit Scotland, 2013). 
 
 
Table 3 Changes in NHS pharmaceutical expenditure in Scotland, 2010/11 – 2012/13 
 
Change in total spending  
2010/11 to 2011/12 a 
Change in total spending  
2011/12 to 2012/13b 
Top 10 HCLV drugs  
  
Cash terms £12.2 million (+15%) £13.5 million   (+13%) 
Real terms £10.4 million (+15%) £12 million   (+12%) 
All hospital drugs  
  
Cash terms £13.4 million (+5%) £28.2 million   (+9%) 
 Real terms £7 million (+2.4%) £23 million   (+7%) 
All GP Drugs   
  
Cash terms £12    million   (+1%) £60 million   (-6%) 
Real terms £11    million   (-1%) £74 million   (-7%) 
Source: Audit Scotland 2012/13 
Notes: a Spending on HCLV drugs and all hospital drugs excludes NHS Highland and NHS Tayside; b Spending on 
HCLV drugs and all hospital drugs excludes NHS Tayside as data are currently being processed by ISD Scotland. 
 
2. 3. Key drivers of expenditure growth and financial sustainability 
The growth of public expenditure on healthcare is influenced by several determinants that affect the 
demand and supply of health services (European Commission and Economic Policy Committee, 2012): 
Demand side factors may include demographic changes, related changes in health status, 
regulations and entitlements governing access to healthcare, and changing expectations about 
standards of care; 
Supply side factors may include costs associated with new health technologies (in particular 
pharmaceuticals), staff costs, and the organisation of service provision.  
 
In this section we focus on the demand-side factors as the supply side factors are to a large extent a 
function of policy action, which is the focus of the next two sections. 
 
Rising demand: ageing of the population 
 
Between 2012 and 2032, the share of people aged 65 years and over is projected to grow substantially 
(Figure 3). In contrast, the population of working age (16 to 64 years) is expected to remain stable or (in 
the group aged 16 to 29 years) even decline.  
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Figure 3 Scotland’s population by selected age groups , 2012 and 2032, plus  percentage change 
 
Source: authors’ estimate based on General Register for Scotland (2014). 
 
These trends pose two challenges for the financial sustainability of the health service. 
 
First, in terms of revenue from taxation, an increasing share of older people increases the old age 
dependency ratio, i.e. fewer contributors in relation to the beneficiaries of services. In Scotland, the old 
age dependency ratio is expected to grow by about 65% between 2012 and 2037 from 27 to 41 people 
over 65 years for 100 people in working age (15-64 years). Consequently, fewer people will pay taxes to 
finance public health care. 
 
Second, because spending rises steeply with age, population ageing can be expected to lead to rising 
health and social care expenditure. In 2012, people over 65 years made up about 17% of the Scottish 
population, but accounted for 33% of NHS operating costs (about £3.37 billion). Integrated mapping of 
resource use across health and social care shows that the NHS and local authorities  spent about $4.61 
billion for people over 65 years in 2012/13. Almost a third of this expenditure was consumed by 
emergency admissions to hospital (authors’ estimate based on ISD, 2014b). The Scottish Government 
forecasts that, by 2031, almost £8 billion will be required to finance health and social care for older 
people (Figure 4). This assumes no changes in age/sex specific costs of health and social care (i.e. no 
improvement in the health of the population or in quality-adjusted efficiency of service delivery). 
 
However, predicting future spending needs is fraught with methodological issues and controversies.  
Macroeconomic models (Lisenkova et al., 2010; Lisenkova and Mérette, 2013) show that the impact of 
population ageing on economic development and on labour income tax rates required to ensure a 
balanced government budget is highly sensitive to population projections and net migration.  
 
In its 2012 Ageing Report, the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee (2012) 
estimate a range of scenarios for future healthcare spending and sensitivity to alternative sets of 
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assumptions regarding future burdens of disease, income elasticity and technological change. This 
shows that whilst ageing per se does drive expenditure growth to a non-negligible extent, a key source 
of uncertainty is whether gains in life expectancy are spent in good or bad health. If disability is 
compressed towards the end of life at a faster pace than mortality (the so-called “compression of 
morbidity” hypothesis (Fries, 1989)), then increasing longevity entails an increasing number of health life 
years and this may moderate the additional cost burden from ageing (and indeed provide greater 
opportunity for older people work beyond statutory retirement). In contrast, the “expansion of morbidity” 
hypothesis (Olshansky et al., 1991) states that falling mortality goes in line with an increase in morbidity 
and disability. Empirical research (Global Forum for Health Research, 2008)  on the validity of these 
hypotheses is inconclusive, and suggests potentially counter-balancing effects of rising rates of some 
disabling conditions (dementia, musculoskeletal diseases) and declining prevalence rates of others 
(cardiovascular and chronic respiratory diseases). Finally, many factors – in particular the long-term 
spending impact of technological change as a cost-increasing or cost-decreasing variable – are 
endogenous and dependent on Government policy decisions.  
 
Though we therefore cannot know for certain what the exact future funding requirements for healthcare 
are, it is clear that healthcare expenditure can be expected to increase into the future. 
 
Figure 4 Health and Social Care resource use: projected increases for people aged 65 and over, 2007/8 
to 2030/31 
 
Source: Scottish Government, COSLA and NHS Scotland (2010). 
 
2. 4. Efficiency savings: what has been achieved and how?  
For 2012/13, the NHS in Scotland as a whole achieved savings of 3% of baseline funding, as required 
by the Scottish Government, and 99% (£269.8 million) of its own forecast savings target of £271.7 
million (Audit Scotland, 2013). Since 2009, local actions to reduce costs while improving the quality of 
healthcare have been supported by a national Efficiency and Productivity Framework (Scottish 
Government, 2011b). In 2012/13, savings were achieved mainly through changes in prescribing 
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behaviour (for example by means of generic prescribing through the operation of the Scottish Tariff) and 
clinical productivity (which includes changes in acute flow and capacity management; Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 Efficiency savings reported by NHS boards, by workstream, 2012/13 
 
Source: Scottish Government (2014a). 
 
On average, 78% of savings reported by boards were recurring in 2012/13, meaning that savings 
achieved recur year on year (e.g. lower staff costs due to better streamlined processes). However, some 
boards continue to rely on a large proportion (up to 56%) of non-recurring savings (e.g. those derived 
from the sale of fixed assets, such as buildings); these one-off savings risk being unsustainable in the 
future (Audit Scotland, 2013). Moreover, 66% of savings required for 2014/15 are still unidentified. This 
amount increases to 73% for 2015/16. Thus, for just two years ahead, boards have not determined how 
or where they will release more than two-thirds of the savings needed to break even, suggesting a lack 
of planning how to achieve sustainable financing over the long term (Audit Scotland, 2013). 
 
In 2013, the Scottish Government’s Route Map to the 2020 vision (NHS Scotland, 2013) set out key 
deliverables for 2013/14 to enhance the financial sustainability of the system. These include a new 
innovation fund to provide pump-priming for innovations that enable Scottish small and medium sized  
enterprises (SMEs) to collaborate with NHS Scotland to test approaches that improve the quality of care 
and foster economic growth, as well as efforts to scale up shared services (including the reduction of 
drug costs through a single, coordinated programme at national level). However, as should be evident 
from the previous subsection, the system faces ever more pressing challenges to its long term 
sustainability over the next decade or two.  It seems likely that once the one-off gains from picking the 
'low hanging fruit' have been harvested, deeper policy and operational innovations will be needed to 
transform the health service for the years to come. 
3. The innovation challenge 
As health care systems in advanced economies across the world experience the same challenges of 
growing, ageing populations, rising levels of chronic conditions and ever increasing costs, there is a 
growing recognition that short-term cost cutting measures are no longer sufficient response. The 
challenge is now seen as how to change the way health care is delivered (Taunt et al., 2014).  
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Creating a system of health and social care which is patient centred, safe, accessible and affordable, 
requires the simultaneous pursuit of better quality of care, at lower costs.  Several barriers exist to 
achieving this goal. The lack of a detailed model for health care reform, which balances short term cost 
containment with longer-term goals, is one such barrier while the absence of a candid dialogue involving 
patients, professionals and communities is another. There is a need to gain acceptance from 
stakeholders that it is no longer sufficient to avoid future costs and that reduction of current costs is 
required, accompanied by a redirection of costs – and care – away from hospitals. As noted, in Scotland, 
the hospital share all of NHS expenditure currently stands at 57%, largely unchanged over the last five 
years (ISD, 2014). 
 
On their own, individual health care organisations have been historically unlikely to achieve radical 
service transformation, irrespective of the scale of financial challenge (Thirlby, 2011).  Scottish Health 
Chief Executives acknowledged in their leaked paper, that: “Boards lack the mandate and ability to 
implement the scale of reform required” (reported by BBC Scotland, 16/09/14).  To achieve a future state 
of high quality, affordable health care, service innovation is the key to future sustainability (Department 
of Health, 2011).   
 
In Scotland, many favourable conditions are already in place to help make a start in this necessary 
transition. High quality medicine in centres of excellence, and primary care, a large stable workforce, 
135,980 in 2014 up by nearly a third in 15 years, (Scottish Government, 2014c), comprehensive long-
term data sets and a compact Public Sector, largely unaffected by continuing reforms, are in place. In 
relative terms, health services are well resourced, with more GPs, hospital doctors and nurses per 1000 
population than the rest of the UK (Bevan et al., 2014). And, following the referendum process, the 
country has been described as having one of the most politically engaged populations in Europe (Alex 
Salmond MP, First Minister’s statement in the Scottish Parliament 23/09/14). These are all assets that 
Scotland can put to use, to create a sustainable health and social care service for its citizens.  
 
These underlying circumstances support the task of translating “the best work anywhere into the 
standard everywhere” (Cochran and Kenney, 2014: 23), in the cause of achieving future sustainability 
through innovation.  An example of such ‘best work’ is the introduction of integrated care, defined as 
“planning and providing services to impose the patient perspective as the organising principle of service 
delivery” (Shaw et al., 2011: 7).   
 
As an example of an opportunity for learning, is the Kaiser Permanente health care system3.  Its 
systematic adoption of better-integrated care supports a range of acute hospital admissions that is  
around one third lower than that of the UK. Similarly, its length of hospital stay per 1000 of population, is 
3.9 days, against 5.7 in Scotland. Inpatient admissions in the Kaiser System are 69 per 1000 population, 
against 143 in Scotland. Acute bed days used per 1000 population are 270 in Kaiser, against 812 in 
Scotland (Bevan et al., 2014).  In the UK, the health care system in Torbay is achieving comparable 
benefits (Thistlethwaite, 2011). 
                                                        
3
 Kaiser Permanente is a not for profit, integrated managed care consortium, based in Oakland, 
California. Founded in 1945, by industrialist Henry J Kaiser, and physician Sidney Garfield, it has an 
income of US$53bn, with 180,000 employees, including 15,000 physicians 
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Integrated care systems feature “community navigators” to co-ordinate health and social care systems 
and in Kaiser’s system, “community paramedics” who can intervene and treat patients in crisis, where 
hospital admissions may otherwise be required. In Yorkshire, Airedale Hospitals have adapted the 
Kaiser model of using community nurses linked directly to doctors and hospital by skype and iPad. This 
approach has reportedly yielded a 60% reduction in hospital admissions (Financial Times 5/10/2014). 
Across the NHS, face to face contact accounts for 95% of all health care intervention and a reduction of 
1% of this activity is estimated to save £200m (Department of Health, 2011). In the USA, the culture of 
“presenteeism”   in hospitals is tackled through video conferencing with doctors and groups of patients, 
with health care provided where the patients live, work and play. 
 
Telehealth (the remote exchange of data between individuals and health care professionals as an 
assistance to diagnosis and treatment) and telecare (the use of remote monitoring to manage the risks 
of independent living) have benefited from £20m investment in Scotland over the past five years, 
affecting 44,000 patients. Benefits attributed to this investment focus on the avoidance of 8,400 
emergency admissions over the same period, according to the National Telehealth and Telecare 
Delivery Plan (NHS Scotland, COSLA and The Scottish Government, 2012). The Delivery Plan does not 
make a direct connection between telehealth and telecare and cost reduction, while acknowledging that 
further work is required “to establish a baseline and develop consistent outcome measures and 
indicators, to track the impact of telehealth and telecare, on working practices, productivity and resource 
use”. 
 
Statistically significant benefits in respect of reductions in admission levels and mortality have been 
reported (Steventon et al., 2012), but none relating to cost reduction. No significant reduction in 
demands on GP time was found. Innovation in telecare and telehealth has the potential to improve 
unnecessary hospital admissions but “robust information on costs and outcomes is lacking” (Clark and 
Goodwin, 2013: 3). In the Scottish context, telehealth and telecare initiatives are not yet part of a co-
ordinated and systematic programme of integrated care and therefore are more likely in current form, to 
generate benefits in remote accessibility, rather than the more radical effects of disruptive technology 
now being seen elsewhere in the UK, and in the USA. 
 
In Scotland, the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act 2014 allows for the establishment of 
Integration Joint Boards, with the organisational potential to support widespread adoption of integrated 
care innovations.  Alongside integrated care, the extensive mining of patient related data sets offers the 
opportunity to move care in Scotland from the industrial age to the information age. Data sharing with 
the patients at the centre is central to the success of initiatives in Torbay, resting on the principle 
“nothing about me, without me.”  
 
In many systems, data mining is already used by doctors to determine the best form of treatment for 
patients. It is also central to risk stratification of patients. In the USA, 5% of individuals incur half of all 
health care expenditure (Cochran and Kenney, 2014: 21) In Airedale, 3% of patients have been 
identified as consuming 39% of resources (Financial Times 5/10/2014). Equivalent figures for Scotland 
do not appear to be readily available. Yet having such data is critical to identifying the patients who 
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cannot be discharged due to failings in the social care system: effectively medicalising (at great cost) 
social problems with roots that are outside the healthcare system.  At the aggregate level is the cost of 
this can be demonstrated by the most recent delayed discharge figures for Scotland, which show that 
against a target of no patient waiting longer than two weeks for discharge (a target not demanding by 
international standards and due to be introduced in 2015), 518 patients were awaiting discharge, 
amounting to around 150,000 lost bed days.  The need for approaches such as the Kaiser approach is 
apparent for older patients with complex needs, where increased longevity is accompanied by increased 
incidence of multiple conditions. In the USA, it is estimated that half of all people over the age of 75 have 
3 or more complex conditions (Goodwin et al., 2014). 
 
International models of Primary Care support the importance of the role of the General Practitioner or 
primary care physician, at the heart of an integrated, team based approach. The current status of 
General Practitioners as Independent Physicians, their existing workloads and remuneration 
arrangements, have the potential to inhibit their membership of integrated Teams. Correspondingly, 
“where care givers are working within common governance and incentives rules, facilitated through 
closer organizational partnership arrangements, then the more likely it seems that integrated care on the 
ground can be supported” (Goodwin et al., 2014: 20).  A useful resource in this discussion is the recent 
report from King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust, which reviews a number of possible models of integrated 
primary care drawing on international experience (King’s Fund and the Nuffield Trust, 2013). 
 
4. The openness challenge 
 
If it is not possible to find efficiency savings along the lines outlined in Section 3 to meet the challenges 
outlined in Section 2, additional revenue will have to be obtained from elsewhere.  However, health is 
the second largest budget category in the public sector accounts after welfare, and although spending 
on benefits is arguably less politically popular than health, large scale raids on the benefit budget (to say 
nothing of the pension budget) would clearly raise issues of their own, outside the scope of this note.  
Increasing general revenues would be another route.  Presumably raising significant additional financing 
would be well within the scope of powers of a future Scottish government with enhanced tax raising 
powers but public willingness to accept tax rises has yet to be tested.  A conceivable policy option (quite 
common in other European countries) would be to institute a hypothecated tax to pay for health services: 
this would create greater public visibility on the costs of the healthcare system specifically and limit the 
scope for political discretion (or “interference”) in the allocation of funds.   
 
If money to cover the additional expenditure is not forthcoming from general tax revenues, there are as a 
matter of logic, a number of possible options.  These can be conceptualised through the famous cube of 
universal coverage promulgated by the WHO (2010).  Countries providing universal coverage must 
make decisions about: 
1. Who is covered? 
2. What fraction of expenditure is covered? 
3. What is covered? 
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Each of these dimensions of coverage drives cost and therefore countries wishing to reduce public 
expenditure must cut back on one of these dimensions.   
 
In terms of 1., there is the option of denying care to some people altogether.  As an example of this, 
Kentekenelis et al. (2014)  report that 800,000 people in Greece are now unemployed and without 
access to either unemployment benefits or health coverage, as a result of the government’s austerity 
programme.  For them, health provision is only via  the voluntary sector.  Of all possible ways of dealing 
with a budget shortfall, this seems the worst – a breach of the very principles of universal coverage itself, 
and a dereliction of society’s duty to people at a time in their life when they are most in need. 
 
In terms of 2., a second option is cost-shifting to patients through imposition of or increases to user fees 
and co-payments.  Typically there is also some form of means testing to protect those who are unable to 
pay.  The recent history of Ireland an example of this approach close to home.  Altogether Thomas et al. 
(2014) estimate that on average every person in Ireland is paying an extra €100 in user fees compared 
to before the crisis, although of course this average masks the fact that older and sicker people will pay 
more and younger and healthier people will pay less. Although user fees are often advocated on the 
grounds that they reduce unnecessary care, the general thrust of the evidence is that user fees reduce 
both necessary and unnecessary care in a fairly indiscriminate fashion (Swartz, 2010).  What is certain 
is that compared to obtaining funds from general taxation, user fees disproportionately hit people who 
are unwell.  User fees may be a last resort means of funding, if there are political barriers to raising the 
funds through taxation, but should not be a seen as a sustainable solution.   
 
A third alternative is to restrict what is covered in the healthcare system (this is dimension 3. above), 
typically by “implicit” rationing through imposing access restrictions such as waiting lists (Morton and 
Bevan, 2012).  Economically waiting lists are problematic as a means of rationing as they impose 
deadweight costs in the system.  Implicit rationing is also more acceptable in societies where it is 
accepted that “doctor knows best” but for better or for worse, modernity is associated with a decline in 
such deferential attitudes.   A related response to restricting coverage is to degrade the quality of the 
service offering.  Yet even if it were desirable to sanction clinicians cutting corners to reduce costs, this 
runs counter to the core principle of focussing on quality and patient safety which have been central to 
Scottish health policy discourse since devolution, and would risk undercutting the gains which have been 
made from the government’s determined pursuit of this agenda. 
 
In view of the problems associated with implicit rationing, many countries in response to the austerity 
introduced by the financial crisis have introduced or strengthened explicit rationing of services through a 
defined benefit plan or “positive list” of treatments which patients are entitled to expect in the public 
system.  This is also a common feature in the systems of many middle-income countries (for example 
those in Latin America, see Giedion et al. (2014)) who have sought to introduce universal coverage but 
who are simultaneously acutely mindful of the budget constraints that such systems must operate under.  
An advantage of defined benefits plans is that they can be used throughout the planning process, both 
at the stage of budgeting and assessing public sector resource needs, as well as in monitoring system 
delivery.  Indeed, if there is agreement about what should be provided by the healthcare system, and for 
what indications, it should in principle be possible to monitor the volumes of services provided with what 
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is expected given population morbidity, and thus assess both under- and overuse of services – see e.g. 
Schang et al. (2014) for an example of some modelling to support this sort of exercise in a paediatric 
ENT context.  
 
Defined benefit plans have the attractive feature that they make it clear to the taxpaying public what the 
system can and cannot afford and thus make it possible for citizens to make an informed decision about 
the right level of funding for the health service.  Scotland is in the fortunate position of having a suite of 
institutions which have a guideline development and technology assessment role: the Scottish 
Intercollegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN), the Scottish Medicines Consortium and the Scottish Health 
Technologies Group.  However, defining a benefits package which is robust is not merely a technical 
exercise: it requires strong processes which incorporate evidence and synthesise them with social 
values, and which can be shown to procedurally fair.  Although engaging members of the public and 
other stakeholders in deliberating about the key economic and ethical challenges is not easy, examples 
of good practice do exist (Daniels and Sabin, 2007; Gold et al., 2007; Airoldi et al., 2014).  Moreover, the 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE) in England has commissioned studies of population 
values as they relate to healthcare prioritisation (Edlin et al., 2012), and willingness to pay assessments 
for a quality adjusted life year (Donaldson et al., 2011, drawing on the expertise of Scottish researchers).  
If Scotland aspires to have a healthcare system which reflects her values, and to make a balanced and 
informed judgement about a socially acceptable /agreed  trade-off between additional expenditure and 
coverage and system reform, there is a clear need to establish more clearly what these distinctively 
Scottish values actually are, and involve wider stakeholders in decision making about the health system, 
so that the coming difficult decisions are taken in as robust, defensible and democratice manner as 
possible.    
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Although we have rehearsed some of the issues and options in this paper, we do not have the 
knowledge or the indeed the mandate to make detailed and specific recommendations about what 
should be done.  However, we consider that in charting a way forward, there are five important streams 
of activity which should be part of a credible response. 
 
Issue One: There should be a detailed and authoritative high level investigation of the scale of the 
funding gap between projected expenditure and healthcare financing needs which Scotland faces, 
chaired by an authoritative and credible figure. (A possible model is the Wanless Review (Wanless, 
2002) in England from some years ago). Of course, as we highlight above, the methodology for 
assessing future healthcare financing is not a settled science: it is not the case that there a single 
number.   A properly rigorous study would produce a range of estimates which reflect genuine 
uncertainty about the way in which population morbidity and cost drivers will evolve, and so would 
command broad assent and credibility.  At the same time, such an assessment would provide Health 
Boards with the framework that they need to begin operational planning and would set the stage for an 
informed and realistic public discussion.    
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Issue Two: . There should be a concerted effort to strengthen leadership capability in the health 
service.    Clinical leadership in particular has a vital role.  In response to the calls from the BMA and 
Royal Colleges for an open debate about the future of the NHS in Scotland, doctors need to assume the 
role of “accountable leaders”. As the Chief Executive of the Institute of Health Improvement describes it 
“We need doctors to be the leaders for whom ‘hanging onto the status quo‘, is a betrayal of their 
patients” (Maureen Bisognano, cited in Cochran and Kenney, 2014: 30). Indeed, in general, the delivery 
of better integrated care, based on innovative technology, new roles and personalisation of care across 
health and social care, will require new leaders and new leadership skills (Taunt et al., 2014).  
 
Although integral, clinicians cannot lead in isolation. The leadership cadre in the public sector in 
Scotland is small and the number of leaders with the necessary experience to transcend organisational 
boundaries, even smaller.  Universities in Scotland, with their business schools and Innovation centres 
offer the potential to develop programmes of joint learning, which foster a culture of innovation and the 
confidence to navigate new models of governance. “Mitigation Planning“ for the uncomfortable 
consequences of shifting resources away from the acute sector and the development of robust 
information sharing arrangements with the patient at the centre “nothing about me, without me“ will also 
require focussed leadership. 
 
Issue Three:. There needs to be a suite of tools for Health Boards to shift the balance of 
investment in local health economies, making difficult but necessary decisions such as closing 
inefficient facilities. Well-designed systems of integrated care, accompanied by innovative use of 
disruptive technology have the potential to release substantial monies from the acute sector (Bevan et 
al., 2014).  Yet in Scotland and in many other countries there is no validated approach for successful 
disinvestment (HealthPACT, 2013).  Working with universities and leading economists, Scotland could 
lead the way in developing an open and rigorous process for disinvestment and reinvestment, with 
accompanying metrics for assessing outcomes. To accompany innovation, “reverse innovation” is 
required, offering a mechanism for stripping out activities, which no longer add value, or can be replaced 
by something better (Department of Health, 2011).  To realise benefits from new ways of working, 
existing spending must be treated as variable, when all too often it is seen as fixed (Kaplan et al., 2013).   
 
Strategic planning requires reality-proofed technical and process tools to support difficult decisions.  For 
example, the Journey Making approach (Ackermann and Eden, 2011) has a track record in supporting 
healthcare organisations to think about the formulation of strategy; the Program Budgeting and Marginal 
Analysis (Mitton and Donaldson, 2001) or the STAR approach sponsored by the Health Foundation 
(Airoldi et al., 2014) have been used to think about strategic prioritisation and service redesign.  
However, developing strategic planning competency is not “plug and play”: learning about such 
approaches has to be done in a context where there is the provision of opportunities for senior staff to 
learn and develop the necessary skills alongside with their peers.   There needs to be a broader public 
national dialogue about what is affordable, what level of increased spending the public are prepared to 
bear, and how services are to be “rationed” if the spending to meet the financial demands of providing 
existing levels of service to an older and hence sicker population.  
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Issue Four:. International experience (Clemens et al., 2014) the importance of an open and honest 
debate, accompanied by broad and continuing stakeholder consultation and engagement, leading 
to a shared vision of the future state. This accords with the view of the BMA Scottish Chairman (Dr Peter 
Bennie, cited in the Scotsman 19/09/14). Politicians have to lead this debate but ultimately the whole of 
Scottish society will have to participate.  Here there are opportunities to learn from other areas of policy: 
for example, the UK government made a substantial commitment to engaging the public in a national 
debate about what should be done about the UK’s radioactive waste in the middle of the last decade, 
and much could be learned from that exercise (Morton et al., 2009; Dietz and Morton, 2011).  Indeed, 
the Irish government appears to be contemplating a move towards an explicit “health basket” or health 
benefits plan, arrived at in a consultative fashion through the development of a guiding “values 
framework” (Irish Government Department of Health, 2014).  
 
Issue Five:. Implementing a shared vision, with clinicians leading the way, is more likely to be 
successful, with the availability of a Transformation Fund, supporting the initiation of new services and 
the transition away from old ones (Taunt et al., 2014). As Scotland begins the process of being able to 
determine its own taxation levels, there is an opportunity to link revenue generated, to the evident public 
concern for the future sustainability of the NHS.  Delivery of new models of care, in accordance with a 
shared vision and facilitated by a Transformation Fund, could be seen as an early and legitimising task 
for the new Integration Joint Boards. These are to be responsible for adult social care, adult community 
services and a proportion of adult acute services. Their role is to ensure “That health and social care in 
Scotland, is joined up and seamless” (Scottish Government, 2014 (website)).  
 
This initiative has already attracted conflicting views. The Confederation of Scottish Local Authorities 
(COSLA) response to the consultation on the Public Bodies (Joint Working) (Scotland) Act highlights the 
need for the effective disinvestment and reinvestment mechanisms: “Integration authorities must have 
sufficient control of the means to shift the balance of care from acute to community setting and take 
demand out of the system“ (COSLA response 2/6/2014 – authors’ italics) By contrast the BMA response 
suggests that: “It will be difficult to support the shift of resource between health care and social care 
without an adverse impact on care” (BMA response 23/9/2014). Even Audit Scotland is unclear on the 
effects on hospitals (Audit Scotland response July 2014).   
 
In conclusion, the delivery of health and social care which is safe, timely, effective, efficient, patient 
focussed and also affordable is a huge task.  Our forebears have bequeathed us a healthcare system 
based on the principles of universal coverage which has been both resilient over decades and a source 
of global inspiration.  In Scotland, today, politicians, clinicians and health care leaders have the 
opportunity, in the words of Jonas Salk, discoverer of the first polio vaccine, to demonstrate that: “Our 
greatest responsibility is to be good ancestors”: that we have the courage and imagination to reinvent 
the universal coverage so that it is sustainable for future generations, and to do so in a way which 
remains faithful to the distinctive values of the Scottish people. 
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It all depends on your perspective: economic 
perceptions and the demography of voting in the 
Scottish Independence Referendum 
John Curtice, University of Strathclyde 
 
A lot closer than had seemed likely a few months previously; not as close in the end as the final polls 
had suggested. That probably summarises many people’s reaction when they learnt that 45% had voted 
Yes, and 55% No in Scotland’s independence referendum. 
But Scotland did not vote as one. Voters’ propensities to vote Yes or No varied according to their social 
and economic circumstances. Not least of the reasons is that those circumstances affected their 
perceptions of the economic consequences of independence. 
Two polls of how people actually voted have been published so far. One was conducted on polling day 
by YouGov (via the internet) and consisted of interviews with 1,756 people who had also participated in 
YouGov’s final pre-polling day poll, undertaken during the three days immediately before 18 September 
2014. To their reports of how they had just voted were added the reported voting behaviour of 783 
people who had previously told YouGov that they had already voted by post.  The results of this exercise 
were first published shortly after the polls closed at 10pm on polling day and it forecast that 46% had 
voted Yes, and 54% No, only one point apart from the actual result. 
 
Figure 1: The Scottish Independence Referendum - Gender Gap: % of men and women voting Yes 
 
The second poll, commissioned by Lord Ashcroft, was conducted on polling day and the day after. In this 
case some respondents (1,216) were interviewed by ‘phone, others online (831), giving a grand total of 
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2,047 interviewees.  In this poll the data were weighted, so that the overall proportion who said that they 
voted Yes and No reflects the actual result.  
Between them, the two polls uncover three clear patterns, patterns that in each case had long been 
anticipated by pre-polling day opinion polls. First, as Figure 1 shows, women were less likely than men 
to vote Yes. According to YouGov, 51% of men voted Yes but only 42% of women. This figure is quite 
close to the pattern in the final polls; on average each company’s final poll pointed to a 51% vote 
amongst men, 43% amongst women. Ashcroft’s poll suggests that the gender gap was rather narrower, 
with 47% of men voting Yes and 44% of women. But taking into account the vagaries of sampling error it 
is at least possible that a majority of men voted Yes and that Scotland’s decision to stay in the Union 
rested on the support given to the No camp by women. 
 
Figure 2A: The Scottish Independence Referendum  -  Age Gap (1): % voting Yes, by age group 
 
* Source: Ashcroft Polls 
Second, older people were less keen on the idea of independence than younger people.  According to 
Ashcroft (see Figure 2A), the age gap was particularly stark, with just 29% of those aged 65 plus saying 
that they voted Yes, whereas a little over half of those aged under 55 backed independence. YouGov 
suggest that the age gap was not quite that stark, but even so still found that only around a third of those 
aged 65 and over voted Yes, whereas support for independence amongst the under 60s as a whole 
might have been only just short of 50%. This age gap has led to some speculation that perhaps there 
might be a majority for independence in, say, twenty years’ time when the current generation of older 
people is no longer with us. However, we should note that both polls suggest that support for 
independence was highest amongst those in their late twenties and thirties rather than amongst the very 
youngest group of voters aged 16-24. So perhaps we should not necessarily assume that future 
generations of voters will necessarily evince the same degree of enthusiasm for independence that is 
currently in evidence amongst those aged between 25 and 55. 
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Figure 2B: The Scottish Independence Referendum  -  Age Gap 2: % voting Yes, by age group* 
 
    * Source: YouGov 
Third, those living in less affluent circumstances were more likely than those who are living more 
comfortably to vote Yes.  According to YouGov, 50% of those who market researchers classify as 
‘C2DEs’ that is those who are or who were engaged in manual, ‘working-class’ occupations, or who are 
now primarily dependent on the state for their income, voted Yes. In contrast support amongst those 
categorised as ‘ABC1s’, primarily those in white collar, ‘middle class’ jobs, stood at only 41%. This class 
gap is, though, bigger than that found on average in the final polls, where support for Yes again stood at 
50% amongst C2DEs, but at 44% amongst ABC1s. Ashcroft also has a rather lower estimate of the gap, 
with only 47% of C2DEs supporting Yes and 44% of ABC1s. 
However, this binary division of Scots into two large classes undoubtedly underestimates the extent to 
which economic circumstance influenced the way that people voted. A much sharper pattern was 
uncovered by Ipsos MORI when in two polls they conducted just before polling day they classified their 
respondents according to the level of deprivation in their neighbourhood. As Figure 3 shows, a clear 
majority of those living in the most deprived parts of Scotland (as measured by the Scottish Index of 
Multiple Deprivation) voted in favour of independence, whereas only around only two-fifths of those living 
in the most affluent did so. 
These patterns were also evident in the geography of the vote as revealed by the results in each of 
Scotland’s 32 local council areas. In the one-third or so of council areas with the highest levels of 
unemployment, on average 51% voted Yes. In contrast, the Yes vote averaged just 39% in the places 
with the lowest levels of unemployment. Equally, in the one-third of council areas with the highest 
proportion of people living in one of the 15% most deprived neighbourhoods in the country, on average 
51% voted Yes, compared with 40% amongst those areas with the fewest living a multiply deprived 
neighbourhood. 
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Figure 3  The Scottish Independence Referendum Deprivation Gap: % voting Yes, by degree of  :
 neighbourhood deprivation (SIMD*) 
 
* SIMD ( Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation)       
Source: Calculated from Ipsos MORI polls 15-16.9 & 16-17.9 
 
The Yes vote was also higher in places with a relatively young population. In those council areas with 
relatively few people aged 65 and over, on average 47% voted Yes, whereas only 39% did so in those 
areas with the highest proportions of such voters. 
It is thanks to these patterns that, despite its historical association with the Labour party, Clydeside 
together with Dundee provided the four areas where a majority did vote in favour of independence.  
Glasgow, North Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire and Dundee are amongst the six council areas with 
the highest unemployment count and the highest proportions of people living in a deprived 
neighbourhood. At the same time, all four areas contain relatively low proportions of people aged 65 or 
over. 
But why did these demographic differences and geographical patterns arise?  One hypothesis that 
suggests itself is that those who were less well-off felt that they had relatively little to lose financially and 
indeed might have been inclined to hope that independence would bring about an improvement in their 
lot. Older people, meanwhile, might have been more likely to feel that independence posed an economic 
risk that they as pensioners could not afford to take. 
After all, people’s evaluations of the economic consequences are known to have played a central role in 
whether they opted to vote Yes or No (Curtice, 2014). According to the 2014 Scottish Social Attitudes 
survey, conducted between May and August 2014, no less than 92% of those who thought that the 
economy would be better under independence said that they intended to vote Yes rather than No. In 
contrast, just 6% of those who reckoned the economy would be worse under independence stated that 
they would vote in favour of leaving the UK. ICM uncovered much the same pattern when in the polls it 
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conducted each month they asked whether independence would be good or bad for Scotland’s 
economy. 
 
Table 1:  Perceptions of the economic consequences of Independence, by gender, age group and social 
class (by %) 
 
…by  
 
Better off Worse off 
No difference/ 
Don’t know 
Gender 
 
   
Men 
 41 43 17 
Women 
 30 51 19 
Age group 
 
   
16-24 
 37 44 19 
25-39 
 40 40 21 
40-59 
 37 45 17 
60-64 
 35 48 17 
65+ 
 26 59 15 
Social grade 
 
   
ABC1 
 32 51 16 
C2DE 
 38 43 19 
Source: YouGov 15 -17 September 2014 
These perceptions did vary significantly from one demographic group to another. As Table 1 shows, 
older voters were markedly less likely than younger voters to think that Scotland would ‘economically 
better off’ if it became an independent country. The same is true, if less starkly, of ABC1 as opposed to 
C2DE voters.  Here again, however, a rather sharper picture emerges if we look at how perceptions 
varied according to the character of the area in which someone lived. According to the Scottish Social 
Attitudes survey, amongst those living in one of the one-fifth most deprived neighbourhoods in Scotland, 
30% thought Scotland’s economy would be better under independence, almost as many as the 34% 
who thought it would be worse.  In contrast amongst those living in one of one-fifth most affluent parts of 
the country, only 24% thought the economy would be better while as many as 54% felt it would be 
worse.  
So it looks as though people’s views of the economic consequences of independence depended on the 
perspective from which they were looking. For those living in less well-off circumstances and for younger 
people, the economic prospects under independence looked brighter than they did for those who were 
better off and were older. For all the complex debate about currency union, the prospects for North Sea 
Oil, and the future of labour market productivity, the debate about the economics of independence was 
in truth in part at least an argument about whose interests might or might not be best served by 
changing the country’s constitutional status - and thus was an argument that reflected some of the social 
divisions in Scottish society. 
University of Strathclyde | Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary: 38(2)  Policy section  
November 2014 152 
That, of course, still leaves us with one other pattern to consider – the gender gap. For as our Table 
shows, it appears that the gender gap also reflected different perceptions of the economics of 
independence. However, it is less obvious why women’s current economic circumstances should lead 
them to come a different perspective (or at least a less favourable one) on independence than did men.  
Perhaps here a different psychology came into play – certainly women were more inclined to say that 
the consequences of independence were all rather uncertain (Ormston, 2014). Or maybe women just 
proved to be a lot more hard-headed than men? 
Despite the best efforts of professional economists to lay out what the implications of a Yes or No vote 
might be, in practice voters were faced in the referendum with a choice between two uncertain futures. 
Nobody could be entirely sure what the economic consequences of independence or remaining in the 
Union might be. Against that backdrop we should not be surprised that people’s evaluations of those 
consequences were influenced by their current circumstances and psychology, and that as a result who 
voted which way reflected some of the social divisions in Scottish society. After all, those were a present 
reality, not part of an unknown future. 
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The fate of the UK’s single market - the issue that 
the referendum campaigns failed to address and 
how it shaped the outcome 
 
  Alf Young  
 
The referendum produced a blizzard of claim and counter-claim about the consequences for the Scottish 
economy of a Yes or a No vote. However one defining economic issue, it seems to me, was overlooked 
throughout on all sides. Hardly anyone chose to explore, in any depth, the fate of the United Kingdom’s 
single market in goods and services, labour and capital, if the political union that brought it into being 
came to an end, by popular assent. 
Yes Scotland was at pains throughout to insist that, were there to be an in-out referendum in 2017 on 
UK membership of the European Union, the only way to preserve Scotland’s place in Europe’s single 
market would be to embrace independence. That implies being part of a wider, open market is vital to 
national economic success. So why did Yes have so little to say about the fate, were its campaign to 
succeed, of the much older common market Scotland currently enjoys, by being a member of the UK? 
The No side had plenty to say about a related economic feature of the existing union. Its shared 
currency. No hammered away at why an independent Scotland could not expect to go on using the 
pound, as part of a formal monetary union, if it chose to leave. One of the main campaigning thrusts of 
Better Together was to accuse the other side of having no Plan B. What currency an independent 
Scotland might then use.  
But where was Better Together’s analysis of what a constitutional parting-of-the-ways might mean for 
one of the most potent symbols of that togetherness - the single market we all call, in its political guise, 
the UK? That common market is an order of magnitude older than its European counterpart. It has been 
three centuries in the making and is markedly more seamless in internal trading terms, labour mobility, 
investment flows and regulatory oversight than the European Economic Community, first created by its 
six core members under the Treaty of Rome in 1957, first embraced by the UK in 1973. 
It has been an integral part of our shared heritage across these islands since the political union of 1707. 
The UK single market has helped make us all who we are. It has shaped our industries and many of our 
careers; informed and entertained us; built and furnished our homes; shaped our urban landscape as it 
clothed and fed us. It has enabled us to save and borrow and put something aside for our old age. In 
short, for good or ill, that UK single market has touched almost every aspect of our lives. 
Strange then that its future received such scant attention in such a protracted campaign. A passing 
reference to the benefits of “a borderless UK” featured in the first of the nineteen papers published by 
the UK government in defence of the existing union. For its part the Scottish government promised the 
“social union” with the rest of the UK would survive us becoming independent again. We would all stay 
friends. 
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That left a nagging question. The social union Yes wanted to perpetuate has been mediated, for so long, 
in so many ways, by the UK’s diverse and sophisticated single market. So how could that social union 
be preserved without retaining the UK single market too? A social union also implies freedom of 
association, across national borders. It was asserted that an independent Scotland, seeking EU 
membership in its own right, would not be required to join the Schengen Area. 
Schengen, which Norway and Iceland participate in, requires free movement of people, without border 
checks, across national boundaries across most of the EU. The UK and Ireland are the only two member 
states currently enjoying a Schengen opt-out. Yes claimed an independent Scotland would also secure 
that opt-out, thus avoiding border controls with the rest of these islands. No insisted that an independent 
Scotland, to gain accession to the EU, would have to join Schengen. Since No prevailed neither claim 
will now be tested. So we simply do not know whether that free movement of people, such a vital 
ingredient in a social union and an essential pillar of the existing UK single market, would have survived 
independence. 
We did see, late on in the campaign, a number of UK-wide businesses go public about the 
consequences for them of a Yes vote. Some financial services groups, headquartered in Scotland but 
with the vast majority of their customers south of the border, signalled an intention to move their 
registered offices south. Some major retailers warned of the prospect of differential pricing of goods if 
the existing UK single market was broken up by Scottish independence. 
Such interventions were dismissed by Yes as further scaremongering, an extension of Project Fear. 
There was talk of boycotting companies, like Standard Life and the John Lewis Partnership, that dared 
speak out. However there was virtually no debate about the reality of border effects, however lightly 
policed, on free trade across them, especially when the status of these borders undergoes constitutional 
change.  
The fate of the UK single market wasn’t just neglected by both sides in the referendum campaign, it was 
posted missing elsewhere too. When the leading Scottish historian Professor Sir Tom Devine came out 
as a Yes voter a month before the poll, he provided his own analysis of why the 1707 union, “a marriage 
of convenience”, born of “pragmatism” on both sides, had become so destabilised it was no longer fit for 
purpose. 
“From the 1750s down to the 1980s there was stability in the relationship,” he wrote. “Now, though, all 
the primary foundations of that stability have gone, or have been massively diluted.” The British Empire, 
in which Scots had played such a significant role, was gone. The two great wars of the 20th century and 
the collapse of the old Soviet empire had left no “obvious other” to test our collective security. “Dinosaur 
heavy industries” hadn’t survived the Thatcher era. Even the “new glue” of the post-war welfare state 
and the creation of the NHS was not enough to save a political union past its sell-by date. 
Professor Devine cites “a silent transformation of the Scottish economy” as one of the 21st century 
realities propelling him on his journey to Yes. “We now have an economy that can sustain itself in a 
resilient way in world markets,” he contends. “The English and imperial markets were once a great 
seduction for Scotland, but now Europe is of great importance.”   
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Are we really being asked to believe that that economic transformation in Scotland in the past three 
decades - one that has turned Scotland into the most prosperous per-capita part of the UK outside 
London and the south-east of England - came about despite the core significance of that UK single 
market, not, in large measure, because of it? 
With 70% of Scottish exports still going to the rest of the UK and non-oil exports to the continuing UK 
accounting for nearly one-third of total Scottish GDP, how can Professor Devine dismiss English 
markets as an old seduction, now supplanted by the lure of Europe? He must know the UK is currently 
registering strong GDP growth, while eurozone economies are stalling and are stalked by the spectre of 
deflation. 
Nowhere in his analysis, does the long-term economic significance of the UK single market, or its fate 
were Scotland to become independent, feature. It’s a big omission. Notably the three and a bit decades 
since 1980, in which Professor Devine claims to have detected that “silent transformation” in Scotland’s 
economic prospects, is precisely the period over which Scotland’s two oldest banks set strategies for 
themselves that led not to resilient independence, but near-death experiences. 
Up until the mid 1980s Bank of Scotland (BoS) and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), like banks south of 
the border, were reluctant to embrace the competitive opportunities offered by the UK single market. 
They adhered to a commercial non-aggression pact with their English counterparts, buttressed by the 
fact that Barclays owned 35.4% of BoS while Lloyds owned 16.4% of RBS. 
Barclays had acquired its stake in BoS in 1971, through a deal to allow its wholly-owned subsidiary, 
British Linen Bank, to merge with Scotland’s oldest bank. British Linen became the Bank’s merchant 
banking arm, while Barclays retained its dominant minority shareholding in BoS until 1985. That entire 
holding was then sold on to Europe’s largest mutual life assurance business (and the Bank’s close 
Edinburgh neighbour), Standard Life. In 1996 Standard Life decided such a large stake in one bank 
unbalanced its equity portfolio. In a tense, politically-charged episode it sold its BoS shares to a range of 
institutional investors. 
Lloyds built up its stake in RBS in the late 1970s with a view to launching a full takeover bid for its 
Edinburgh rival. But it was beaten to the punch by RBS agreeing a merger with another London-based 
bank, Standard Chartered, only to find itself on the receiving end of a rival hostile offer from the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). When both these deals were thrown out by the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, any prospect of Lloyds winning control of RBS evaporated too. 
By the end of the 1990s both Scottish banks, having escaped the clutches of English rivals, had 
themselves turned predator. In 1999 BoS launched a hostile bid for a struggling English clearer, 
NatWest. When its Scottish rival, RBS, decided to bid for NatWest too and saw its offer prevail, BoS 
threw itself into a merger with the biggest demutualised building society, Halifax, creating a combined 
bank called HBOS. Emboldened by its NatWest conquest, RBS went on (in concert with two continental 
banks) to outbid Barclays for control of Dutch banking group ABN AMRO. 
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Eight years on, as the great financial crisis broke and cash was running out, both RBS and HBOS had to 
throw themselves on the mercy of the UK Treasury. Lloyds, which in 1979 had wanted to take control of 
RBS, was prevailed upon to swallow HBOS whole. It is still digesting that meal, shedding tens of 
thousands of jobs, scraping through the latest European bank stress tests. A shrunken RBS remains 
more than 80% owned by the UK taxpayer. Two transformations certainly. But hardly welcome ones. 
Only the resilience of the UK single market kept these banks afloat.  
While it featured only peripherally in the referendum campaign, the historic significance of the UK single 
market and doubts about its future had Yes prevailed may still have shaped voting intentions. We don’t 
yet know nearly enough about why Scots voted the way they did. We know something of how patterns 
varied by age, gender and social class. We also know that many in the cohort that voted most strongly 
No, older voters, made up their minds many months before the actual vote. 
That group has been accused by some on the Yes side of acting out of downright selfishness. It could 
equally be argued these were the very people who, because they had lived the longest, were the most 
frustrated by a political debate that, despite its intensity, failed miserably to address intuitively-obvious 
questions from the outset. Questions like what would happen, if Scotland became independent, to the 
UK single market that had shaped so much of their own lives.  
As the polling analyst Professor John Curtice puts it “In practice voters were faced with a choice 
between two uncertain futures. Nobody could be entirely sure what the economic consequences of 
independence or remaining in the Union might be. Against that backdrop we should not be surprised that 
people’s evaluations of those consequences were influenced by their current circumstances and 
psychology.” 
To suggest that the fate of the UK single market may have helped determine the outcome of the Scottish 
referendum campaign is not to argue that free trading blocs like it or the more embryonic European 
single market are invested with any more historical permanence than political unions are. There are too 
many other formidable forces at work in these first decades of the 21st century. 
Globalisation of production. Rising income inequality. Tensions between growth agendas and those that 
prioritise wellbeing. The mismatch between the fiscal demands of nation states and tax avoidance 
strategies of global corporations. The pressures the growing digital economy, with online distribution of 
goods and services, is placing on traditional territorial models of matching supply and demand, even 
those that have embraced free trade and single markets. To name but five. If Scotland is destined to 
revisit its national question, I would hope the then state of its market relationship with the rest of these 
islands gets greater scrutiny than it did this time. But by then there will doubtless be many other great 
issues fighting for consideration. 
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